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ABSTRACT

This study examines right-wing, nationalist-conservative discourses on Twitter.
Specifically, this study explores the features of right-wing discourses and counter-discourses in
the context of the European migrant crisis in 2015 and the terrorist attack in Berlin, Germany, in
2016. Informed by critical discourse analysis and multimodal discourse analysis, the analysis
focuses on discursive strategies and semiotic and multimodal resources found in tweets that
either endorse or challenge anti-refugee stances during the aforementioned time frames.
Additionally, this study explores to what extent the platform-specific technological affordances
facilitate dialogic interaction between users who express right-wing opinions and users who
challenge right-wing discourses.
The findings show that right-wing discourses construct negative presentations of migrants
as well as mainstream politicians. Users employ discursive strategies to depict migrants and
refugees as a threat to German culture and society and to the national security, and blame
mainstream politicians, particularly the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to be responsible for
the perceived downfall of Germany. Users leverage the technological affordances of Twitter,
which promotes new forms of political discourse. Conversely, counter-discourses construct
positive presentations of refugees triggering empathy and compassion and encouraging others to
contribute to refugee relief efforts. At the same time, discursive strategies are used to construct
negative presentations of right-wing supporters. In fact, right-wing discourses are identified,
explained, and criticized, particularly when users interact with right-wing supporters.
vi

This study contributes to a better understanding of how right-wing discourses are
constructed and reproduced, facilitated by the affordances of digital communication, as well as
challenged and contested. With social media becoming an increasingly important source for
information gathering, the study also highlights the need to educate social media users about
platform usage and the dangers of ideological manipulation and confirmation bias in order to
prevent the naturalization of right-wing discourses through repetition, downplaying, and
misinformation.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

The Revitalization of Right-wing, Nationalist Discourses
Right-wing, nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant discourses are currently
increasing in Western societies (Jiwani & Richardson, 2011; Richardson & Colombo, 2014;
Richardson & Wodak, 2009; Wodak, 2015b). In the United States, those discourses have been
supported and fueled by the Trump administration, which has led to a rise in extreme-right
groups (Lee, 2017) and the implementation of isolationist, anti-immigrant policies. These
policies can be seen in executive orders like the so-called “Muslim ban” as well as the
administration’s decision to rescind the “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA)
policy. In Europe, the migrant crisis has contributed to putting such discourses in the focus.
Right-wing politicians such as Marine Le Pen of France or Geert Wilders of the Netherlands
have consistently employed a nationalist, anti-immigrant rhetoric and received significant
numbers of votes during 2017 elections in their countries. In Germany, the migrant crisis has led
to the formation of a new far-right political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is
not only openly xenophobic but also deliberately employs Nazi-diction. As of January 2019, the
AfD is represented in all 16 state parliaments. In the September 2017 federal elections of the
national parliament, the Bundestag, the AfD received 12.6% of the vote. Consequently, a farright political party not only entered the Bundestag for the first time since 1961, but became the
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largest of the third parties after the two mainstream political parties, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
The increased popularity of right-wing discourses is also connected to the rise of
nationalist ideologies in Europe. In Post World War II Western Europe, there was a strong
movement by the European nations to create peace, to cooperate, and to move beyond the
interests of the mere nation-state in order to achieve a prosperous and peaceful international
community. This eventually led to the creation of the European Economic Community (ECC),
which was based on the belief that states which share trade and integrated markets are less likely
to engage in conflict. After this economic cooperation had proven successful, the Maastricht
Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992 and the ECC was renamed the European Union (EU),
while also adding additional economic as well as political and judicial dimensions. Since 1992
more countries have joined the EU committing a partial delegation of their state sovereignty to
the European Union and its institutions. This partial loss of sovereignty as well as the general
perception of an increased bureaucracy and democratic deficit on the European Union level, have
led to a recent rise in anti-EU sentiments and the desire to return to the nation-state (Wodak,
2015b). In the last few years, political parties that advocate the revitalization and sovereignty
claims of the nation-state have gained power throughout the EU. In the United Kingdom (UK),
for example, the rise of the British right-wing, nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP)
contributed to the British electorate voting to leave the EU after 44 years of membership in the
European Union (i.e., the so-called “Brexit”). While the EU was celebrating its 25th anniversary
in February 2017, the UK started to prepare its withdrawal, and populist right-wing leaders in
France, the Netherlands, or Austria were calling for a Frexit, Nexit, and Auxit respectively
(Lyons & Darroch, 2016).
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The contemporary nationalist discourse is often about securing the nation-state and its
borders from foreigners and maintaining a national identity, culture, and language. This national
identity and culture is based on the construction of an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983)
that is depicted “as an essentially bounded entity whose integrity is threatened by the presence of
residents supposedly belonging to a different ‘culture’ and not being willing to learn and adopt
‘our’ conventions and norms, or assimilate” (Wodak, 2008, p. 66). While belonging can be
defined by citizenship, heritage or ethnicity may also be considered a prerequisite in order to be
part of the imagined community. In Germany, for example, birthright citizenship did not go into
effect until 2000, and due to the long tradition of nationality based on parentage, the common
perception still prevails that one is not a “real” German unless one’s heritage is German (Wolff,
2002). Group membership may furthermore be connected to factors like language. Language
requirements for immigrants are often used as “gatekeepers.” Immigrants are required to show a
certain level of proficiency in the official language of the state. Furthermore, they may be
required to take Integration Courses and are expected to assimilate to the respective culture. Such
policies legitimate the discursive constructions of migrants as “others” because language and
language use are employed to define group membership. The Austrian mainstream conservative
political party, for instance, uses language policies to construct the concept of a “welcoming”
country by highlighting the importance of becoming proficient in the German language and of
assimilating to the culture in order to be welcomed (Wodak & Boukala, 2015b). Many countries
such as Greece, Germany, the UK, and some East European countries have similar policies and
produce and circulate similar types of discourses (Blackledge, 2005; Krzyżanowski & Wodak,
2013; Michalowski, 2011; Piller, 2001; van Oers, Kostakopoulou, & Ersbøll, 2010; Wodak &
Boukala, 2015b).
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The Role of Social Media for Right-wing, Nationalist Discourses
While right-wing, nationalist-conservative tendencies have been observed across Western
countries top-down at the level of government institutions, “grassroots” activity also plays a role
in circulating such discourses bottom-up. Digital communication tools have contributed
substantially to bottom-up activity, and right-wing, nationalist discourses have gained ground in
digital and social media. Several studies have shown how right-wing groups and political parties
leverage the opportunities that social media provide in order to disseminate their ideologies,
reach larger audiences, or connect across geopolitical and linguistic boundaries (e.g.,
Baumgarten, 2017; Daniels, 2009; Doerr, 2017). Right-wing populist politicians and political
parties, for example, benefit from social media as they allow them to communicate directly with
the people without the mainstream media functioning as a gatekeeper (Ott, 2017). The use of
social media for campaign purposes and for the unmediated dissemination of right-wing
ideologies has been observed in the U.S (Ott, 2017) as well as in European countries like
Austria, France, Switzerland, and the UK (e.g., Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri, 2015; Engesser,
Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016; Gimenez & Schwarz, 2016). According to Lohse (2016), social
media have also contributed to the rise of the far-right political party, AfD, in Germany. In
November 2016, no other political party had more Facebook followers and “likes” than the AfD.
Digital and social media have taken on an important role for many people who frequently
rely on these types of media for verbal and visual communication, as well as a source of news
and information. Social media may produce and spread societal discourses and have become
increasingly influential due to large amounts of daily users who employ social media for not only
connecting with others but also sharing information and to becoming informed about current
news. One can therefore say that social media share “many traits and functions often ascribed to
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traditional mass media, not least by framing issues and events and thus shaping people’s
perceptions of reality and of social and political issues” (Moscovici & Duveen, 2000 as cited in
Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016, p. 403). Moreover, digital and social media users are often not just
passive consumers and observers but have become content “curators,” “distributors,” and
“creators” (Tagg, 2015). When it comes to getting informed about current events, for example,
users both share news links and thus contribute to informing their network, and also consume
news shared by their network. The 2016 U.S. Presidential election demonstrated how the
dissemination of information and news on social media may lead to so-called filter bubbles (Ott,
2017). Filter bubbles are facilitated by algorithms that select and recommend web content based
on the user’s online behavior. That way, users are constantly exposed to the same perspectives
and ideologies, which may lead to the reproduction of discourses within networks. Social media
may thus also contribute to the normalization of socially unacceptable, non-mainstream
discourses as extreme-right discourses are continuously repeated in these filter bubbles
(O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy, & Cunningham, 2013).

Purpose and Significance of the Study
Racist, xenophobic, and nationalist ideologies are taboo in mainstream German
discourses due to Germany’s Nationalist Socialist past. After World War II, West Germany
made great efforts to denazify every part of society and develop a consolidated democracy, and
has continually engaged in the process of coming to terms with its past. At the same time, the
country has faced several waves of immigrants, such as ethnic Germans from the former German
territories located in Poland or Russia (Wolff, 2002), guest workers from Italy or Turkey (Höhne,
Linden, Seils, & Wiebel, 2014), or refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia in the
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1990s (Lederer, 1997) or from Syria in the last few years (Park, 2015). All of these immigration
waves resulted in increasing xenophobia and racism, however with the most current wave of
Syrians there has been a strengthening of extreme-right groups on a broad national level. In fact,
since 1961, there has not been a far-right political party represented in the federal parliament.
The rise of the extreme-right political party, AfD, and of extreme-right groups such as Pegida
(Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident; German: Patriotische Europäer
gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) can be considered a new phenomenon for Germany
and one that aligns with trends in other Western countries (Doerr, 2017; Gür-Şeker, 2015; Reetz,
2017).
Along with the waves of immigrants, the religious spectrum of Germany has changed.
Although the population in Germany is predominantly Christian and the influences of Christian
values on German society and culture cannot be denied, around five percent of the population in
Germany is Muslim (Stichs, 2016). Even though the German minister of the interior claimed in
2006 that Islam is part of Germany and Europe (Detjen, 2015), Muslims and Islam in general are
targets of right-wing, nationalist discourses that advocate a homogeneous national identity and
culture.
Given the increasing influence of digital and social media, Wodak and Meyer (2016)
have called for new studies that “explore what impact new communication networks really have
on social and political change in systematic detail” (p. 13). For this reason, this research study
examines nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses in social media with the
focus on the micro-blogging service, Twitter. With this study, I attempt to contribute a better
understanding of how right-wing discourses are constructed and reproduced, facilitated by the
affordances of digital communication, as well as challenged and contested. This study explores
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how the nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses fit into the social, cultural,
and political context of Germany and Europe, and specifically, in the context of the European
migrant crisis and the 2016 Islamic terror attack in Berlin, Germany. Furthermore, I hope to raise
awareness about these discourses. Even though Twitter is not as widely used in Germany as in
the U.S., it is gaining importance as the number of users is increasing. It is thus important to
inform and educate social media users in order for them to make educated judgments about
claims and fake news spread via Twitter and other social media. This will hopefully enable users
to be able to be better detect misleading and manipulative strategies. Therefore, I attempt to
reveal social media strategies that are employed to promote discrimination, domination, and
inequality, and to show that they can also be challenged and condemned.

Research Questions
The study is guided by the following research questions:
1. What are the features of nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses
on Twitter?
a. What discursive strategies are used?
b. What semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?
2. What are features of counter-discourses to right-wing positions?
a. What discursive strategies are used?
b. What semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?
3. To what extent do the technological and communicative affordances of Twitter lead
to a potential for dialogic interaction between the opposing discourse communities?
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I am, therefore, interested in exploring how Twitter users employ strategies to construct a
negative image of refugees and immigrants in the context of the European refugee crisis.
Specifically, I focus on self- and other-presentations as well as topics and themes to which
explicit or implicit references are made. Since Twitter facilitates the use of multiple modes and
resources for meaning-making, I believe it is vital to also examine the semiotic and multimodal
resources employed by tweeters in this context. Given the public visibility of these types of
discourses on Twitter, I am also interested in how other Twitter users, who do not share extremeright ideologies, react and respond in order to challenge and condemn the domination and
exclusion of refugees and immigrants. Lastly, I am interested in exploring if and how Twitter
affordances lead to dialogic interaction between those who express right-wing, nationalistconservative ideologies and those who challenge these discourses. Dialogic interaction in this
context is to be understood as an interaction where users reach out to other users who do not
share the same ideologies in order to try to understand and potentially accept each other’s
positions.

The Context of Twitter
Twitter is one of the most popular social networking sites and “has become the ‘real
time’ of the digital media landscape because of the precipitous speed of its propagation of
messages, information and ‘news’” (Sharma, 2013, p. 49). It has generated new forms of
interaction with specific conventions and communication practices (Squires, 2015). The three
main Twitter-specific features are #, @, and retweet. Hashtags enable searchability because they
are labels used to identify and categorize messages based on specific topics. Registered users can
create new hashtags or use existing hashtags when they send tweets, that is, messages limited to
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140 characters before November 2017 and 280 characters since then. A tweet may also include
pictures, videos, gifs, polls, emojis, or a location. Users can also address other users by including
@username in their tweets and thus directly respond to other users or engage in a conversation.
Although users are limited in characters when contributing tweets to the community, Twitter
users can make great use of these 140 characters by relying on multimodal features and semiotic
resources. The function of the @ character to enable addressivity is available in other social
media, but the hashtag was originally specific to Twitter. Tweets can also be retweeted. They are
then labeled RT. This feature is comparable to the “share” option on Facebook.
The majority of user profiles are publicly available and the default relationship between
users is non-reciprocal (Page, 2012). Unregistered users are also able to read tweets and search
the platform for hashtags, users, or news. Unlike on other SNS, on Twitter, there is no
expectation of turn-taking (Zappavigna, 2011) and, therefore, the subsequent tweet with a
particular hashtag may not be directly connected to a previous tweet but may still refer to the
same context or point to similar opinions, beliefs, or attitudes. Moreover, users often do engage
with others by responding directly to someone’s tweet or by retweeting. Sometimes this may
result in a discussion thread on a given topic.
Twitter’s character limitation promotes an informal, conversational style. Combined with
the depersonalized interaction common for the use of technology (Tait, 2016, as cited in Ott,
2017), it may “[undermine] norms that tend to enforce civility” (Ott, 2017, p. 62). According to
Ott (2017), Twitter may in fact foster impulsivity and incivility.
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Definition of Terms
In the following section, I will provide definitions of terms that are relevant for this study
since these terms may be conceptualized differently across research fields and geographical
regions. By providing my understanding of the terms, which will serve as the foundation for my
reasoning, I hope to minimize ambiguities.

Discourse and Discursive Strategies
Discourse can be understood as language in use, that is, how interlocutors use linguistic
units like sounds, words, sentences, or larger groups thereof to communicate in a specific context
(Gee, 2014). The meaning of these features can be conventionalized or created through the
interaction and identities of the interlocutors. Discourse is thus contextually situated (van Dijk,
2011b) and a tool for “‘social practice’ that is both determined by social structure and contributes
to stabilizing and changing that structure simultaneously” (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 7).
Discourse may also refer to larger systems of beliefs, values, and behaviors in which users enact
socially situated identities and which reflect social orders (Gee, 2014). For this reason, Gee
distinguishes between little-d discourse and big-D Discourse. In this project, I follow Gee’s
twofold notion of discourse as well as the notion of discourse as a social practice. I
operationalize discourse as twofold, with the micro level being concerned with linguistic and
semiotic resources and the macro level being concerned with the realization of socially and
historically significant structures and identities. For the analysis of discourse, I am interested in
the relationship between the ‘micro’ level of discourse (having to do with the way texts
are put together and used to take specific actions in specific situations), and the ‘macro’
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level of discourse (having to do with the way texts reflect and help perpetuate certain
social orders (Jones, Chik, & Hafner, 2015, p. 4)
To operationalize discursive strategies, I follow Reisigl and Wodak (2016), who define a
strategy as a “plan of practice … adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological
or linguistic goal” (p. 33).

Filter Bubble
The term “filter bubble” was coined by Pariser (2011, as cited in O’Callaghan et al.,
2013) and refers to the concept that algorithms and recommendation services select and limit the
content that is available to and thus consumed by users based on the users’ previous online
behavior. This may lead to the constant presentation of aligning perspectives and conversely the
perhaps unintentional avoidance of diverging perspectives, “potentially leading to immersion
within an ideological bubble” (O’Callaghan et al., 2013, p. 1). The term became particularly
relevant during the last US presidential election as well as the European migrant crisis as
increasingly more users started to rely on social media as a source of news and information.

Intertextuality, Interdiscursivity, and Recontextualization
The terms intertextuality and interdiscursivity refer to the connection among and between
texts and discourses. According to Bennett (2016), “texts are linked diachronically to other texts
via content, style, and genre and synchronically via reference to, and the presence of, other
discourses” (p. 7). Although these contexts are often associated with literary texts, they are
particularly relevant in digital media, where texts may include references to other texts and
content via hyperlinks (Tagg, 2015). Recontextualization refers to the transformation of texts for
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the purpose of changing the context, for example, in the case of right-wing groups, by “repeating
the same historical phrases but changing their meaning via the use of tropes, pragmatic
presuppositions, and implicatures” (Bennett, 2016, p. 9). The technological affordances of social
media like Twitter facilitate intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and recontextualization, and
previous studies have shown that Twitter users take advantage of these affordances to legitimize
their ideologies and discourses.

Multimodality
Multimodality refers to the availability of, combination of, and meaning-making through
multiple modes, that is, semiotic resources that are socially shaped and culturally contingent
(Kress, 2012). Semiotic resources in written discourse may include text, typographic expression,
image, layout, or color, and graphic representations of emotions or facial expressions (van
Leeuwen, 2015). Multimodality is particularly relevant in digital media; digital communication
often cannot rely on paralinguistic features which may serve as contextualization cues. Hence
these cues are represented differently in digital media, for example, via emoticons, emojis, letter
capitalization, and letter repetition. It is important to highlight that such non-verbal signaling
may serve a variety of functions and is highly context-dependent (Darics, 2013). Due to
Twitter’s word limit, users often rely on a variety of multimodal resources in their contributions.

Nationalist
In order to operationalize nationalist, I refer to the definition of nationalism as “a sense of
national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on
promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational
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groups” (“Nationalism,” 2017). Wodak et al. (2009) further point out that nations are “imagined
communities” (Anderson, 1983) and national identities are produced and reproduced
discursively. Nationalist-conservative discourse supports the concept of a nation as an existing,
bound, and homogeneous entity that is sovereign and superior to other nations. It is further
characterized by the conservation of national identity and culture, and traditional values.
Nationalist-conservative discourses tend to be employed by right-wing groups and have been
fueled the European migrant crisis.

Right-Wing
Although the term “right wing” has different connotations in different geographical
regions, it is usually associated with a conservative, political ideology. Right-wing political
parties and groups advocate the “return to a traditional way of life, with established morals and
(usually Christian) values; … [and] ‘law and order’ ideologies, thus a strong state and
authoritative leader” (Wodak, 2015b, p. 52). Furthermore, right-wing discourses may draw on
national identity and belonging, on the one hand, and openly fascist and Nazi ideologies, on the
other hand. Hence, it may be conceptualized as a continuum from moderate to far-right positions.
Nonetheless, the common denominator is the preservation of the national identity and culture,
which “suggests contrasting ‘our community’ with dangerous ‘others’” (p. 52). In recent years,
especially extreme-right ideologies seemed to have (re-)surfaced across Western societies and
have been fueled by the migrant crisis and terror attacks across Europe.
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Social Representations
Social representations are “set[s] of beliefs, images, metaphors and symbols collectively
shared in a group, community, society or culture” (Wagner, 1994, p. 199), and “serve to classify
circumstances, phenomena and individuals with whom we deal, theories which permit us to
establish facts about them” (Jodelet, 1991, as cited in Howarth, 2006, p. 4) such that they may
contribute to the maintenance of social inclusion and exclusion across communities (Howarth,
2006). For the context of this study, social representations of the perceived and constructed other
are particularly relevant. Othering serves to establish and reinforce relations of inclusion and
exclusion.

Topoi
Topoi are “content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument or
arguments with the conclusion, the claim” (Wodak, 2008, p. 6). Topoi are argumentative devices
that are used to justify discrimination, inequality, and exclusion. Examples of topoi in the context
of right-wing discourses about immigration are danger and threat, burdening, or culture. The
term is used in the discourse-historical approach to CDA.

Xenophobia and the Other
Xenophobia is the fear of the foreign and other. According to Wodak (2014), racism and
xenophobia are linked to “the construction of ‘differences’ on many levels, which serve
ideological, political and/or practical discrimination at all levels of society” (p. 402-303). These
differences rely on the discursive construction of in-group and out-group. Xenophobic rhetoric
may be used along with or as part of a nationalist-conservative discourse to distinguish between

14

in-group and out-group and to legitimize the exclusion of the constructed other. The out-group,
or the other, is depicted as homogeneous and associated with negative attributes and
characteristics, which also serves to blame the other as responsible for real and imagined issues
and problems. The negative presentation of the other is further used to justify and legitimize
exclusion and inequality. According to Wodak, the rhetoric of exclusion focuses “on the
discursive construction of in-groups and out-groups which relates to strategies of positive selfand negative other-presentation; on strategies of justification and legitimation of exclusionary
practices through argumentative devices; and finally on the denial of racism which frequently
accompanies and introduces discriminatory rhetoric” (2008, p. 57, emphasis in original). In
recent years, the expression of xenophobia seems to have increased in Western societies (Wodak,
2015b), and it is an element of right-wing, nationalist-conservative discourses.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW

The first section of this literature review offers an overview of right-wing, nationalist
tendencies in political and mass media discourses thus focusing on the elites who are
traditionally associated with the (re)production of discourses. In order to account for the
increasing influence of digital and social media as news sources and thus on the (re)production
of ideologies, the subsequent section includes a review of the literature on right-wing, nationalist
discourses and counter-discourses in digital media such as commentaries to online newspapers,
discussion forums, and participatory websites as well as social media like Facebook and Twitter.
The last section presents a discussion of the perceived gaps.

Right-wing, Nationalist Discourse in Elite Discourses
Right-wing, nationalist, anti-immigrant discourses produced by the elites can be found in
diverse media outlets ranging from mass media texts such as newspapers to the various forms of
political discourse, including but not limited to legislation, policy documents, or political party
leaflets. These texts are produced by the elites and the analysis of such texts is concerned with
“opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and
control as manifested in language” (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 10).
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Political Discourse
Political discourse can be defined as the discourse created by politicians and may focus
on the spoken and written texts created by politicians, but according to van Dijk (1997, 2002), as
politics is located in the public sphere, the conceptualization of political discourse should include
the discourse of “all participants in the political process” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 13, emphasis in
original) and thus include not only what is produced by politicians and political actors but also
by everyday citizens. In fact, van Dijk (1997, 2002) points out that political discourse should be
conceptualized “contextually, viz., in terms of special events or practices of which the aims,
goals or functions are maybe not exclusively but at least primarily political” (van Dijk, 1997, p.
15), since political discourse is known to play a significant role in the development of popular
opinion on national identity (van Dijk, 1993, 2002).
Most research studies, however, focus on the analysis of texts that are produced by
political actors. Richardson and Wodak (2009), for example, analyzed political leaflets and
slogans about employment in the UK and Austria and showed how, by using anti-immigrant and
anti-foreigner discourse, mainstream political parties legitimized xenophobic phrases and
enabled far-right groups to reappropriate such discourses. The authors used the discoursehistorical approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) because “it integrates and triangulates
knowledge about historical, intertextual sources and the background of the social and political
fields within which discursive events are embedded” (Wodak, 2012, p. 529). The focus of such
analysis is on intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, extralinguistic social variables, the
history of texts and organizations, and institutional frames of the specific context or situation.
Using this approach, the authors illustrated that the recontextualization of slogans like “jobs for
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Brits” or “Austria first” into contemporary rhetoric still draws on historical connotations based
on fascist ideology.
Richardson and Colombo (2014) also analyzed political leaflets of far- and extreme-right
political parties in Europe and showed how these parties used fear concerning national identity,
culture, and security to construct an imminent threat of Muslims. The multimodal analysis of
leaflets found across Europe showed how inter-ethnic conflict was constructed discursively and
visually by referring to two recurring images: the first image showed a woman wearing a niqab
and seven minarets which were placed on the national flag of the respective countries depicting
the invasion of Muslims, and the second image portrayed a black sheep being kicked by a white
sheep depicting the exclusion and scapegoating of the other. The Internet allowed these political
parties to share their leaflets with a wider audience and to make use of intertextual and
interdiscursive relationships by addressing the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts,
such as anti-immigrant ideologies, in which these discursive strategies were embedded.
According to Doerr (2017), the use of the same images enabled right-wing groups to
unite and join forces. Doerr combined the discourse-historical approach to CDA with multimodal
analysis in her analysis of cartoon images used in electoral posters by right-wing political parties.
In order to find out “how far-right political groups use[d] the aesthetic and visual dimension of
transnational network publics for their political activism” (p. 7), she analyzed the visual image
and the written text of the black sheep poster (cf. Richardson & Colombo, 2014) which was used
and recontextualized by far-right political groups. Based on the original that was created by the
far-right political party in Switzerland, she collected (via Google searches) translated versions
that were used in Germany and Italy, and illustrated how these images were used to construct a
shared ethno-nationalist identity across multilingual and transnational social networks:
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Although each of these parties appeals to a specific national context, they all share the
systematic strategy of visual or symbolic media provocation that speaks to multiple
audiences. The use of visual images to reinforce anti-immigrant discourse serves as a
means for right-wing groups to bond with their constituents, while eliding actual social
and cultural differences within differentiated national audiences. (Doerr, 2017, p. 4)
Mainstream media tend to be reluctant to report on extreme-right groups and political
parties to not give them the platform to disseminate their ideology. For this reason, right-wing
groups use “transnational social networks” for political activism. However, Doerr also pointed
out that the analysis of the anonymous public space “cannot reveal the true identity and
relationships between these groups” (p. 10).
Lastly, Atton (2006) analyzed the far-right discourse of the British National Party’s
website using a Foucaultian perspective and found that power, culture, and oppression were
reappropriated to represent themselves, that is, their perceived in-group, as oppressed by the
other, that is, foreigners and immigrant sympathizers.

The Discourse in Mass Media
Right-wing, nationalist, and anti-immigrant discourse is not only found in political
discourse but is also evident in mass media. Wodak and Boukala (2015b) examined how the
depiction of immigrants by the press in Austria and Greece contributed to the construction of
national identities. Some mass media not only depicted immigrants and refugees as out-group
members but also contributed to the development of negative connotations with refugees such as
“criminality, danger, and burden” (p. 257). Similar trends of negative representations of refugees
and asylum seekers in the press were also documented in the United Kingdom (Baker et al.,

19

2008; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008). Using a CDA approach in combination with corpus
linguistics (CL), the researchers investigated how refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, and
migrants (RASIM) were linguistically defined and constructed in British news articles. They
further explored the topics that were discussed and the attitudes that emerged in relation to
RASIM. The 140-million-word corpus covering ten years of several national and regional British
newspapers provided a map of lexical patterns that were then further analyzed using CDA to
discover topics and legitimation strategies related to RASIM. Baker (2012) also used CL and
CDA to analyze the British press but focused on the representation of Islam and Muslims.
Kuusisto and Östman (1997) analyzed how anti-foreigner discourse was constructed in
Finnish newspapers. The authors found that the media, as a mediator between political officials
and laypersons, helped shape a negative public opinion about refugees and migrants and
construct a Finnish culture and identity in response to voters’ fears of negative influences of
foreigners on Finland. Wiggen (2012) researched anti-immigration rhetoric in Norway and
showed how both media and politicians contributed to the spread and normalization of
xenophobia, particularly against Muslims who were blamed for domestic issues. Religion may
thus also be used to distinguish between those who belong and those who do not and are
considered as harm to the in-group. This kind of “othering” based on religion has intensified and
manifested itself as increasing xenophobia and Islamophobia due to the European migrant crisis
(Doerr, 2017; Ekman, 2015; Gür-Şeker, 2015). Terror attacks associated with the Islamic State
(also know as ISIS) in Paris (November 2015), Brussels (March 2016), Nice (July 2016), and
Berlin (December 2016) have also contributed to the othering. It is important to point out that
Christianity is the largest religion in Europe and many refugees come from Muslim-majority
countries (Park, 2015).
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Although Europe is currently in the spotlight for the ongoing migrant crisis, antiimmigrant and anti-refugee discourse can also be found in mass media outside of Europe, for
example in Australia (Lueck, Due, & Augoustinos, 2015) and the United States (Stewart, Pitts, &
Osborne, 2011). Both Australia and the United States are affluent societies where people from
underprivileged and conflict-laden neighboring countries seek refuge. Both nations have a long
history of immigration, yet, studies have shown that immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers
are often portrayed negatively by mass media, which may lead to negative opinions about and
rejection of migrants by parts of the population.
The overview of research literature focusing on right-wing, nationalist, anti-immigrant,
and xenophobic discourses found in mass media texts and political discourse showed similar
trends as regards the discursive construction of the other through xenophobic, nationalist, and
even extreme-right discourses. Such discourses are found in diverse media outlets and have been
investigated by researchers from various disciplines. The studies reviewed above illustrate how
topics and discursive strategies used in elite texts are employed to discursively construct a
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation and thus facilitate the legitimation of
the exclusion of the constructed others.

Right-wing, Nationalist Discourses in Digital and Social Media
The discourse of the elites such as mass media or political actors certainly contributes to
building the public opinion, and a critical analysis of texts produced by these actors can uncover
hidden inherent belief systems. But although mass media and political discourses are important
and have received well-deserved scholarly attention, increasingly more research has focused on
digital and social media discourses. As Androutsopoulos (2013) points out, “digital media
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evolved from socially exclusive to almost ubiquitous in the Western world” (p. 492).
Furthermore, “a large proportion of day-to-day verbal and visual communication has migrated to
various participatory web platforms” (KhosraviNik & Unger, 2016, p. 230). It is, therefore,
crucial to also investigate these new media to understand how nationalist, right-wing,
xenophobic, anti-immigrant discourses present themselves in online platforms, because
researchers “interested in describing, explaining, and criticizing the ways dominant discourses
influence socially shared knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies, … must naturally continuously
follow the source of these discourses as they shift in society.” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016, p.
403).
Although the widespread access to digital and social media may lead to the assumption
that users have the opportunity to participate freely and equally, internet researchers have
observed that this idealized view might not necessarily hold true (Tagg, 2015). For instance,
Herring, Johnson, and DiBenedetto (1995) observed early on that offline behavior may transcend
into online behavior. In their study of aggressive behavior on academic online forums, the
authors showed that the “mutedness [of women] … is actively constructed and enforced through
everyday discursive interaction” (p. 92), and therefore old power hierarchies were reproduced.
Many contributions to online platforms such as comments to online newspapers or on
discussion boards are posted anonymously and Harlow (2015) suggested that “allowing readers
to post anonymous comments seem[ed] to be encouraging racist diatribes” (p. 38). Tagg (2015)
also pointed out that online “anonymity worries many people, who see it as facilitating a range of
dangerous activities from terrorism to paedophilia” (Tagg, 2015, p. 60). However, social media
have reduced online opportunities for anonymous participation because users’ online identities
can often be linked to their offline identities. Facebook, for instance, is often primarily based on
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one’s offline network of friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. Twitter, on the other hand, does
allow for more opportunities to stay “anonymous” or to use and perform a different identity,
because the default relationship between tweeters is non-reciprocal (Page, 2012) and followers
are not always connected in the offline world. Unless a Twitter profile is verified and thus
associated with a real person, one has to rely on other factors to identify a user; usernames,
profile descriptions, profile pictures, and the content in tweets may give clues about the real or
performed identity of a user. However, due to the increasing occurrence of bots and fake profiles,
it is becoming more difficult to recognize the author and the intention of a message. This
consequently also means that any radical group or movement can take advantage of the
technological affordances of digital media to disseminate their ideas and opinions with neither
being held accountable nor with having to personally face negative repercussions for propagating
extreme discourses. The repeated unmediated and uncritical dissemination of non-mainstream
discourses in digital and social media may then also lead to the normalization of these
discourses.
Although digital communication may enable wider participation and facilitate community
building (Tagg, 2015), researchers have pointed out that online communication may reproduce
old hierarchies, and the emergence of filter bubbles and echo chambers may contribute to the
uncritical dissemination of extreme opinions, including xenophobia and racism.

Commentaries to Online Newspapers
The Internet has become an integral part of every-day interactions and many people rely
on digital media to get informed (Klein, 2012). Consequently, many newspapers have developed
online versions and social media are also increasingly used for news retrieval (KhosraviNik &
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Unger, 2016). Furthermore, many online newspapers provide the opportunity for user-generated
content such as comments. Although readers’ comments in the form of letters to the editor are
not a new phenomenon, not all reader responses were printed and the ones that were appeared in
the following issue creating a time lag. Online comments, on the other hand, are published faster
as registered users can directly write comments at the end of an article, consequently providing
other readers access to these comments while engaging with the article.
Alonso Belmonte, Chornet, and McCabe (2013), Gomes (2014), and Harlow (2015)
investigated user comments to online newspaper articles. All three studies discovered that
xenophobic comments were common and widespread in their respective online contexts (online
newspaper articles in Spain, Singapore, USA).
In an exploratory case study of 497 commentaries to an article in the online version of the
Spanish daily newspaper, El País, Alsonso Belomte et al. (2013) drew on CDA to examine the
discursive positioning of the commenters toward immigration, race, and racism. Although overt
racism was denied in the commentaries, the authors identified the dominant ideology of
whiteness and the depiction of immigrants as a financial burden. The newspaper article under
investigation in this study was about African immigrants being refused admittance to nightclubs
near Madrid.
Adopting a different methodology, Harlow (2015) used quantitative content analysis to
examine reader comments to the front page stories of 24 U.S. American newspapers (resulting in
747 articles) in order to determine the relationship between news stories and reader comments
about race or ethnicity. The study showed that readers often made references to race and applied
negative racial or ethnic stereotypes regardless of whether or not the focus of the article was
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related to issues of race or ethnicity. Latinos and African Americans were the predominant target
of these racial comments.
Xenophobic comments to online newspapers are not an exclusively Western
phenomenon. Gomes (2014) examined online comments to two online opinion pieces about
educated migrants in Singapore. Specifically, these articles referred to “foreign talent” migrants,
that is, educated professionals, in Singapore. The analysis showed that online commenters
expressed xenophobia and disappointment at the government, and incited hatred toward foreign
migrants particularly if they were originally from Mainland China, South Asia, or the
Philippines. Moreover, the comments pointed to the construction of “true Singaporeans,”
representing those whose lineage goes back to the time when Singapore was still a British
colony. The author also argued that this increase in xenophobia resulted from the emergence of
social media platforms which “provided Singaporeans with a much needed avenue for expressing
their dissatisfaction towards the government” (p. 33).
Both the studies of Gomes (2014) and Alonso Belmonte et al. (2013) are limited in
applicability and transferability because they focus on a very specific and confined context.
Furthermore, neither of the studies was able to give information about the demographics of the
commenters (other than self-described within the posts) due to the anonymity of online
comments. Therefore, the platform-specific features may constrain the type of data a researcher
can collect.

Discussion Forums and Participatory Websites
Research on right-wing discourses was also conducted on discussion forums and
participatory websites. An example of an extreme-right participatory website is Stormfront.
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Sociologist Daniels (2009) examined how white supremacist groups entered the digital world
and transitioned into virtual communities. In her comparison of five predominant groups, she
demonstrated that Stormfront could be considered one of the most “successful” examples,
because it took advantage of participatory Web 2.0 features. Using ethnographic observations,
discourse analysis of text, graphic design, layout, and images, and analysis of Web analytics,
Daniels (2009) found
that old forms of overt white supremacy (e.g., racist hate speech) have entered the digital
era alongside new, emergent forms of white supremacy that include mass e-mail, user
names, participatory discussion boards, overtly racist online games [such as “Border
Patrol” where players are encouraged to shoot immigrants], and covertly racist websites
with obfuscated propaganda addressing the meaning of civil rights. (p. 23)
Her analysis of user identities is also insightful. Users make intertextual and
interdiscursive references in their user names and enact translocal whiteness. The discursive
construction of user identities is also analyzed by McLaughlin (2014) in the context of a
Senegalese web portal (“Seneweb”) and by Vásquez (2014) in the context of online consumer
reviews. Offline and online identities are socially constructed and fluid, but while offline
identities are “generally more constrained by their physical appearance and other material
circumstances” (Vásquez, 2014, p. 53), users can mold their identity in digital spaces to some
extent. Depending on the platform and its requirements, user IDs, for example, may serve to
deliberately portray oneself or to unconsciously ‘give off’ clues. Pseudonyms thus offer the
opportunity to index a specific, contextually relevant identity (Vásquez, 2014). In Mc Laughlin’s
(2014) study of “Seneweb,” for instance, many user names include references to places or
cultural items and markers of authenticity or ethnicity. According to the author, “the majority of
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the names used on Seneweb commentaries index Senegalese locality … thereby contributing to
the construction of an interactive, virtual Senegal” (p. 31).
The far-right movement, Stormfront, was also examined by Caren, Jowers, and Gaby
(2012). The authors analyzed close to seven million posts from the online community of white
nationalists collected between 2001 and 2010 to draw similarities and differences between
offline and online social movement communities. The findings of this study showed that a major
goal of the social movement online community (SMOC) of white nationalists was “building and
sustaining a network of like-minded individuals through such processes as the establishment and
maintenance of a collective identity” (p. 165). The authors could identify similarities to offline
social movement communities such as the participatory nature, the construction of a collective
identity, and the creation of a “free space” for “marginalized” viewpoints, as well as distinct
features of SMOCs such as rapid expansion, geographic diversity, and anonymity. The study
demonstrated, similarly to Daniels (2009), how right extremists employ technological
affordances in order to reach a wider, global audience. Although the analysis was concerned with
the characteristics of SMOCs rather than linguistic features, the article is useful because the data
“[make] up 92% of the activity on Stormfront during this period” (p. 174) and therefore gives a
comprehensive overview of the platform. The authors further illustrated how right extremists
used digital technologies to expand their reach, and connect across geopolitical boundaries.
In her exploratory study of discussion posts related to the topic “Europe,” Baumgarten
(2017) also analyzed the extreme-right website, Stormfront, but focused on how users
constructed others as out-groups. The author found that othering not only targeted individuals but
also “potentially diverse entities” (p. 4) such as organizations, social institutions, geographical
entities, cultural practices and belief systems, and social processes. Applying positioning and
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appraisal analysis, the author showed that othering facilitated the construction of “a coherent
group-internal discourse world” (p. 10). Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated that English was
used as a lingua franca to discuss local contexts and build a globally connected right-wing online
community.
The research by Daniels (2009), Caren et al. (2012), and Baumgarten (2017) shows how
right extremists in the United States leverage the technological affordances of participatory
platforms. The affordances provided by digital technology are also used by ultranationalists in
Japan. Yamaguchi (2013) demonstrated through ethnographic fieldwork both offline and online
how the “net far right” used the largest anonymous message board in Japan to spread racist
propaganda and to connect the online and offline movement by the use of video streaming. The
author pointed out that the hate speech not only targeted Koreans or Chinese but also Westerners.
Yamaguchi (2013) and Gomes (2014) demonstrated in their research that right-extremism is
present across contexts and thus not an exclusively Western phenomenon. Moreover, it is
facilitated by technological affordances such as anonymity and the opportunity to connect
translocally, similarly to Western right-extremist groups.
As shown in the research of Wodak (e.g., 2008), among others, national “identities gain
their meaning and value through the relations with the other, that is through the construction of
contrasts and oppositions” (Madisson, 2016, p. 20). Right-wing movements focus on various
targets, depending on how they perceive their relation to the respective other or out-group, but in
Europe, a common target is Muslims. Ekman’s (2015) analysis of three key online platforms of
the Islamophobic online network demonstrated that right-wing populists use “the idea that the
Western world is ‘under attack,’ ‘silently occupied’ by, or even at ‘civil war’ with Islam” (p.
1986). Ekman analyzed the discursive strategies of three Islamophobic websites: US-based
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Jihad Watch, pan-European Gates of Vienna, and Swedish Avpixlat. From these websites,
Ekman collected over 10,000 blog entries related to Muslims or Islam in 2012 and randomly
selected 200 from each site in order “to exemplify and contextualize some of the key discursive
themes in relation to the larger idea of a Muslim colonization of the West” (p. 1992). The CDAinformed analysis examined the discursive strategies present in the so-called counter-jihadist
online network. He found that Islam and Muslims were represented as a threat to the Western
world. The main themes of “the politics of fear” were: the demographic threat; the silent
infiltration of Muslims in society, institutions, government; the imposition of sharia law; and the
depiction of Islam as political ideology and as inherently violent. Ekman furthermore pointed out
that “the discursive strategies of the online networks do not originate from a political and societal
vacuum, but are nourished from already established media representations of Muslims and from
mainstream political discourses” (p. 1998). According to Ekman, an increase in Islamophobia
both offline and online is leading to the normalization of anti-Islam rhetoric and a rise in antiIslam websites and online networks such as the so-called counter-jihad network.
Hirvonen (2013) also examined the counter-jihadist online network, but focused on the
representations of unaccompanied minors in the three biggest anti-immigrant webpages in
Sweden, Avpixlat, Nordic Front, National Now. In her netnography, she examined 288
comments and 60 articles and also found the construction of Europe being “under threat from
mass Islamist invasion by stealth, i.e. through immigration” (p. 83). She further illustrated that
the online space used by the counter-jihadist movement served as echo chambers and created an
environment where socially unacceptable opinions became the norm. So-called echo chambers or
filter bubbles are created by algorithms and “recommendation services [that] may limit the types
of content to which a user is exposed” (O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy, & Cunningham,
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2013, p. 1; see also Bolander & Locher, 2014; Bouvier, 2015; Hirvonen, 2013; Trilling, 2015).
Consequently, users have access to pre-determined pieces of information and thus types of
discourse selected based on the assumption that they fit the previously accessed information.
This may lead to the normalization of such discourses due to the constant repetition thereof and
the concomitant lack of exposure to counterdiscourse.
Similarly to Ekman’s (2015) study, Hirvonen (2013) found that in those platforms
unaccompanied minors were represented as criminals and parasites who came to invade and
impose sharia law in Europe. The normalization of these opinions online also influenced the
national debate on immigration making it more conservative (Hirvonen, 2013). Although she
illustrated how the websites served as echo chambers and contributed to the normalization of
Islamophobic and anti-immigrant opinions, her analysis would benefit from a closer look at
linguistic and semiotic features. This closer look at semiotic features is offered by Madisson
(2016), who explored the far-right in Estonia by analyzing blogs and discussion forums over a
period of three years from a cultural semiotics perspective. She “demonstrate[d] that the
framework of NWO (New World Order) conspiracy theory function[ed] as an important codetextual center that guide[d] the mapping of social reality of individuals navigating the
groupuscular network” (p. 32). Moreover, identities were constructed based on the contrast and
opposition to the other. Her research, however, focuses on the far-right in Estonia and is, despite
similarities to the far-right movement in other regions, limited in scope. Nonetheless, Madisson’s
case study illustrated that under the veil of anonymity, users of online discussion forums and
blogs felt less inhibited to express extreme and socially unacceptable opinions, which then also
influenced offline communication and discourse in Estonia. Her study thus showed that the
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affordances of online communication contributed to the dissemination of extreme right
discourses and ideologies both online and offline.
The influential Scandinavian discussion forum, Flashback, served as research site for the
studies of Törnberg and Törnberg (2016) and Malmqvist (2015). Malmqvist (2015) explored two
discussion threads in the forum “Integration and Immigration” on Flashback that were concerned
with Roma EU-migrants begging for money. Specifically, the author focused on the use of
humor and satire in racist discourse. Despite the assumption that the anonymity of the platform
would lead to disinhibition and thus unrestrained forms of racism, the author found that racist
discourse was rather subtle and restrained and hypothesized that users might deliberately choose
this form in order to reach a wider audience. By contextualizing the discursive target of humor,
examining the echo, and identifying racist affective-discursive articulations, the author further
illustrated how users articulated feelings of superiority.
Malmqvist’s study was based on only two discussion threads with a total of 3196 posts
and only focused on a very specific group of immigrants, however, Törnberg and Törnberg
(2016) provided a more comprehensive overview of Flashback with their analysis of over 50
million posts. By combining topic modeling and critical discourse analysis, the authors analyzed
the discursive connections between Islamophobia and anti-feminism. Törnberg and Törnberg
(2016) showed how right-wing users exploited arguments of gender equality to criticize
immigration, particularly of Muslims, and accused feminists and liberals of being hypocritical
and contradictory since they were fighting for gender equality and at the same time supporting a
group that was against gender equality. While users portrayed Islam “as a ‘threat’ against gender
equality” (p. 414), the results also showed that within the right-wing community gender
inequality was considered a minor or non-existing problem. The synergy of topic modeling and
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CDA “enable[d] the analysis to start more inductively by focusing directly on the
recontextualizations of various social practices and then exploring and identifying common
discourses, underlying ideologies and tensions, and modifications within them” (p. 408).
While most of the studies described above were concerned with extreme-right positions,
the studies of Del-Teso-Craviotto (2009) and Cleland (2014) investigated xenophobic and racist
discourses that were not necessarily linked to the far-right movement. Del-Teso-Craviotto (2009)
examined the racist and xenophobic discourses of Argentines expatriates in Spain on the internet
forum, PatriaMadre.com. The author used the CDA framework to analyze eight messages on the
topic “soy español y vivo en Madrid” (“I’m Spanish and I live in Madrid”) in the forum
“extranjería” (“Foreign Affairs”) and revealed that xeno-racist discourses of the Spanish elite
were reproduced by a Spaniard, reformulated by some Argentines toward other Latin American
groups of immigrants, and contested by other Argentines and a Romanian user. Xeno-racism
refers to racism “that is based not so much on biological or racial features, as happens in neofascist ideologies, but on economic inequalities between the rich Europeans and the poor Other”
(p. 573). It is important to note, however, that the sample size of the study was very small,
namely eight messages from six participants.
Cleland’s (2014) study covered a topic that is also very prone to racism and xenophobia
because it is based on nationality, rivalry, and the construction of the other; he examined soccer
fans’ views toward racism and xenophobia in English soccer. The analysis of two message
boards demonstrated that, despite anti-racism and anti-discrimination campaigns of sports
associations, the anonymity of social networking sites seemed to have brought back old racial
schemata. While all other studies on participatory websites or discussion forums reviewed above
collected “naturally occurring” data, that is, the researchers did not elicit users’ contributions but
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analyzed what was “out there,” Cleland’s (2014) investigation differs in that he elicited
responses. He made an initial post in two message boards and collected users’ contributions to
the unfolding conversation. He then examined the attitudes, opinions, and views of English
soccer fans in 500 posts and found that the fans’ perceptions on belonging and national identity
centered around whiteness. Multiculturalism and Islam were rejected. Even though it is not
explicitly stated, the study seemed to be informed by critical discourse analysis because the
author draws on the work of van Dijk on racist discourse. There are ethical benefits to this kind
of data collection because users are aware that research is being done with them as opposed to
the collection of publicly available data without informing the user. That said, the presence of the
researcher might result in some inhibition or potentially even exaggeration and could thus skew
the results.
To sum up, most studies on participatory websites or discussion forums have been
informed by CDA or used CDA as a theoretical framework. This makes sense because the
studies focused on investigating the (re)production of racist and xenophobic discourses.
Furthermore, none of the studies, apart from Madisson (2016), used multimodal discourse
analysis. This may be due to the (perceived) limited availability of multimodal resources in textbased contributions on participatory websites and discussion forums.

Social Networking Sites
The studies highlighted above were concerned with nationalist, right-wing, xenophobic,
and anti-immigration discourse in mass media, political discourse, and online platforms like
discussion boards or websites. Mainstream social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter,
with over 1.87 billion and 317 million monthly active users respectively, reach a much wider
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audience than any of the described websites or forums. Rightler-McDaniels and Hendrickson
(2014) point out that “social networking sites, such as Facebook, are primarily based upon the
notion of existing relationships” (p. 176). Users, therefore, do not have access to all Facebook
content but to the content that is circulated in their networks of friends, groups, and, if the
privacy settings allow, the profiles they follow. Consequently, Facebook may function as a filter
bubble, which may lead to a constant reproduction of similar types of discourse. O’Callaghan et
al. (2013) found that algorithms used on social networking sites foster the development of
homogeneous extreme-right communities and users who access far-right online sites are likely to
be directed to further far-right content. Tagg and Sergeant (2019) furthermore found that filter
bubbles are also created by users’ own behaviors and actions on the platform.
On the other hand, platforms like Facebook and Twitter have rules that are supposed to
prevent hate speech and discrimination. However, in a study of the Facebook pages of seven
extreme-right political parties in Spain, Ben-David and Matamoros Fernández (2016) found that,
despite platform rules, hate speech and discrimination were widespread. In fact, those groups
took advantage of multimodal resources: they used images and encoded insults to propagate antiimmigration ideas, and they were internationally connected. Ben-David and Matamoros
Fernández (2016) used multimodal content analysis and network analyses in their comparative
and longitudinal study. Using textual analysis, the authors compared overt hate speech and
covert discriminatory patterns found on the pages of the extreme-right political parties and
compared it to the page of the governing party. The image and link analysis yielded negative
targeting of the constructed other, predominantly Muslims. The results of the network analysis
indicated that extreme-right groups are nationally and internationally well connected. Although
the study only investigates political parties in Spain, it does so in a comparative and longitudinal
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way, which reveals patterns of the extreme-right movement in Spain. Furthermore, the study
illustrates the necessity to analyze how extreme-right groups employ multimodal resources
because they may point to covert discrimination patterns.
Gür-Şeker (2015) examined the Facebook page of the German far-right, anti-Islam
movement, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident; German:
Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes). The author created a corpus of
over 280,000 comments (pro and con) posted between October 2014 and October 2015 on
Pegida’s Facebook page. Furthermore, the author collected online newspaper articles on Pegida
and one YouTube video of a Pegida event. The author not only identified the movement as a
populist right-wing movement opposing immigration, ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as the
establishment, but also illustrated how the slogan “We are the people” (“Wir sind das Volk”),
which was used in the peaceful political protests against the regime of the German Democratic
Republic (“Monday demonstrations” between 1989 and 1991), was reappropriated to construct
the need to reclaim a German identity while excluding Muslims represented as invaders of
German culture. By recontextualizing the slogan of the Monday demonstrations, Pegida
portrayed itself as a resistance movement fighting against the establishment. The study only
covers a small part of the right-wing community in Germany but is an important contribution
given that Pegida is a new far-right movement that has gained national attention in Germany and
produced offshoots in Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. Both studies, BenDavid and Matamoros Fernández (2016) and Gür-Şeker (2015), demonstrated how right-wing
groups used the communicative affordances of digital communication for disseminating their
ideology and how they constructed a national identity and discriminated against the other.
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As pointed out above, Facebook is a very large social networking site connecting 1.87
billion people, but many interactions are not publicly available (Tagg, 2015). Twitter, on the
other hand, “resides more as a public space that a user manages according to interests or
relationships” (Rightler-McDaniels & Hendrickson, 2014, p. 176). Furthermore, the microblogging platform is frequently used by many politicians and celebrities, the most prevalent
example being President Trump, who has used Twitter not only to connect with followers but
also to conduct politics (Kreis, 2017b). The micro-blogging platform can thus be considered “a
channel for discursive power and has an equivalent function in producing and spreading societal
discourses just as any traditional newspaper” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016, p. 409). For this
reason, several research studies have addressed nationalist, right-wing, xenophobic, or antiimmigrant discourses on Twitter; however, these studies vary in terms of data collection.
Cisneros and Nakayama (2015) based their exploratory case study on an event, the
victory of the first Indian American Miss America, which was the subject of controversial
discussion on social media. The authors collected 100 tweets that were found on web or news
stories on reactions to the 2014 Miss America and selected 24 representative tweets for analysis.
The reactions to her pageant victory included doubts regarding her U.S. American identity and
claims that she was Arab and connected to Al-Qaeda, thus representing a terror threat. A white
finalist from Kansas, on the other hand, was seen more favorably. Informed by critical race
theory, the authors illustrated how “‘old’ racism [which] rests on imputing difference, exclusion,
and domination based on biological and cultural essentialism” (p. 111), resurfaced, on the one
hand, and how racist tweets were contested but “actually reasserted norms of whiteness and
‘post-racialism’” (p. 121), on the other hand.

36

The discourse on Twitter can also be explored through the activity of certain Twitter
accounts. O’Callaghan et al. (2014) analyzed extreme-right Twitter accounts to contribute to the
understanding of the activity of extreme-right communities on social media. The researchers
collected “Twitter data including followers, friends, tweets and list memberships” (p. 4) for
mostly non-electoral accounts from eight Western countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, UK, USA). The number of accounts from which data was retrieved ranged from
17 (Italy) to 53 (Germany). Using network analysis, the authors demonstrated that extreme-right
groups interacted nationally and internationally, while geographical and linguistic proximity
played a role in the connectedness of these networks. The case studies of German and English
language data indicated that German accounts “used social media to propagate national socialistrelated material” (p. 16), while data containing English contributions centered around the
opposition to the EU and the counter-jihadist movement, but were thematically more dispersed.
The study illustrates how extreme-right communities in Western societies benefit from and use
the communicative affordances of social media. The data show that extreme-right groups have
become increasingly active while building stable communities translocally connected across
geopolitical boundaries.
Bennett’s (2016) data are linked to both events and accounts. In order to examine the
topoi and legitimation strategies of political actors, and how they changed over time, he collected
180 tweets from five British political actors (including politicians as well as political parties)
across the ideological spectrum during three timeframes related to key events during the
European migrant crisis. More than half of the tweets included links to other texts (hyperlinks,
embedded photos/video, retweets). Using a multimodal, discourse-historical approach, he
illustrated the intertextual and interdiscursive nature of the discourse. While tweets of the far-
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right actor remained stable and continuously employed arguments of burden, threat, abuse, and
numbers to legitimate the exclusion and discrimination of refugees, the discourse as well as
implemented policies of the mainstream actors shifted depending on the mediatized events. The
findings further showed how existing discourses were recontextualized by right-wing actors to
benefit their xenophobic, anti-immigration discourse, that is, “right-wing political parties are …
repeating the same historical phrases but changing their meaning via the use of tropes, pragmatic
presuppositions, and implicatures” (p. 9). Although the study is concerned with xenophobic, antiimmigrant discourse in the UK, the results and implications are also important for other
European countries given the international reach of the migrant crisis.
The majority of the studies dealing with xenophobic discourse on Twitter collected
tweets with specific hashtags. Awan (2014) randomly collected 500 tweets from 100 mostly
British Twitter users based on three hashtags (#Woolwich, #Muslim, #Islam) between January
2013 and April 2014 to examine how Muslims were described, stereotyped, and abused. The
time frame for the data collection was chosen to compare tweets before and after the so-called
Woolwich attack. Using content analysis, the author illustrated “the emerging rise of online antiMuslim hate, prejudice, discrimination, and threats” (p. 147) fueled by a particular grievance,
perceived self-confidence and power, anonymity, or the creation of alliances. The analysis
showed that users targeted and abused Muslims, while claiming their freedom of speech. The
author pointed out that this online abuse could become naturalized and thus called for more
attention and examination of online Islamophobia.
Although Twitter only allows 140 characters per tweet, users can add emojis, photos,
videos, gifs, polls, or their location, thus using more than one mode of communication to convey
meaning. Furthermore, in digital communication, “users [cannot] rely … on prosodic features
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and physical clues when expressing themselves, but on visual graphic resources (such as
emoticons or emojis, punctuation and font) and on spelling” (Tagg, 2015, p. 136). Multimodal
resources are therefore a key feature of Twitter, albeit not unique to Twitter. Some studies
described above about mass media and other digital media also analyzed how multimodal
resources were employed to contribute to the meaning-making. Addressing these multimodal
resources, Rettberg and Gajjala (2016) examined images and text shared in tweets with the
hashtag #refugeesnotwelcome to understand how male Syrian refugees were portrayed on
Twitter in the context of the European migrant crisis. Based on the claim that the majority of the
refugees were male, which was continuously repeated through images depicting only men, the
users portrayed refugees either as dangerous criminals or as cowards who would selfishly leave
their women and children behind. However, the commentary did not explicitly identify data
collection or theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the analysis of images and text illustrated how
Syrian refugees were portrayed as dangerous criminals or cowards.
General Islamophobia was also discovered by Rasmussen (2015), who used Discursive
Psychology to examine Twitter users’ attitudes toward Muslims after a terror threat in Norway in
2014. He analyzed 211 tweets with the hashtag #terrorthreat for prominent themes, which
seemed to align with themes revealed in other studies such as threat, burden, and criminality.
Although the majority of the collected tweets were related to the users’ attitudes toward
securitization actors’ communication and the responsibility of the public, some tweets also took
the attitude of blaming Muslims and thus pointed to Islamophobia.
While most studies on right-wing discourses on Twitter focused on the European context
(cf. O’Callaghan et al., 2014; Bennett, 2016; Awan, 2014; Rettberg & Gajjala, 2016; Rasmussen,
2015), Rightler-McDaniels and Hendrickson (2014) and Graham (2016) focused on racist and
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xenophobic discourses in the U.S. context. Rightler-McDaniels and Hendrickson (2014) studied
the construction of gender and race in trending topics in southeastern regions of the U.S. and
found that the discourse regarding race was highly stereotypical:
All dialogue dealing with race was from a Black or White perspective – no other race was
presented – supporting the premise that there is a clear Black/White binary. Race,
although a secondary social construct to gender in this study, was especially prevalent in
the popular culture theme. White males (i.e., Maury Povich) were discussed according to
their intellectual abilities and wealth, while Black males (i.e., Kobe Bryant, Shaquille
O’Neal, and Tiger Woods) were discussed according to their athletic abilities and their
philandering ways. (p. 186)
The authors collected 19,583 tweets containing the hashtag #becauseofhoes posted in
southeastern regions of the U.S. and selected a random sample of 151. They further downsized
the sample to 151 tweets by eliminating retweets in order to focus on semantic fields which
“allow a critical discourse analysis of the textual element to the dialogue, and its linguistic
complexity encourages an intertextual analysis that recognizes social media within an evolving
cultural arena” (p. 181). In order to explore constructions of gender and race in the data set,
content analysis and CDA were applied and revealed that social media discourse reinforced
stereotypical representations of gender and race.
While the previous study focused on the emergence and convergence of a regionally
bound community, Graham’s (2016) case study explored how the extreme right in the U.S.
deliberately used hashtags to facilitate content-sharing across ideological boundaries in order to
reach new audiences. Graham collected 4800 tweets via purposive sampling and snowball
sampling of hashtags denoting white extremism (e.g., #whitegenocide, #antiwhite), mainstream
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conservatism (e.g., #tcot, #conservative), and mainstream progressivism (e.g., #uniteblue,
#progressive) in order to examine inter-ideological mingling. His hierarchical cluster analysis
followed by textual analysis revealed that white extremists managed to enter mainstream
political discourse by purposefully mixing hashtags that are used in both extreme-right and
mainstream communities.
The default setting for tweets is public. If this setting is not changed, tweets can be
searched for and accessed by registered Twitter users and even by unregistered visitors of the
website. The use of a hashtag can increase a tweet’s visibility because it categorizes the tweet
and the tweet appears to other users who search for the hashtag. Graham pointed out that,
although there was little cross-talk and people tended to stay in their filter bubbles, white
extremists were able to get their message out by including trending hashtags (e.g., #tcot,
#uniteblue) in their tweets in order to reach a wider audience. His research showed
that white extremists leverage the affordances of the digital environment to disseminate
their ideology. They find ways to communicate with people who do not expressly commit
to extremist ideology … despite the lack of cross-talk between users, there may be
episodes of content-sharing on the same platform, a process I call inter-ideological
mingling. (p. 27)

Reactions to Right-wing, Nationalist Discourses in Digital and Social Media
While a number of studies focus on right-wing, anti-refugee, anti-immigration,
xenophobic and racist discourses on digital and social media, there are also a handful of studies
that examine users’ reactions and responses to racist, xenophobic, and discriminatory comments,
posts, and tweets. Del-Teso-Craviotto’s (2009) small-scale research study of eight messages in a
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Spanish internet forum showed that some commenters also challenged the xeno-racist discourses
of the Spanish elite: the users with immigration background criticized a Spaniard for his lack of
differentiation, questioned his knowledge and authority, and provided explanations and examples
to remind him about Spain’s past as an emigration country.
Cisneros and Nakayama (2015) also examined user reactions to racist comments but in
the context of Twitter. The researchers analyzed in their study on racist tweets about the victory
of the first Indian American Miss America, Davuluri, also users’ reactions toward the racist
tweets. According to the researchers, “the tweets about Davuluri generated immediate backlash
by other Twitter users, who reacted strongly with efforts to publicly shame and attack the
offending tweeters. Some responses pointed out the racism in the original tweets and expressed
anger, shame, or indignation” (p. 114). Some of the condemning tweeters expressed criticism by
using irony or correcting the racist tweets, whereas others addressed the authors of the racist
tweets directly by including their @username in order to shame or even attack them; they were
called “yahoos,” “rednecks,” and “uneducated” in order to decrease their relevance and standing
within the platform and society. The news media reports about this particular “event” contributed
to marginalizing and pathologizing the authors of the racist tweets. At the same time, Miss
America was celebrated as the multicultural ideal of the U.S. It is interesting to point out that
both groups, that is, those who tweeted racist positions and those who challenged these positions,
used the same hashtag, #MissAmerica, which not only created a shared community but also
enabled an interaction between both groups and possibly led to the direct engagement with each
other.
Rasmussen (2015) also took into account Twitter users’ reactions to discriminatory
tweets in the context of a terror alert in Norway. Although many tweets reproduced negative
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prejudices against ethnic minorities, “twice as many [took] a stand against the blaming of
minorities” (p. 208) and challenged the negative portrayal and generalizations of Muslims.
The Scandinavian context is also examined in the studies of Gustafsson (2012) and Pantti
(2016). Gustafsson interviewed focus groups to analyze users’ attitudes toward online political
participation but did not analyze publicly available tweets. His study is however relevant because
he found that Swedish social media users express their political opinions by sharing facts and
making comments in order to contest and fight against racism and xenophobia. Gustafsson’s
findings are thus interesting since four of the reviewed studies on right-wing discourses are
concerned with Islamophobic websites or discussion forums visited by Swedish users. While
Gustafsson’s study is quite general and not event-specific, Pantti analyzed social media users’
reactions to a specific event: She analyzed social media users’ reactions to an anti-asylum protest
in Finland where a protestor was dressed like a member of the Ku Klux Klan while waving a
Finnish flag. Specifically, she examined users’ affective-discursive practices in tweets, messages
posted to Suomi24, a Finnish social media site, and comments on news sites. She collected 1002
Finnish tweets with #kkk, #hennala (city where the protest took place), and #rasismi (‘racism’),
625 postings in 20 discussion threads on Suomi24 related to “Hennala” and “KKK”, and 553
comments that were posted in three online news comment threads. All data were collected during
a one-month period after the incident. In her analysis, Pantti focused on the language of disgust,
contempt, and shame toward the event, disgust being the most common response. Disgust further
“worked as an expression of severe moral judgment against the violence expressed in the
comments posted on Twitter” (p. 370). Similarly to Cisneros and Nakayama’s (2015) study, the
authors of racist tweets were portrayed negatively as uneducated and ignorant. Furthermore,
users’ disgust also addressed the physical appearance of the protestors. The users assessed the
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“asylum seekers—who did not bring the suffering on themselves—[as] more deserving than the
demonstrators with their beer-bellies and destructive lifestyles” (p. 374) and thus made a moral
assessment of the protestors while appealing to Finland’s responsibility and duty of care for
asylum seekers.
Neumayer and Valtysson (2013) investigated how Twitter is used strategically to contest
power in the context of anti-fascist counter-protests in East Germany. Specifically, the authors
analyzed the tactics, practices, and strategies of 6262 tweets posted before, during, and after
three nationalist demonstrations (Neo-Nazi marches) and their counter-protests (October 16,
2010 in Leipzig; February 13 and 19, 2011 in Dresden). The counter-protests were formed by
civil society networks and anti-fascist groups. For the first protest, neo-Nazis used #RaZ10,
which is an abbreviation of the slogan of the protest, ‘Right to a Future’ (Recht auf Zukunft), and
the year 2010. The counter-protestors used #L1610, which is an abbreviation for Leipzig and
October 16 because the demonstration took place in the city of Leipzig on that day. The hashtags
used by the counter-protestors for the subsequent demonstrations were #13februar and
#19februar, denoting the dates of the protests. February 13 is also the date Dresden was bombed
in 1945. Although it is a day to commemorate the victims of World War II, it has been
instrumentalized by the extreme right for their propaganda.
The two different “communities” used particular hashtags which served as a filter to
identify the different groups and which also had a social component used to identify with the
cause, which can be described as networked publics (boyd, 2011):
The groups that form alliances on Twitter against the nationalist demonstrations are all
represented by one hashtag. Despite the diversity of groups involved in the counter
protests, the hashtag they recommend following on their mobilisation websites and blogs
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is the same. The networked publics that are composed surrounding the events are thus
connected. Their tweets on the events are filtered along a certain hashtag, which
constitutes the networked publics. (Neumayer & Valtysson, 2013, p. 5)
In their analysis of the tweets, the researchers illustrated that counter-protestors used
Twitter for several purposes: to share values and express solidarity, to disseminate “true”
information by sharing links to videos or pictures, to monitor the other (that is, the neo-Nazis), to
challenge power and domination, to criticize mainstream news media coverage, and to mock and
humiliate the other. The micro-blogging platform was therefore not only used to mobilize and
coordinate but also to “interact” with the neo-Nazis and the news media. Furthermore,
“spamming the hashtag of the opponents” (p. 11) was employed because it served as a symbolic
blockage online and to confuse the other group by providing false information about gatherings.
All these strategies and practices illustrate how the counter-protestors exploited the platformspecific affordances to perform tactics of contestation. The study shows how social media “can
be appropriated for subversive action to challenge power and lead to political change” (p. 4). The
spamming of a hashtag was also observed by Jackson and Welles (2015). The authors analyzed
how #myNYPD was hijacked to criticize police violence and racial profiling in New York. The
hashtag was intended to share positive experiences with the New Yorker police but was used to
“organize, generate, and promote counterpublic narratives” (p. 2).

Summary of Right-wing, Nationalist Discourses in Digital and Social Media
The review of studies about right-wing, nationalist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant
discourses in digital and social media illustrated that various platforms have been studied as
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of studies on digital and social media.
Commentaries to Online Newspapers
Author
Platform
Sample
Alonso
Spanish daily
497 commentaries
Belmonte et
newspaper, El
al. (2013)
País
Harlow (2015) U.S. American
newspapers

747 front page
stories

Gomes (2014)

Singaporian
281 and 50
newspapers,
responses to two
The TR
online articles
Emeritus &
The Online
Citizen
Discussion Forums and Participatory Websites
Author
Platform
Sample
Daniels
Online
Ethnographic
(2009)
representations observations,
of white
discourse analysis of
supremacist
text, graphic design,
groups in the
layout, and images,
U.S., e.g.,
and Web analytics of
Stormfront
five predominant
groups
Caren et al.
Stormfront
6.9 million posts
(2012)
Baumgarten
(2017)

Stormfront

Discussion thread
about “Europe”

Yamaguchi
(2013)

largest
anonymous
message board
in Japan
Jihad Watch,
Gates of
Vienna,
Avpixlat

Offline and online
ethnographic
fieldwork

Ekman (2015)

Focus
Discursive
positioning of
commenters toward
immigration and
racism
Readers’ comments
about race and
ethnicity
Xenophobia and
hatred toward
foreign talent
migrants in
Singapore

Framework
CDA

Focus
White supremacism
in the U.S.

Framework
CDA,
ethnography

Online social
movement
communities of
white nationalists
Linguistic-discursive
construction on
others
Racist propaganda

Quantitative
analysis and
qualitative
topic analysis
Positioning and
appraisal
analysis
Ethnography

10,000 blog entries
Discursive strategies
related to Muslims
on Islamophobic
and Islam, randomly online network
selected 200 for each
platform
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CDA
Discourse
analysis

CDA

Table 1 (Continued)
Discussion Forums and Participatory Websites
Author
Platform
Sample
Hirvonen
Swedish anti288 comments and
(2013)
immigrant
60 articles
webpages,
Avpixlat,
Nordic Front,
National Now
Madisson
Blogs and
141 posts
(2016)
discussion
forums in
Estonia
Törnberg &
Flashback
Over 50 million
Törnberg
posts
(2016)
Malmqvist
(2015)

Flashback

Del-TesoCraviotto
(2009)

Spanish
internet forum,
PatriaMadre.c
om
Cleland
2 English
(2014)
message
boards
Social Networking Sites
Author
Platform
Ben-David & Facebook
Matamoros
Fernández
(2016)
Gür-Şeker
(2015)

Facebook

Cisneros &
Nakayama
(2015)

Twitter

Focus
Counter-jihadist
online network;
representations of
unaccompanied
minors

Framework
Discourse
Analysis

Far-right in Estonia

Multimodal
CDA

Discursive
connections between
Islamophobia and
anti-feminism
Satire in racist
discourse toward
Roma EU-migrants

CDA and topic
modelling

Xeno-racist
discourses

CDA

500 elicited posts

Racist attitudes and
opinions of English
soccer fans

CDA

Sample
Facebook pages of 7
extreme-right
political parties in
Spain

Focus
Hate speech and
covert
discriminatory
patterns

280,000 comments
posted between
October 2014 and
October 2015
Collected 100 tweets
and selected 24
representative tweets

Pegida

Framework
Multimodal
content
analysis and
network
analysis
CDA

3196 posts in two
discussion threads in
the forum
“Integration and
Immigration”
8 messages by
expats in Spain
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First Indian
American Miss
America

CDA

Critical race
theory

Table 1 (Continued)
Social Networking Sites
Author
Platform
O’Callaghan
Twitter
et al. (2014)

Bennett
(2016)

Twitter

Awan (2014)

Twitter

Sample
Information from
extreme-right
Twitter accounts
from 8 Western
countries
180 tweets from 5
British political
actors

Focus
connectedness of
extreme-right
network

Framework
Network
analysis

Topoi and
legitimation
strategies of political
actors

Multimodal,
discoursehistorical
approach to
CDA
CDA

500 tweets from 100 Woolwich attack
mostly British users; (UK)
#Woolwich,
#Muslim, #Islam
Rettberg &
Twitter
Tweets with
Portrayal of mal
Gajjala (2016)
#refugees
Syrian refugees
notwelcome
Rasmussen
Twitter
211 tweets with
Terror threat in
(2015)
#terrorthreat
Norway in 2014
RightlerTwitter
Collected 19,583
Construction of
McDaniels &
tweets with
gender and race
Hendrickson
#becauseofhoes and
(2014)
selected random
sample of 151
Graham
Twitter
4800 tweets with
Inter-ideological
(2016)
hashtags denoting
mingling
white extremism,
mainstream
conservativism, and
mainstream
progressivism
Pantii
Twitter,
1002 Finish tweets
Language of disgust
Suomi24,
with #kkk, #hennala, in anti-racist
Finnish online and #rasismi; 625
discourses
news sites
postings to
Suomi24; 553 online
news user comments
Neumayer &
Twitter
6262 tweets with
Tactics and
Valtysson
#Raz10, #L1610,
strategies of anti#13februar,
fascist protests
19februar
Note. The studies are in the order they were mentioned in the text.
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Multimodal
analysis
Discursive
Psychology
CDA and
content
analysis
Hierarchical
cluster analysis
and textual
analysis

Affectivediscursive
practices

Networked
publics

Right-wing discourses can be found in the comment sections of online newspaper articles,
on mainstream or right-wing websites or discussion forums, and on social media platforms like
Facebook or Twitter. The majority of the population engaging in such discourses seem to be
people who share nationalist, xenophobic ideologies, although studies have also shown how
xenophobic discourses are contested (e.g., Cisneros & Nakayama, 2015; Del-Teso-Craviotto,
2009). Most studies have focused on extreme-right or far-right groups and communities. The
data range from anonymous posts to tweets by identifiable political actors. Data samples vary
greatly depending on the research methods used and research questions asked. Whereas Cisneros
and Nakayama (2015) analyzed a purposeful sample of 24 tweets from a collection of 100
tweets, Caren et al. (2012) analyzed close to seven million posts from a ten-year period, and
Rightler-McDaniels and Hendrickson (2014) analyzed a sample of 151 tweets that were posted
in a 24-hour timeframe. Most studies chose to collect publicly available screen-based data and
engaged in some systematic online observations, however not in contact with the users
(Androutsopoulos, 2013). Twitter-specific data can be categorized as collected by event, by
account, or by hashtag.
Although some studies did not focus on detailed linguistic analyses but were exploring,
for example, network formations and community features (e.g., Caren et al., 2012), most studies
analyzed discourse features including (de)legitimation strategies and the construction of concepts
like burden, threat, and abuse. Furthermore, studies have also analyzed communicative
affordances of digital media and shown how semiotic features have been used in combination
with text as resources for meaning-making. Specifically, studies have analyzed hyperlinks,
images, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, or recontextualizations (e.g., Bennett, 2016; Daniels,
2009; Doerr, 2017).
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Most research questions have investigated the themes or topics that were emphasized by
users, the strategies to express their opinions, persuade or align with others, the construction of
national identity, the other, or group relations, and the connection of extreme-right movements.
Given the political dimension of the topic, many studies were informed by CDA. Another
common research approach was content analysis. The major research findings indicate that
•

right-wing, xenophobic, nationalist, anti-immigrant discourses are present in digital
and social media,

•

extreme-right groups have built stable online networks that are translocally connected
and able to deliberately use technological affordances of digital communication
including semiotic resources to widen their reach, and

•

discursive strategies and common topics (threat, burden, othering, national identity,
etc.) are employed to construct a negative presentation of others, which, in most
studies, targets Muslims.

The studies reviewed above have shown that there are various ways to conduct research
on digital and social media. However, the studies also have limitations. Most studies did not
collect information on users’ demographics; therefore, they could not make a clear statement
about the authors’ identity and how this might impact the data. Many online platforms allow
users to post anonymously and even when users are required to create a profile, they can create
fake profiles or deliberately choose to present themselves in a way that does not represent their
offline identity. This is a well-known limitation of studying publicly available, naturally
occurring online discourse. On the other hand, however, the data collected do represent authentic
language. Another limitation is concerned with the data sample. On the one hand, studies that use
large data sets in order to find general trends and generalize findings often lack linguistic detail
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that would give information about discursive strategies. Consequently, co-textual detail,
intertextual links, and (intentional) misspellings may be overlooked. Given that extreme
statements may be censored because of platform rules, it is possible that there is a certain level of
encoding to hide violations of platform rules. Boyd (2010) called this encoding of messages for
specific purposes “social steganography.” On the other hand, many studies were case studies that
focused on a specific context (e.g., country, group, timeframe). The studies’ applicability and
transferability is therefore limited. Furthermore, although studies suggest that social media are
widespread, not all platforms are equally used. When it comes to Twitter, there were only 3.83
million unique visitors in Germany in 2013, which is less than 5% of the population (Trilling,
2015), while in Norway, 18% of the population had Twitter accounts (Rasmussen, 2015). Even
though the numbers are increasing steadily – in 2016, close to 15% of the population in Germany
(Statista, 2017) and 21% of the population in the US used Twitter (Greenwood, Perrin, &
Duggan, 2016) – Twitter data may not be representative of the general public opinion. Moreover,
Twitter user demographics may be skewed toward certain ages, levels of education, occupations,
and regions. For example, while in the German capital, Berlin, 42% of social media users are
active on Twitter, only 19% of social media users are active tweeters in the rather rural state of
Brandenburg. In addition, the number of Twitter users decreases with the age of the users from
more than 30% among teenagers to less than 5% among the 50-69 year-old users (Statista, 2017).
Based on the reviewed literature, there are few studies that have employed multimodal
CDA. Given the insights one can gain about the characteristics of digital communication and
hidden ideologies, there is a need for more studies that employ multimodal CDA because such an
analysis may shed light on how multiple modes and semiotic resources are employed in digital
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discourse to (re)produce and challenge dominance and inequality (Jancsary, Höllerer, & Meyer,
2016).
Furthermore, a few of the studies examined the reactions and responses to nationalist,
right-wing, xenophobic discourses, demonstrating that public reactions to such discourses exist.
Publicly available tweets on Twitter and the platform-specific technological affordances
facilitate interaction between authors of racist tweets and users who criticize and challenge these
nationalist, xenophobic discourses. The platform-specific features also influence the “electronic
repertoire of contestation” (Harlow & Guo, 2014; Rolfe, 2005), which are tools available to users
in order to challenge domination and power as well as mobilize and organize against racism and
discrimination. The strategies used to contest racism, xenophobia, and nationalism include using
humor and irony, sharing facts to reveal fake news, as well as attacking and insulting the
opponent. Certain features facilitate the interactions between these two communities, such as
@username to address other users, retweets to share or challenge other users’ statements, or the
use of hashtags to mark a conversation and “creat[e] a particular interpretive frame” (Bonilla &
Rosa, 2015, p. 5). The studies reviewed above showed that the same hashtags may be used by
opposing groups, which may lead to interaction between these groups.
Lastly, many studies concentrated on accounts of extreme-right groups around the world,
but few studies addressed nationalist, right-wing, xenophobic discourses in Germany, even
though nationalist ideologies and xenophobia have increased and have gained attention in
Germany in the last years, especially in the context of the European refugee crisis.
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Perceived Gap
Nationalist, right-wing, xenophobic, anti-immigrant discourses are on the rise in Western
societies. Networks, communities, groups, or political parties which employ these discourses
leverage the affordances of digital communication. They are thus able to not only bond and
affiliate around their opinions and ideologies but also to widen their audience and increase the
number of followers by recontextualizing mainstream discourses. Klein (2012) points out that
far-right ideas and ideologies may turn into “information” because they are made available,
shared, and taken up by mainstream users and mainstream media. The repetition and
reappropriation leads to normalization. Hate speech is also being laundered into information
because of technological features of search engines that “[designate] the most relevant websites
upfront in their directory pages usually based upon the ‘popularity’ and ‘freshness’ of those
sites” (Klein, 2012, p. 436). Therefore, the more it is repeated, the more it continues to be
repeated.
Studies have revealed that right-wing actors use common themes of economic burden,
abuse, threat, and security, and discursive strategies to construct an ethno-nationalist identity and
to exclude and discriminate against the “criminal” and “dangerous” other, often targeting Islam
and Muslims. The (de)legitimation strategies often draw on historical connotations that reflect
fascist ideology and thus the supremacy of white Europeans. According to Benbassa (2007),
Islamophobia has replaced anti-Semitism as a reason to secure the future of Europe. She argues
that “the expansion of the European Union, unfettered globalization, and economic neoliberalism have resulted in the hardening of identities and the growth of nationalism. This time,
the Other is the Muslim Arab, who replaces the Jew of yesteryear” (p. 89).
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It is, therefore, important to continue to reveal the strategies used by such groups and
actors to prevent the naturalization of such discourses through repetition, downplaying, and
misinformation. It is equally important to educate social media users, as social media like Twitter
are becoming an “increasingly important source for the (re)production of discursive power in
society, … [and are] a unique source for studying everyday discourses outside the scope of mass
media” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016, p. 402). Given the different possible forms of meaningmaking opportunities, linguistic creativity, and “hiding” or encoding messages in a public space
in a platform like Twitter, the examination of multimodality is pivotal. Furthermore, more
research using a discourse-historical approach, that is, an integrated analysis of topics, discursive
strategies, and linguistic means, is needed in order to investigate how historical discourses are
exploited for the sake of right-wing, nationalist, anti-immigrant discourses.
Lastly, there are few studies that also take into account the reactions and responses to
right-wing, nationalist discourses. Little research has focused on how these discourses are
challenged and condemned by social media users. In order to draw a more comprehensive
picture of the right-wing, nationalist discourses on Twitter, it is beneficial to address not only
tweets that discriminate against refugees and Muslims, among others, but also tweets that
challenge these negative representations as well as anti-refugee and anti-immigration stances.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHOD

This chapter describes the research methods that were used to conduct the study. First, I
will describe the research design and the theoretical and analytical framework. The outline of
sampling strategy, data collection, and data management and storage will be followed by a
presentation of the data analysis procedures including a sample analysis. Lastly, I will address
the validity criteria and ethical considerations.

Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
Right-wing, nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant discourses are currently on the
rise in Western societies (Jiwani & Richardson, 2011; Richardson & Colombo, 2014; Richardson
& Wodak, 2009; Wodak, 2015b). In the United States, those discourses are currently fueled by
the Trump administration and executive orders like the so-called “Muslim ban,” and in Europe,
right-wing populist groups have availed themselves of the migrant crisis to advocate the return of
the sovereign nation-state, to oppose immigration, and to construct the Islamization of Europe.
Moreover, nationalist forces are gaining power all over Europe. The UK voted to leave the EU in
2016 and the leader of the French populist right-wing and nationalist political party, Front
National, received one third of the votes during the run-off of the French Presidential Election in
2017. In Germany, a new far-right populist political party has entered all 16 state parliaments as
well as the national parliament in September 2017, and in several other European countries,
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nationalist-conservative political parties are part of the national governments (e.g., Hungary,
Poland, Switzerland, etc.).
Nationalist-conservative, right-wing, and xenophobic discourses are not new to Europe
and research studies have examined the discursive construction of national identity (e.g., Wodak,
2015a; Wodak et al., 2009), negative representations of immigrants and refugees (Gabrielatos &
Baker, 2008), and right-wing discourses on nativism (Richardson & Wodak, 2009). These
studies analyzed mass media or political discourse such as speeches, legislation, or political
leaflets and showed how right-wing ideologies have been produced and reproduced. But given
that digital and social media have become part of many people’s daily lives (KhosraviNik &
Unger, 2016), it is necessary to investigate the role of these new media in the (re)production of
such discourses.
For this reason, this research study examines national-conservative, right-wing,
xenophobic discourses in social media with the focus on the micro-blogging service, Twitter.
The purpose of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of how right-wing discourses
are constructed, reproduced, and challenged on Twitter, and facilitated by the affordances of
digital communication. Specifically, this study explores nationalist-conservative, right-wing,
xenophobic discourses in the context of the European migrant crisis and the terror attack in
Berlin, Germany, in 2016.
The study is guided by the following research questions:
1. What are the features of nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses on
Twitter?
a. What discursive strategies are used?
b. What semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?
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2. What are features of counter-discourses to right-wing positions?
a. What discursive strategies are used?
b. What semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?
3. To what extent do the technological and communicative affordances of Twitter lead
to a potential for dialogic interaction between the opposing discourse communities?
For the first research question, I focus on social representations of the perceived “other,”
that is, perceived out-group members, and the topics and themes employed in such discourses. I
also analyze how users take advantage of the communicative affordances of Twitter to create
meaning. This includes semiotic resources, multimodality, and intertextuality. For the second
research questions, I explore how Twitter users react and respond to nationalist-conservative,
right-wing, xenophobic discourses on Twitter. For the third question, I investigate if and how the
technological and communicative affordances of Twitter lead to dialogic interaction between
those who express right-wing, nationalist-conservative ideologies and those who challenge these
discourses.

Research Design and Theoretical/Analytical Framework
In order to investigate nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses on
Twitter in the context of the European migrant crisis and the terror attack in Berlin, Germany, in
2016, I conducted a study that is guided by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Multimodal
Discourse Analysis. CDA scholars “conceive discourse as the result of jointly constructed
meanings of the world. They assume that understanding, significance and meaning are developed
not separately within the individual, but in coordination with other human beings” (Wodak &
Meyer, 2016, p. 16). In this study, I explore the “role of discourse in the (re)production and
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challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). Specifically, I explore how social
representations of the “other” are constructed and presented, and I analyze discursive strategies
that “underpin the justification/legitimization of inclusion/exclusion and the constructions of
identities” (Wodak, 2015a, p. 370). I adopt CDA as a framework in this study because it allows
me to analyze how “discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one
group over others …” (van Dijk, 2009, p. 63), and to reveal how such discourses and the hidden
values, positions, assumptions, and ideologies are used to build a community and (national)
identity, legitimize inclusion and exclusion, and contribute to the discrimination against others
and the (re)production of inequality.
Wodak (2015a) points out that many debates about immigration and nationhood are
linked to a place and ideologies such as “our” place “here” within the European Union or a
European/Christian/homogeneous/superior nation-state where “foreigners” do not belong.
Foreigners are often merged “into one homogeneous group, which is subsequently stigmatized as
the negative ‘other’” (Wodak, 2008, p. 56). The expressions “our” and “here” are deictic, that is,
they point to the context and center of the speaker, and thus reflect ethnocentricity. This rhetoric
of exclusion is a discursive construction of in-group and out-group through strategies of positive
self- and negative-other presentation. Both positive self-presentation and negative otherpresentation are linked to justification and legitimation discourses to depict culture as an
essentially bounded entity whose integrity is threatened by those who do not belong because they
have different norms and values.
Wodak (2015a) and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) name five discursive strategies which
represent the positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation: referential/nomination,
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predication, argumentation, perspectivization, intensification/mitigation. Further explanations
can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2
Discursive strategies (adapted from Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).
Strategy

Explanation

Referential/nomination

How are people named and referred to?

Predication

How are these people described and what qualities or
characteristics are attributed to them?

Argumentation

What explicit/implicit arguments are used to support these
characterizations and to justify exploiting and discriminating
against others?

Perspectivization, framing or
discourse representation
Intensification/mitigation

From whose perspective are such names, descriptions, and
arguments expressed?
Are these utterances stated explicitly or implicitly and are they
intensified or mitigated?

Similarly, van Dijk (2011a) provides discourse strategies with which group relations (ingroups and out-groups) are depicted in text and talk. These strategies are represented by the
concept of the “ideological square” and linked to positive self-presentation and negative otherpresentation, that is, to emphasize “our” good qualities and characteristics, de-emphasize “our”
bad qualities and characteristics, emphasize “their” bad qualities and characteristics, and deemphasize “their” good qualities and characteristics. These evaluations can be achieved by
formal and semantic structures (See Table 3).
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Table 3
Formal and semantic structures (adapted from van Dijk, 2011a).
Formal structures

Semantic structures

Superstructures

Negative topics

Visual, sound, and syntactic structures

Level of description and completeness

Definite expressions

Implications and Presuppositions

Pronouns

Denomination and Predication

Demonstratives

Modality and Agency

Rhetorical moves

Focus

For this study, the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of CDA is applied because “it
integrates and triangulates knowledge about historical, intertextual sources and the background
of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded” (Wodak, 2012, p.
529). The DHA has three levels of analysis: topics, discursive strategies, and linguistic means.
Furthermore, it takes into account intertextuality, the linkage of past and present texts, and
recontextualization, that is, the restating of arguments in new contexts (Wodak, 2012).
Since this study is about digital discourse and also interested in multimodality and
semiotic resources and how they are used for meaning-making, this study is also guided by
Multimodal Discourse Analysis in order to account for Twitter-specific affordances of digital
communication. As KhosraviNik and Unger (2016) point out, social media are “inherently and
substantially multimodal” (p. 211). Therefore, this research study also takes into account
multimodality and the usage of semiotic features as afforded by Twitter.
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In spoken language, modes may include intonation, voice quality, rhythm, or stress. Since
Twitter works, inter alia, with written text, the aforementioned paralinguistic features may be
represented typographically, via letter repetition, capitalization, or emoticons/emojis. However,
these non-verbal signals are context-dependent and provide contextualization cues to
interactional partners who can “make situated inferences about the most likely interpretation of
an utterance” (Darics, 2013, p. 143). Consequently, the same sign may be interpreted differently
in different contexts based on the contextualization cues provided by the author.
According to multimodal discourse analysts (e.g., Jewitt, 2014a; Kress, 2012; van
Leeuwen, 2015), language is just one of many resources for meaning-making. The modes and
the combination or ensemble of modes are constructed, shaped, and influenced by cultural,
historical, social, and situational contexts and conventions as well as technological affordances.
The organization of the ensemble is meaningful and a multimodal discourse analysis “provides
tools for analysing and describing the full repertoire of meaning-making resources which people
use to communicate … and how these are ‘organized’ to make meaning” (Jewitt, 2014a, p. 15).
Applying multimodal discourse analysis may thus “provide insight into the relation of the
meanings of a community and its semiotic manifestations” (Kress, 2012, p. 37).
A limitation of multimodal discourse analysis may be that there is not enough focus on
language itself and that the analysis is not put into the larger social context (Paltridge, 2012). For
this reason, I draw on multimodal critical discourse studies (Machin, 2013) in order to “show
how choices of visual semiotic resources can be used to communicate ideologies and discourses”
(Jewitt, 2014b, p. 32). The purpose of critical multimodal discourse analysis is “to reconstruct
the ways in which the combination … of modes suggests particular versions of social reality that
are not neutral with regard to power: they serve some interests while marginalizing others”
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(Jancsary et al., 2016, p. 185). Consequently, multimodal discourse can also contribute to
naturalization processes, for example, because a message that is supported visually may evoke
stronger emotions that feed into existing social representations of groups, or because a picture is
worth a thousand words as illustrated in the following example offered by Machin (2013):
if we see a news item about a particular issue in a Muslim community and we find an
image of a woman in a full Burhka to represent ‘Muslimness’, it would not be possible to
write ‘all Muslims look like this’, or ‘this is representative of all Muslims’. Yet, the
image does tend to suggest this and certainly places the story into a particular news frame
of traditional values, difference and threat. As many theorists on the visual have
observed, images do not have such specific denotative meaning as language and therefore
it is a less easy matter to pin down precisely what meanings they convey; images to do
not specify relations in the same precise way as there are no verbs to indicate ‘this is the
women in the story.’ (p. 350)
It is thus easy to deny visually communicated xenophobia; the invoked message can be
dismissed since it is not explicitly present and it is open other possible interpretations (versus a
lexical referent, which normally has fewer meaning potentials). For this reason, a critical
investigation of multimodal discourse is necessary (van Leeuwen, 2004, 2015).

Sampling Strategy
The sampling strategies used in studies that investigate the discourse on Twitter differ
depending on their research design and research questions. In order to examine my research
questions, I collected tweets that include specific hashtags; were tweeted within a specific
timeframe; and are publicly available.
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The sampling strategy of this study is guided by Page, Barton, Unger, and Zappavigna
(2014) and Androutsopoulos (2013) who provide recommendations for how to collect and select
data for qualitative research in social media or digital media respectively. Following the
suggestions of Page et al. (2014), I limited the data collection to one platform, that is, Twitter.
Guided by Androutsopoulos (2013), I sampled by theme, that is, I collected data from
“thematically organized streams of online discourse (e.g., hash-tagged tweets)” (p. 496) because
it allowed me to explore the linguistic and semiotic features of the tweets (Page et al., 2014).
Micro-blogging on Twitter is a semiotic activity, and hashtags are used so that tweets can be
found by others in order to establish a community that shares similar values. Zappavigna (2012)
points out, “discourse tagging is the beginning of searchable talk, a change in social relations
whereby we mark our discourse so that it can be found by others, in effect so that we can bond
around particular values” (p. 1). Hence, hashtags, which can be topic-based or evaluative, are
ideological resources and used to indicate identity, beliefs, and group membership. This
characteristic feature of Twitter enables people who may not be connected otherwise to align
around shared values; labeling the topic of a tweet may thus be considered a process of “ambient
affiliation” (Zappavigna, 2011, 2012). Ambient affiliation refers to the process of “bonding
around evolving topics of interest” (Zappavigna, 2011, p. 800). The hashtag functions as the
connection between users who “may not have interacted directly and likely do not know each
other, and may not interact again” (p. 801). Since I am interested in the discursive strategies and
semiotic features of nationalist-conservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses on Twitter, I
consider it appropriate to sample by hashtags.
Furthermore, I confined the data collection to a limited time period (Page et al., 2014),
which is useful because it reconstructs a shared context for the tweets (Bennett, 2016), and to a

63

limited number of tweets. As regards the time period, I focus on two different, yet connected
events. The first event is represented by a press conference of German Chancellor, Angela
Merkel, on August 31, 2015. During that press conference she made the statement “We have
managed so many things – we can do it” (German: Wir haben so vieles geschaft – wir schaffen
das) in order to justify her policy of open borders and allowing refugees in Germany who had not
followed Dublin procedures. This statement was a reaction to the increasing numbers of refugees
arriving in Europe and the consequential humanitarian crisis that unfolded at the borders of the
European Union. The statement is linguistically ambiguous because the referent of “it” in “we
can do it” is unclear (Delcker, 2016). Furthermore, the German verb “schaffen” is polysemous
and thus lends itself to word play. It can be glossed as “to manage,” “to handle,” “to create,” and,
in Southern German varieties, “to work.” The second event is represented by the terror attack
that occurred in Berlin in December 2016 and was committed by a person who entered Germany
as a refugee in the summer of 2015.
As regards the hashtags, I selected two hashtags for each of the two events. All hashtags
were trending in the aftermath of the events and thus represent the dominant discourses on
Twitter related to the context of the chosen events. For the first event, I chose #wirschaffendas
(‘we can do it’) and #openborders. Both phrases are associated with Chancellor Merkel’s refugee
policies and thus allow me to analyze Twitter users’ reactions to the significantly increasing
number of arrivals and the pro-refugee policy of the German Chancellor, which was heavily
contested by right-wing groups.
For the second event, I chose #MerkelsTote (‘Merkel’s dead’) and #BerlinAttack. I chose
#MerkelsTote for the second time period based on a tweet by a German politician of the far-right
political party, Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland) shortly after the
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attack, even before there was a suspect, “When will the German state strike back? “When does
this damn hypocrisy end? They are Merkel’s dead! #Nizza #Berlin” (German: Wann schlägt der
deutsche Rechtsstaat zurück? Wann hört diese verfluchte Heuchelei endlich auf? Es sind Merkels
Tote! #Nizza #Berlin). With this tweet, he supported the debate about the correlation between
open-border, pro-refugee policies and the increased Islamic terrorist activity in Europe.
The first tweet that took up the politician’s phrase, “Merkels Tote,” in a hashtag appeared
four hours later, and within 24 hours, users had posted 43 tweets that included #MerkelsTote and
expressed harsh criticism of Chancellor Merkel’s immigration policies. The other hashtag,
#BerlinAttack, is relevant because it was trending after the terror attack and thus seen and used
by many Twitter users.
I limited the data collection to up to 250 tweets per hashtag and the first four weeks
following the event described above, that is, the press conference and the terror attack. The
numbers of tweets collected for each event as well as the time frames differ because some
hashtags are used more than others. For the first event, I collected 246 tweets with
#wirschaffendas between August 31 and September 29, 2015. Twenty-nine of these tweets were
not relevant for this study because they were written in a language other than German, English,
French, and Spanish – the languages I am able to understand the meaning of the tweet – or dealt
with a topic not related to the European migrant crisis, such as personal video game competitions
or German soccer games. These tweets were discarded resulting in a sample of 217 tweets. The
majority of the sample was written in German.
The second hashtag associated with the timeframe of August – September 2015 resulted
in more tweets, as the context was not bound to the migrant crisis and Germany’s position.
Tweets with #openborders not only referred to the European migrant crisis but also covered U.S.
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American, Israeli, and Australian border politics; however, only tweets that were relevant for the
European context were included in the data sample, resulting in 217 tweets between August 31
and September 18, 2015. The majority of the sample was written in English.
For the second timeframe, I collected 172 tweets with #MerkelsTote tweeted between
December 19, 2016 and January 16, 2017. Twenty of these tweets were discarded and not
included in the analysis because they were written in a language other than German, English,
French, and Spanish, or the user account had been suspended, or finally the context was not
related to the European migrant crisis. The majority of the 152-tweet sample was written in
German. Additionally, I selected the first 152 tweets with #BerlinAttack tweeted on December
20, 2016. I only included tweets that were relevant for the purpose and context of this study. The
majority of the sample was written in German or English. Table 4 shows a summary of the data
collection.
Table 4
Data collection – sample.
Date
August 31, 2015

Event
Press conference

Hashtags
#wirschaffendas
#openborders

Sample Size
217
217

Total
434

December 19, 2016

Terror attack

#MerkelsTote
#BerlinAttack

152
152
304
738

Lastly, I used a screen-based approach, which means I collected “data [that] are produced
by participants and collected online by the researcher” (Androutsopoulos, 2013, p. 500).
Consequently, I did not interact with the authors of the tweets. However, I collected and
analyzed metadata of the tweets, which include user ID, profile photo, user location if applicable,
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location from where the tweet was sent if enabled, time the tweet was sent, and users’ total
number of tweets. The metadata of a tweet are helpful for the analysis for various reasons: User
IDs and profile pictures may provide interesting and useful information about the intentions of
the tweeter and thus help me understand and analyze the tweets. The analysis of user IDs in
previous studies (e.g., Daniels, 2009; Mc Laughlin, 2014; Vásquez, 2014) illustrated that
pseudonyms may portray or point to a specific, contextually relevant identity (Vásquez, 2014)
and even have intertextual and interdiscursive references (Daniels, 2009) to enact an identity.
Twitter users are required to have a username, however, this user name may or may not reflect
the users’ offline identity, which enables users to deliberately choose an identity and how they
want to be perceived by the Twitter community. The profile photo is optional. The location of
the user as well as the time the tweet was sent are significant because they may help identify the
context to which the author is referring. This is especially helpful when English is used as a
lingua franca.

Data Management and Storage
For this study, I collected publicly available data from Twitter. The nature of such data is
dynamic and fast-changing (Page et al., 2014). Tweets can be deleted and new tweets are
constantly added. Twitter offers an advanced search, where users can search for words, phrases,
hashtags, content written in various languages, accounts, places, and time frames. This advanced
search allowed me to collect data for the hashtags and time periods described above. The default
search setting is set to hide sensitive content, but I unchecked this setting to obtain tweets that
may be automatically filtered by Twitter.
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To collect the data, I used the Google Chrome extension software, Data Miner, to scrape
the tweets into an Excel spreadsheet. I then imported the spreadsheet into the qualitative data
analysis software, MaxQDA. After I chose the sample described above, I took screenshots of
each tweet in order to compare the screenshots with the imported data for accuracy, assigned
each tweet a number, and labeled the tweet based on hashtag and number, for example
wirschaffendas 1. In the screenshot I included the additional comments of the unfolding
conversation, if applicable. The files were organized by hashtag and stored in a cloud-based
storage location.
It was necessary to use a web scraper tool such as Data Miner to download the data
because data analysis tools can only retrieve data from the past seven days due to Twitter’s
application programming interface (API), however I collected data older than seven days. I then
used the qualitative data analysis software to assist with the analysis.

Data Analysis
The first research question is “What are the features of nationalist-conservative, rightwing, xenophobic discourses on Twitter?” and includes two parts, “What discursive strategies
are used?” and “What semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?” In order to answer the
question, I followed the steps of the discourse-historical approach to CDA (Reisigl & Wodak,
2016) since they can also be applied to research in social media (Page et al., 2014). When
applying CDA in social media, one seeks to examine “who is communicating with whom, under
what conditions, how and to what end … to account for both the ‘macro’ issues of institutional
context and media ecologies, and the ‘micro’ dynamics of communicative affordances”
(KhosraviNik & Unger, 2016, p. 231).
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I began by reading each tweet and taking notes on information about the immediate, textinternal linguistic context of the tweets. This step also included investigating the user-established
intertextuality by accessing hyperlinks and taking notes on the type of source and information to
which the user is referring. I then searched for relationships between tweets (e.g., tweets from the
same user or referring to the same event), and gathered more information about the broader
socio-political context of tweets (e.g., which specific event a user is referencing). After these
steps that helped me familiarize myself with the data, I coded the data based on the strategies
displayed in Table 5. As my data analysis is guided by the discourse-historical approach to CDA,
I used the five discursive strategies proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009) and van Dijk’s
(2011a) formal and semantic structures. During this step, I also coded emerging topics and
themes that are employed in reference to the constructed “other.” Lastly, I connected the
particular linguistic choices to the social meanings in order to interpret the relationships between
the discourse on Twitter and society (Page et al., 2014).
Table 5
Summary of discursive strategies and formal and semantic structures.
Reisigl and Wodak (2009)

Van Dijk (2011a)

Referential/nomination

Definite expressions, Demonstratives/Pronouns

Predication

Negative topics, Implications, Predication

Argumentation

Superstructures, Presuppositions

Perspectivization

Syntactic structures, Demonstratives/Pronouns, Agency

Intensification/Mitigation

Visual & sound structures, Rhetorical moves, Modality,
Level of description and completeness

In order to address semiotic and multimodal resources, I followed the five steps
suggested by Jancsary et al. (2016) when conducting critical multimodal discourse analysis. I
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first characterized the genre-specific rules, characteristics, and affordances. Then, I coded the
tweets that make use of multiple modes and semiotic resources such as emojis, repetition, letter
capitalization, and other visual and typographical representations that carry meaning. I then
reconstructed latent elements and analyzed the characterization of the social context and reality
including the presences and absences found in the text or images. The examination of the roles
and functions of verbal and visual components helped analyze the messages that are created
through the composition of modes. Lastly, I showed how the analysis of multimodality and
semiotic resources can inform our understanding of the broader socio-cultural context in which
they are embedded and how power and domination are reinforced through the composition of the
modes and use of semiotic resources.
The second research question is “What are features of counter-discourses to right-wing
positions?” and also includes two parts, “What discursive strategies are used?” and “What
semiotic and multimodal resources are employed?” In order to examine the question, I analyzed
the strategies employed in tweets that express pro-refugee positions or react and respond with
opposition to tweets that contain right-wing, nationalist-conservative positions. I began by
identifying these tweets and gathering information about references to other tweets and about the
broader socio-political context. In the analysis, I focused on strategies, practices, and resources
employed to reinforce the support of migrants and refugees as well as to challenge and condemn
xenophobic and discriminatory ideologies. The following illustrates a tweet that is opposing the
right-wing, nationalist-conservative discourse: “I condemn #MerkelsTote of AfD-man
@MarcusPretzell. But doesn’t help the victims either. Unfortunately. #Breitscheidplatz #Berlin”
(German: Für #MerkelsTote von AfD-Mann @MarcusPretzell habe ich nur Verachtung Hilft
aber den Opfern auch nicht. Leider. #Breitscheidplatz #Berlin).
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The third research question is “To what extent do the technological and communicative
affordances of Twitter lead to a potential for dialogic interaction between the opposing discourse
communities?” In order to examine the question, I explored if and how the use of the same
hashtag(s) and references to the same contexts lead to dialogic interactions between users who
feed right-wing, nationalist-conservative discourses and users who challenge and condemn such
discourses. I focused only on direct interaction via replies. As mentioned above, the data was
retrieved via Data Miner, which generated an Excel spreadsheet. In the spreadsheet, only the
tweets themselves were included. Replies to these tweets and tweets to which these tweets
replied could not be included. Furthermore, the spreadsheet does not accurately show if a user is
replying to another user’s tweet or if another user is only addressed. Therefore, the interaction
via @username can be two-fold. If a tweet starts with @username, the user may have used the
“reply” button or the user chose to start the tweet by addressing another user without directly
replying to a tweet. If @username appears in the middle of the tweet, the user most likely
included the other user in order to address them personally, but the tweet may not be a direct
response to another tweet and there may not be a direct interaction between the two users. This
may be the case when politicians, political parties, or media outlets are addressed. Due to the
sampling strategy, not all interactions can be reconstructed. For this reason, only responses to
tweets from the dataset are taken into consideration for the third research question.

Sample Analysis
The following two sample analyses illustrate the application of the proposed data analysis
procedures.
Example 1:
Hungary I ♥ you #refugeesnotwelcome
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The first example (Example 1) shows the emoji of a heart positioned between the first-person
pronoun and the second-person pronoun, which is a conventionalized form of saying “I love
you” since the heart emoji is a symbol of love, indicating that the author of this tweet loves
“you,” which is used as an anaphor and points to Hungary (the precedent of the anaphor). This
example can be interpreted as the author’s approval of anti-refugee policies and practices,
referring to the Hungarian police’s use of tear gas, the government’s erection of wired fences,
and the mayor of Ásotthalom (a small town in Hungary) closing the Serbian border, and creating
a threatening anti-refugee video to deter refugees in the summer of 2015. Such an interpretation
is only made possible because of the explicit message of the included hashtag,
refugeesnotwelcome. Hungary’s actions are also supported by several other users who call
Hungary brilliant or claim that Hungary does the right thing. In another example, a user writes
“Love #Ásotthalom, Love #Hungary, Love #Europe This is our land, this is our home.” This user
also refers to Ásotthalom and Hungary to point to the anti-refugee attitude portrayed in the antirefugee video and indicates his/her approval with anti-refugee practices. Similarly to the first
example, the user makes reference to notions of home and belonging, separating the others
(refugees) from whoever belongs to the in-group in the perspective of the user.
The second example (Example 2) illustrates how Twitter users employ strategies to
negatively depict migrants and refugees and demonstrates the importance of considering
intertextual relations in processes of meaning-making in digital media.
Example 2:
Diese armen “Flüchtlinge”. Und diese ganzen Frauen und Kinder…. #IronieAus
#RefugeesNotWelcome #Invasion
This author also retweets a previous tweet about unrest that arose between refugees and the
police in mid-September 2015 in Röszke, a Hungarian village close to the Serbian border. The
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original tweet also included images of rioting men, thus establishing a connection between the
migrants referred to in the text, and the men depicted in the images. The author not only retweets
this particular account of violent (im)migrants, but also adds the comment: These poor
“refugees”. And all these women and children…. #IronyOff #RefugeesNotWelcome #Invasion.
By putting the term refugees in quotation marks and adding the adjective poor, the author
constructs an ironic tone, both questioning the legitimacy of the term “refugee” and the notion of
refugees requiring assistance. He further adds all these women and children, a group that is often
considered as in need of special protection, further questioning the need to protect refugees.
Indeed, many refugees arriving in Europe were young males and this argument was often used in
anti-refugee discourse. Seeing only rioting men in the images (as also discussed by Gür-Şeker,
2015) further implies that these refugees are not in need, but rather causing trouble. By including
#IronyOff, the author confirms he was being ironic, and after “switching off” the irony, the
following hashtags, #RefugeesNotWelcome and #Invasion, reveal the author’s true perspective.
Although he does not refer to refugees as “illegals” or “criminals” as many other Twitter users
do, he delegitimizes the term “refugee” and questions the need to help refugees. Instead he views
the migration movement as an invasion, and as a threat to his identity and territory.

Validity Criteria
Page et al. (2014) state that research that is “critical” in its approach “is not ‘neutral’ or
‘objective,’ nor does it claim to be: rather, it is motivated by a desire for positive social change”
(p. 98). I further acknowledge that the analysis relies on the researcher’s perspective and
interpretation. My own academic and personal background has shaped my perspectives and thus
also my interpretation of data. I am a German national but my family has a migration

73

background. Discussions about belonging and national identity have thus been part of my own
experiences. Furthermore, I believe that language contributes to the construction of social reality
and thus also the construction of belonging and identity. While I do not attempt to claim
objectivity and generalizability, there are different ways to evaluate qualitative data.
I have previously conducted research on anti-refugee discourse and analyzed discursive
strategies used in tweets that included that hashtag #refugeesnotwelcome (Kreis, 2017a). This
prior experience contributes to my evolving expertise on this topic and my credibility as a
researcher. Furthermore, although I have not participated actively on Twitter, I explored trending
topics and accounts of right-wing actors for two years to get an idea for the kind of discourse that
was present during the European migrant crisis in general and events like the Berlin terror attack
in particular. This exploration also includes the consultation of mass and online media from and
about Germany in relation to the migrant crisis. As a German national, I consider myself an
insider to the context, because I am familiar with the historical, socio-cultural, and political
contexts and developments. In addition, my knowledge as a political scientist provides additional
information and expertise that will support my understanding and interpretation of context and
data.
Although I focus on a particular context that is defined by its own history and
development, the transparent description of research design, sampling strategy, and data analysis
procedures provides the possibility for other researchers to transfer the insights gained through
this project to other contexts and potentially replicate the study within a different context. The
fact that the tweets are publicly available adds to the transparency of this study since everyone
with or without a Twitter account can search for the tweets.
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Wodak and Meyer (2016) state that
data collection is not considered to be a specific phase that must be completed before the
analysis can be conducted: after the first data collection one should perform first pilot
analyses, find indicators for particular concepts, expand concepts into categories and, on
the basis of these first results, collect further data (theoretical sampling). In this
procedure, data collection is never completely concluded nor excluded, and new
questions may always arise that require new data or re-examination of earlier data (p. 21).
I followed their recommendation and treated the data collection process as dynamic, iterative,
and evolving. This also means that I revisited the data and carried out additional rounds of
coding until I reached data saturation. Although my position as an insider provides me with a
deeper understanding of the cultural and historical meanings of the data, it is beneficial to obtain
other possible perspectives through peer debriefing and discuss one’s interpretation of the data.
For this reason, I discussed data collection and data analysis procedures with peers who are
knowledgeable in discourse analysis and familiar with the context (Grbich, 2012).

Ethical Considerations
As pointed out by Bolander and Locher (2014), Squires (2015), and others, internet
researchers need to be aware of and take into account ethical considerations. One aspect is
related to differing notions of privacy online as opposed to offline. The conceptualization of
“private” and “public” has shifted to embrace both access and content. Moreover, it is
conceptualized “as gradable and not absolute” (Bolander & Locher, 2014, p. 17). The default
setting of Twitter is public; unless a user changes this setting, his or her tweets are available for
other Twitter users as well as visitors to the Twitter website. Both private and public content may
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thus be accessed publicly, and users may not always be aware of the implications of sharing
private content on social networking sites (Tagg, 2015). Furthermore, Tagg (2015) points out
that
a user’s audience can often be fairly large and diverse and what is intended for a
particular individual or group can in fact be heard by everyone and interpreted in various
ways in the context of different news feeds. This is what dana boyd and colleagues
describe as ‘context collapse’ or ‘social convergence’ (p. 70).
The Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) provides guidelines for conducting
research in computer-mediated settings. These include considerations about vulnerability of
community, author, or participant, minimization of harm, being aware that there is a human
subject behind the screen, the distinction between author and research participant, and ethical
issues about the research process and decision-making processes (Markham & Buchanan, 2012).
With these guidelines in mind, I collected the metadata of the tweets (e.g., user ID, profile photo,
user’s location if applicable, time the tweet was sent) in order to interpret the contributions
accurately, but my analysis focuses on the linguistic and semiotic content of the tweet and on the
ideological position expressed in the tweet without trying to make generalizations and
assumptions about the users’ identity and beliefs. Moreover, I only collected publicly available
data. For these reasons, I consider these issues minimal and believe that this research neither
benefits nor harms individual Twitter users.
In following three chapters, I examine right-wing discourses and counter-discourses on
Twitter during two different time frames during the European migrant crisis. The research
questions are addressed sequentially in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
FINDINGS FOR RIGHT-WING DISCOURSES

In this chapter I examine the first research question, “What are features of counterdiscourses to right-wing positions?” The chapter is divided into four sections corresponding to
the four hashtags that were used to collect the data. In order to analyze the data, I followed the
steps of the discourse-historical approach to CDA (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016) and critical
multimodal discourse analysis (Jancsary et al., 2016). I read each tweet and took notes on the
information about the immediate, text-internal linguistic context, the use of semiotic and
multimodal resources, as well as the user-established intertextuality for example in the form of
hyperlinks. Then I coded the tweets based on the discursive strategies and formal and semantic
structures displayed in Table 5, the emerging topics that were employed in reference to the
constructed “other,” and the use of multiple modes and semiotic resources. Additional codes
emerged in the datasets of all hashtags. These will be described below in more detail. Table 6
shows the distribution of discursive strategies across hashtags.
Table 6
Frequency of discursive strategies in right-wing discourses.
#wirschaffendas #openborders #MerkelsTote #BerlinAttack
(n = 217)
(n = 217)
(n = 152)
(n = 152)
Referential/nomination
22 (10%)
1 (<1%)
25 (16%)
17 (11%)
Predication
29 (13%)
9 (4%)
26 (17%)
26 (17%)
Argumentation
92 (42%)
10 (5%)
91 (60%)
76 (50%)
Perspectivization
54 (25%)
7 (3%)
59 (39%)
43 (28%)
Strategy
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#wirschaffendas
The #wirschaffendas dataset contains a variety of discursive strategies and topics
associated with right-wing discourses which are described in the following sections.

Referential/nomination
It is common for right-wing discourses to construct a negative image of the other.
Previous research has shown that immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are often depicted
negatively (e.g., Wodak, 2015b). This negative image can be constructed by naming and
referring to people negatively.
As regards tweets with #wirschaffendas, the findings show that there are few negative
references to migrants. In fact, only one tweet contains offensive words to describe migrants:
Example 1 (wirschaffendas 136)1:
“#Wirschaffendas” – “#AllahuAkbar” – die muslimische “#Kulturbereicherung” von
#Paris https://youtu.be/ULCrmGKft2U #Dreckspack #Abschaum
“Wecandoit” – “#AllahuAkbar” – the Muslim “#culturalenrichment” of #Paris [Link to
video] #filthyvermin #scum
Even though migrants are not directly addressed with these offensive words, the two
hashtags, #Dreckspack and #Abschaum, function as anaphors because they refer back to “the
Muslim ‘#culturalenrichment’ of #Paris.” The term cultural enrichment is in quotation marks to
indicate that the user questions the veracity of the term. The user thus employs the rhetorical
trope of a synecdoche to establish juxtaposition between the so-called cultural enrichment
through Muslim immigrants in Paris and the reference to filthy vermin and scum.
1

The data examples are numbered consecutively based on the order of appearance in this text
and include the original categorization in parentheses. In each example, the original tweet is
followed by an English translation if the original is not in English. Bold is used for focal
elements. Each tweet is assigned a code as explained in Chapter Three on page 68, for example
wirschaffendas 1.
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Apart from the previous example, users mostly employ the German or English words for
refugees (German: Flüchtlinge) or asylum seekers (German: Asylbewerber). Only one tweet
(Example 2) contains a word with an inherently negative meaning.
Example 2 (wirschaffendas 124):
#LIVE #Salzburg: #Asylpresser bringen #Infrastrukture zum kollabieren
http://www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/dossier/fluechtlinge/sn/artikel/live-mehr-als-2000fluechtlinge-am-salzburger-bahnhof-lage-prekaer-165966] #wirschaffends
#LandderVollidioten
#LIVE #Salzburg: #Asylumpushers make the #infrastructure collapse [Link to article]
#wecandoit #landofcompleteidiots
The word Asylpresser denotes someone who presses for asylum. The use of this word suggests
that asylum seekers are actively, and potentially forcefully, trying to receive asylum even before
a thorough investigation of the individual case. Furthermore, the word is used in a tweet that
places the asylum seekers as syntactic agents and thus responsible for the action, that is, the
collapsing of the infrastructure in Salzburg, Austria. The tweet is further supported by a link that
leads to an article describing the precarious situation at the Salzburg train station due to the large
amount of refugees. The hashtag LIVE adds urgency to the situation and the hashtag
LandderVollidioten (English: land of complete idiots) adds another negatively evaluative stance
to the meaning of the tweet supporting the word choice Asylpresser.
Since most tweets with #wirschaffendas are written in German, the German word
Flüchtlinge as opposed to English refugees occurs more often in the dataset, however, refugees is
often used in combination with welcome in both English and German tweets, particularly as a
hashtag. In tweets supporting right-wing discourses, #refugeeswelcome does not express
approval of welcoming refugees, but it is used to criticize pro-refugee policies. The phrase wir
schaffen das became the symbol of Germany’s refugee policy and many critics used this phrase
to challenge the position of welcoming refugees (Heißler, 2016). The following tweet illustrates
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how refugeeswelcome is used syntactically in co-occurrence with wirschaffendas to criticize prorefugee positions and policies:
Example 3 (wirschaffendas 247):
“#refugeeswelcome! #refugeeswelcome! ” – hat dieser Wahnsinn etwa Methode??
#wirschaffendas sagt heute Frau #Merkel
“#refugeeswelcome! #refugeeswelcome! ” – Is there any method to this madness??
#wecandoit says Mrs #Merkel today
The author quotes exclamations of #refugeeswelcome and refers to them as madness. The author
further asks if this madness is deliberate and quotes the phrase wir schaffen das in the form of a
hashtag. The structure of the tweet as well as the word choice madness enforced by the two
question marks shows that the phrase refugees welcome is not used as a sign of approval but
rather as a form of criticism of pro-refugee policies and practices.
Another example of this kind of use of refugees welcome and wir schaffen das is found in
the following tweet:
Example 4 (wirschaffendas 64):
@_Traeumerle Das ist die Zeit, wo man die Suppe von #refugeeswelcome und
#WirSchaffenDas auslöffeln kann.
@_Traeumerle This is the moment to face the music of #refugeeswelcome and
#WeCanDoIt.
The tweet is a response to @_Traeumerle who asks an ironic question about Semesterferien
(term used at German universities to describe the winter and summer break between semesters,
which students usually use to write term papers, do internships, work, or travel). The response is
not related to the content of the question but uses the question to share skeptical views regarding
pro-refugee positions and policies associated with refugees welcome and wir schaffen das. The
German idiom Suppe auslöffeln is generally used when one makes a mistake and has to deal with
the unpleasant consequences and negative repercussions.
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In addition to instances where negative words are used to describe refugees, there are also
examples of negative references to Chancellor Merkel, other politicians, or those who support
refugees and pro-refugee policies. Merkel is ironically referred to as mommy (German: Mutti)
and her political supporters are called puppets (German: Vasallen) as in the following example.
Example 5 (wirschaffendas 167):
#Merkel und ihre Vasallen des Amtes entheben! #wirschaffendas bestimmt!
Remove #Merkel and her puppets from office! #wecandoit for sure!
Some users also make use of pronouns to distinguish between those who belong to the
community and the others who are not only represented by refugees and asylum seekers but also
by politicians. The following two tweets show how users use the juxtaposition of pronouns to
demonstrate the divide between the (German) people and the politicians.
Example 6 (wirschaffendas 100):
#wirschaffendas Wer ist wir? Ja, wir schaffen und ihr vergeudet die #Steuern !!
#wecandoit Who is we? Yes, we work and you all waste the #taxes !!
Example 7 (wirschaffendas 71):
Ich höre immer #wirschaffendas Die meinen wohl uns damit weil von denen schafft es
keiner! #hartaberfair
I always hear #wecandoit They probably mean us because of them none will manage!
#hartaberfair
In both examples, the phrase wir schaffen das is used as both a hashtag and as a syntactical
element to juxtapose that we, the ordinary people, work while the politicians waste taxpayers’
money or do not do their job properly. Users seem to exploit the ambiguity and polysemy of we
can do it, as the referetns of we, do, and it generate a range of new meanings in each new tweet.
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Predication
In addition to calling names and using value-laden references to refer to people, othering
also occurs by describing the qualities and characteristics that are attributed to the constructed
other. Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are often described as dangerous, violent, and
criminal in order to justify any harsh methods against them. These methods can be in the form of
government policies, practices of the authorities, actions like protests, or even acts of violence
committed by vigilantes who claim to protect themselves and other citizens. There are several
references to violence, danger, and crime on the part of the refugees as illustrated in the
following tweets.
Example 8 (wirschaffendas 20):
#Gewalt in Unterkünften – #Polizei will #Flüchtlinge nach #Religion trennen
#Wirschaffendas http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146926095/Polizei-willFluechtlinge-nach-Religion-trennen.html
#violence in refugee housing – #police want to separate #refugees based on #religion
#Wecandoit [Link to article]
The author of the tweet uses the headline of an article by the German mainstream newspaper
article, Die Welt, to suggest that belonging to different religions or denominations may lead to
violence in refugee housing, and hence police intervention may be required. Religion is thus
implicitly used as a form of othering and portrayed as a problem, which could, potentially, also
be a risk factor outside of refugee homes. The claim is supported by a link to the article.
While the previous tweet does not contain an explicit evaluative stance in the form of
approval or criticism, the following two tweets do.
Example 9 (wirschaffendas 84):
Schlägerei in Fluchtlingsheim https://www.hna.de/lokales/hann-muenden/verletzternach-pruegelei-adelebser-fluechtlingsunterkunft-5542717.html … #Wirschaffendas ;-)
brawl in refugee home [Link to article] #Wecandoit ;-)
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Example 10 (wirschaffendas 56):
http://bit.ly/1WjpcxD bald wird es auch in deiner Nachbarschaft bunt.
#wirschaffendas #refugeeswelcome #refugeecrisis
[Link to video] Trouble is coming soon to your neighborhood too. #wecandoit
#refugeeswelcome #refugeescrisis
The first tweet uses an emoticon to question the meaning of the statement wir schaffen das, as
there are reports of fights and violence among refugees in refugee homes, particularly when
refugees from different origins are involved. The second tweet begins with the link to a YouTube
video from Euronews, a multilingual European news media service, about violence among
refugees on the Greek island, Kos. The author of the tweet then forecasts the arrival of refugees
in your neighborhood by directly addressing the audience with the second person informal
personal pronoun, which creates an imminent, translocal threat. The arrival of refugees is not
explicitly stated. Instead the author uses the word bunt (English: colorful), which usually has
positive connotations; however, in this case it is used as a euphemism to describe the arrival of
people of diverse backgrounds. Although bunt usually carries positive connotations, it is also
used in the German idioms zu bunt werden and es zu bunt treiben which both mean to go too far.
In combination with the violence depicted in the video, bunt therefore triggers negative
connotations as it implies a threat to the imagined homogeneous community.
The risk of violence may not only occur in refugee homes or camps. According to some
users, religious and cultural differences may also lead to violence toward European citizens in
the form of terror attacks. The following tweet is a response to a tweet by user @Lars9596, who
claims that The #Hungarians checked details of a #refugee at the border & identified him as a
known #terrorist. #Fluechtlinge. The author of the response supports the implied terror threat by
adding the sarcastic claim that refugees pose a risk as potential suicide bombers. The tweet also
contains a stereotypical reference to Islam (virgins in paradise). The Quran contains references
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and allusions to virgins (e.g., verse 56:36 and verse 55:56) who will be the companions of
believers during afterlife, referred to as heaven or paradise (e.g., verse 2:29). Although there are
multiple interpretations and teachings of the Quran, Muslims are often reduced to the depiction
of martyrs who enter paradise where they get 72 virgins.
Example 11 (wirschaffendas 115):
@Lars9596 Not surprising Will not be the last one #wirschaffendas big surprise when the
1st suicide bomber looks for virgins in paradise
Not only the characteristics of refugees are described. As mentioned before, Chancellor
Merkel is perceived as responsible for pro-refugee policies and consequently the influx of
refugees. She is described as incompetent, dumb, and unacceptable and her policies as dangerous
for the German nation, a security threat, and financial burden to be shouldered by the German
citizens as shown in the following example. See also Example 6.
Example 12 (wirschaffendas 195):
#wirschaffendas. bis zum nächsten anschlag. #fluechtlinge
#wecandoit. until the next attack. #refugees
The influx of refugees triggered by pro-refugee policies is further associated with the
downfall of Germany, increased crime, the implementation of sharia law in Europe, and
censorship as shown in the following tweet.
Example 13 (wirschaffendas 113):
Deutschland ruinieren?
Kriminalität steigern?
Scharia in Europa?
Zensur überall?
Ja klar... #WirSchaffenDas
Ruin Germany?
Increase crime?
Sharia in Europe?
Censorship everywhere?
Yes of course… #WeCanDoIt
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In tweets like this, users anticipate the destruction, downfall, and ruin of Germany and Europe.
These negative consequences are also linked to religion (sharia law) and negative stereotypes
about Muslim countries (censorship). As in the following example, the cause of the destruction
or catastrophe is often not directly stated but merely alluded to. The sentence structure and word
choice of the following tweet also suggest that the downfall is already in progress and, due to the
policies and practices of the politicians, unstoppable. #WECANDOIT becomes part of an indirect
referent for refugees and and so makes the connection between cause and effect.
Example 14 (wirschaffendas 144):
#WIRSCHAFFENDAS, so die Losung der Politiker aus deren goldenem Käfig, also
weiter in Richtung Katastrophe u Auflösung unserer Gesellschaft
#WECANDOIT, that’s the slogan of the politicians from their golden cage, and so our
society continues toward catastrophe and downfall
The mentioning of terms associated with a religion demonstrates how religion is used as a
reason to exclude. Muslims are depicted as violent – several tweets include references to
violence among refugees in camps and allusions to violence toward German residents as stated
before – and Islam as a religion is depicted as not suitable for Europe, which is based on
Christian values and traditions. This is supported by references to previous terror attacks
(Example 1: #AllahuAkbar – the Muslim ‘#culturalenrichment’ of #Paris …) and other contexts
as in Example 15.
Example 15 (wirschaffendas 241):
Keinem westl. Land ist es bislang gelungen, muslimische Araber nachhaltig zu
integrieren, aber – klar @GoeringEckardt – #wirschaffendas .
No Western country managed to integrate Muslim Arabs in the long term, but – sure
@GoeringEckardt – #wecandoit .
The authors claim that Muslims cannot be integrated in Western countries since no country has
been successful integrating Muslims, according to the author of the tweet. The reason for this
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claim is imlied: integration is not possible due to cultural differences between Muslim Arabs and
Christian Europeans. The author uses but – sure ironically to indicate that the government is
setting Germany up to achieve the “unachievable” and addresses the former leader of the Green
Party, Katrin Göring-Eckardt. The Green Party is known to promote integration of immigrants
and a multicultural society; however, this position of a multicultural society is criticized and
Muslim immigrants are depicted as a danger for Germany and Europe as evidenced by previous
terror attacks (e.g., Example 11 and Example 12).

Argumentation
In order to support the characterizations described above and hence justify the
discrimination against the other, both explicit and implicit arguments are used. These arguments
are often supported by news reports, various sources, and citing experts. Users strengthen their
points and opinions for example by citing online sources from conservative mainstream media
such as the German daily newspaper, Die Welt, the German monthly magazine, Cicero, and the
German tabloid, BILD. There are also references to local online newspapers to draw attention to
and share a local situation.
Example 16 (wirschaffendas 38):
...es wird immer lustiger! :-( #merkel #wirschaffendas
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146825325/Fuer-Fluechtlinge-gekuendigtDas-war-wie-ein-Tritt.html
…it’s getting more and more hilarious! :-( #merkel #wecandoit [Link to article]
In the above tweet, the ironic statement it’s getting more and more hilarious is followed by a sad
emoticon which reverses the meaning of hilarious, the hashtags merkel and wirschaffendas, and
the link to an article about the story of a woman whose apartment lease was canceled because the
local authorities wanted to use the house as a home for asylum seekers. Although it is certainly
86

important to give voice to all people and point out existing or perceived inequalities and
injustices, the framing of the tweet with the two hashtags suggests that Merkel and her open-door
policy as regards refugees are to be blamed for this situation.
Twitter users also cite online articles from right-wing outlets such as the German weekly
newspapers, Junge Freiheit (English: Young Freedom) and Preussische Allgemeine Zeitung
(English: Prussian General Newspaper) as illustrated in the following example.
Example 17 (wirschaffendas 33):
‘Interner Bericht – Bundeswehr: #Asylbewerber urinieren auf Flüchtlingsfrauen’
https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2015/bundeswehr-asylbewerber-urinierenauf-fluechtlingsfrauen/ Tja, “#wirschaffendas”..
‘internal report – German military: #asylumseekers urinate on refugee women’ [Link
to article] Well, “wecandoit” ..
In this tweet, an internal report from the German military about the inadequate situation in a
migrant reception center in Erfurt, Germany is cited. Male asylum seekers are said to urinate on
women and sexually harass women. At the end, the article states that local authorities denied any
knowledge of the situation; however, some Twitter users may not open every hyperlink but rely
on the headlines to build their opinions. Moreover, neither tweet nor article describes the
situation from the perspective of the refugees and asylum seekers. They do not have a voice in
this report and are depicted as uncivilized and not suitable for German society due to the implied
lack of manners and values. Citing such a report thus contributes to the reinforcement of negative
stereotypes of refugees and asylum seekers.
Apart from using news reports to contribute to the negative presentation of refugees and
asylum seekers, users also reference numbers and experts to increase the credibility as well as
urgency of their statements. The following tweet points out that more than a million refugees
have already arrived and 70% of them are men who would get their families to join them. The
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statement is followed by #wirschaffendas and the negation thereof. The user negates that we will
manage the situation. The first person plural personal pronoun indicates that the author is writing
in the name of the German state and nation. The user thus questions the state’s and society’s
capacity and ability to accommodate such large numbers of refugees. It is further implied that the
1.2 million are just the beginning, as most men would bring their families, too. The tweet also
contains the hashtag hart aber fair (English: tough but fair), which is the name of a weekly
German political talk show. The user may have included the reference to Hart aber Fair because
the show discussed the topic of refugees at that time.
Example 18 (wirschaffendas 70):
Jetzt schon 1,2 Mio #Flüchtlinge Davon 70 % Männer die ihre Familien nachholen...
#wirschaffendas Nee, schaffen wir NICHT #hartaberfair
Already 1.2 m #refugees 70% of them will bring their families… #wecandoit Nope,
we DON’T #hartaberfair
Numbers are not only used to invoke fear as regards the amount of people who are
migrating to Germany but also to express the expected financial burden of Germany’s refugee
policy. In the following tweet, which begins ironically with the hashtag no problem, the wellknown and influential German Institute for Economic Research, ifo, is cited, albeit without
reference. According to the author of the tweet, the institute calculated that refugees would cost
Germany more than €10 billion (approximately $12 billion).
Example 19 (wirschaffendas 83):
#noproblem, #refugees will cost Germany min. €10,000,000,000, according IFO
Institute (Munich) #wirschaffendas
Based on the tweet it is unclear how this number was calculated and what it stands for. While
studies of economic research institutes often calculate the total expenses the state is likely to
face, they may not consider state income generated by migrants in the form of income tax or
value-added tax on goods and services (Diekmann, 2016).
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Fear is also generated by sharing stories that are not always supported by references,
links, or expert voices. Some tweets include made-up stories about the financial or societal
consequences of the influx of refugees such as higher unemployment, higher taxes, and lower
wages as in the following tweet:
Example 20 (wirschaffendas 242):
Hat #Merkel schon verkündet das der #Mindestlohn jetzt auf 3€ gedrückt werden
muss? #wirschaffendas #fluechtlinge #lösung
Did #Merkel already announce that the #minimumwage will now have to be lowered to
€3 (approximately $3.50)? #wecandoit #refugees #solution
The user employs sarcasm to point to the financial burden of the large amount of refugees
arriving in Germany, potentially entering the work force, and thus lowering the wages for
everyone through wage dumping.
Apart from citing or referring to sources, facts, and experts, the most commonly found
feature was the criticism of politicians, particularly Chancellor Merkel as she is the head of
government and vested with policy-making power according to article 65 of the German
Constitution (“Das Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 2012). Politicians of
mainstream political parties in general and Chancellor Merkel in particular are criticized for their
policies and blamed for the influx of refugees and the resulting negative consequences. The
government’s position toward refugees is depicted as an invitation to billions of refugees. In the
following tweet, the user further criticizes those who want to be politically correct (Fairclough,
2003) by referring to them with the pejorative term Gutmenschen (English: someone who is
politically hyper-correct), and policies and practices that represent a welcoming culture.
According to the author, these policies and practices are like invitations for refugees to come to
Germany. The sarcastic tone expressed through the hashtags rich country, we accept everyone,
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and we can do it, as well as the word choice of Gutmenschen and großfressig supports the
tweet’s negative stance toward pro-refugee policies and practices.
Example 21 (wirschaffendas 245):
#Gutmenschen, großfressige Reden wie #Willkommenskultur, #reichesLand
#wirnehmenjedenauf #wirschaffendas – #Einladungen an Mrd. #Flüchtlinge
#thepoliticallyhypercorrect, loud-mouth speeches like #welcomingculture, #richcountry,
#weaccepteveryone #wecandoit – #invitations to billions of #refugees
Furthermore, the politicians’ general competency is questioned by tweets like the
following:
Example 22 (wirschaffendas 126):
#WirSchaffenDas? #Obdachlosigkeit,#Arbeitslosigkeit,#Altersarmut.Haben wir eines
dieser Themen “geschafft”? Was soll diesmal anders sein?
#WeCanDoIt? #homelessness,#unemployment,#oldagepoverty.Have we “managed” one
of these topics? What would be different this time?
The user questions the government’s ability to deal with the migrant crisis, expressed by
#wirschaffendas followed by a question mark and a list of other political issues, such as
unemployment or poverty among the elderly, as the government has not been able to tackle these
other political issues. In this case, the referent for we in wir schaffen das is the government rather
than the German population. This user thus interprets we as an “exclusive we” as opposed to
other users who interpret it as an “inclusive we” and feel addressed by the statement and
requested to contribute.
While the previous tweet represents an indirect criticism of the government, other tweets
criticize Merkel and other politicians more directly by questioning their competency regarding
the migrant crisis. The following tweet is written in four lines. The first two lines display a
repetition of #Wirschaffendas and the contradiction but not with Merkel and the Minister of the
Interior of the time, de Maizière, respectively. The third line is a question about the whereabouts
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of competent and capable politicians, suggesting that the current government is not competent or
capable, particularly when it comes to the migrant crisis. The last line consists of another hashtag
that emerged during the time and denotes that Germany, or the media and people, are paying
attention to the situation, #Dschauthin, which is a blend of Deutschland (English: Germany) and
schaut hin (English: is watching).
Example 23 (wirschaffendas 239):
#Wirschaffendas – aber nicht mit #Merkel
#Wirschaffendas – aber nicht mit #deMaiziére
wo sind die fähigen kompetenten Politiker?
#Dschauthin
#Wecandoit – but not with #Merkel
# Wecandoit – but not with #deMaiziére
where are the competent politicians?
#Germanyiswatching
In the following two examples, the authors do not criticize the competency of the federal
government or Chancellor Merkel directly but point out the consequences faced by regional and
local authorities. According to the author of the first example and the online newspaper article
the user is citing, registered associations (German: Vereine) are required to provide their
gymnasiums for refugees, which threatens the existence of these associations as regular activities
and practices cannot be performed. Registered associations play an important part in German
social life as many recreational activities take place in registered associations such as sports as
well as chartitable and political activities. These associations are governed by the German civil
code and can be compared to voluntary non-profit organizations in the US.
Example 24 (wirschaffendas 21):
die zwangsbelegung von hallen bedroht existenz von vereinen
http://www.derwesten.de/region/belegung-von-hallen-mit-fluechtlingen-bringt-vereinein-not-id11125620.html … #wirschaffendas
the compulsory use of gymnasiums threatens the existence of associations [Link to
article] … #wecandoit
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Another user cites an online newspaper article about local authorities in Southern Bavaria
who complain that they have exceeded their capacities. The phrase wir schaffen das is followed
by a question mark, which indicates that the user questions the statement and thus criticizes the
federal government for not supporting the local governments appropriately. These local and
regional governments are confronted with the arrival of refugees due to the proximity of Munich
and Upper Bavaria (German: Oberbayern) to the Austrian border and thus to the two most
popular migratory routes at the time, the Western Balkan route and the Eastern Mediterranean
route (Frontex, 2016).
Example 25 (wirschaffendas 184):
#wirschaffendas? #München und Oberbayern werden gerade im Stich gelassen:
http://bit.ly/1VTzWm0 via @SZ #refugeeswelcome
#wecandoit? #Munich and Upper Bavaria are currently being abandoned: [Link to
article] via @SZ #refugeeswelcome
The strongest form of criticism is the request for the removal of the Chancellor and her
supporters. Example 26 (same as Example 5) is written in the form of a general command
without a direct addressee. Additionally, #wirschaffendas is reappropriated to express
encouragement for getting rid of Merkel rather than managing the migrant crisis. In this example,
we is used to mean the opposition of Merkel.
Example 26 (wirschaffendas 167):
#Merkel und ihre Vasallen des Amtes entheben! #wirschaffendas bestimmt!
Remove #Merkel and her puppets from office! #wecandoit for sure!
Example 27 includes the link to a petition to start a vote of no confidence in the Chancellor with
the purpose of removing the government from office. A constructive vote of no confidence
represents the only constitutional tool for the parliament to remove the German Chancellor. The
opposition is required to propose a new candidate for Chancellor on the same ballot. The tweet
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represents an invitation to participate in the petition and bring forth a new government without
Merkel. The use of #wirschaffendas at the end of the tweet not only serves the categorization of
the tweet; in fact, the phrase is reappropriated because it is connected to getting rid of Merkel
and thus can be read as an encouragement for other users to participate in the petition in order to
remove Merkel from office. Her own words are thus juxtaposed with the sentiment of opposition.
Example 27 (wirschaffendas 47):
Im Übrigen bin ich der Meinung, das #Merkelmussweg
Don’t hesitate, activate! https://www.change.org/p/wir-fordern-das-misstrauensvotumr%C3%BCcktritt-der-bundeskanzlerin-dr-a-merkel-und-sofortige-neuwahl-derbundesregierung-resignation-of-the-german-chancellor-dr-a-merkel-and-immediatereelection-of-the-german-government #Zukunft ohne Merkel #Wirschaffendas
By the way, in my opinion, #Merkelmustgo Don’t hesitate, activate! [Link to petition]
#Future without Merkel #Wecandoit
Perspectivization
Another common strategy found in right-wing tweets is perspectivization. Names,
descriptions, and arguments are framed to support the negative presentation of the other and the
positive self-presentation. Negative qualities and characteristics of the constructed other and
positive qualities and characteristics of the in-group are emphasized, while positive actions of the
other and negative actions of the in-group are downplayed. This can be achieved by the use of
pronouns, demonstratives, syntactic structures, and agency.
Refugees are depicted as favored and prioritized as opposed to citizens who have to
suffer the consequences of the politicians’ pro-refugee policies and practices. In the following
example, the user sarcastically claims that Merkel has become a motherly figure for refugees
who do not need to follow the law in order to get to mother Merkel. The expression mother
Merkel as well as the hyperbolic claim that no laws and rules are in effect serve as a
contextualization cues for the sarcastic meaning of the tweet.
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Example 28 (wirschaffendas 110):
auf dem Weg zu #MutterMerkel gelten keine Gesetze&Regeln #Flüchtlinge lassen
sich nicht aufhalten #wirschaffendas
on the way to #motherMerkel no laws&rules are in effect #refugees can’t be held
back #wecandoit
The user probably refers to the Dublin procedures, which were suspended by the German
government and allowed refugees to enter and seek asylum in Germany.
The authors of the following two examples juxtapose the phrase wir schaffen das with the
burden that we as the citizens have to carry. In both cases, the users question the meaning of we
and claim that we should be understood as only referring to the citizens. In the first example
(same as Example 7), the author questions the ability of them to manage the situation. The
German word denen (English: them, those) is used in this context as a demonstrative pronoun
and thus as a deictic form to add emphasis. It is used not only to distinguish between us and them
but also to create distance. Therefore, the user distinguishes between the ordinary citizens, who
will have to carry out what is associated with wir schaffen das, and the politicians, or the
establishment, who are unable to deal with the situation.
Example 29 (wirschaffendas 71):
Ich höre immer #wirschaffendas Die meinen wohl uns damit weil von denen schafft es
keiner! #hartaberfair
I always hear #wecandoit They probably mean us because of them none will manage!
#hartaberfair
In the second example (same as Example 6), there is also a distinction between us the
people and you all the politicians who waste the taxpayers’ money. Additionally, a different
meaning of the word schaffen is used, that is, to work. After asking who we refers to, the user
defines that we refers to the citizens who work, while the taxes are wasted by you all referring to
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the politicians who support the pro-refugee policies and practices. Opposition is thus created
through the two pronouns.
Example 30 (wirschaffendas 100):
#wirschaffendas Wer ist wir ? Ja, wir schaffen und ihr vergeudet die #Steuern !!
#wecandoit Who is we? Yes, we work and you all waste the #taxes !!
In the following tweet (same as Example 14), the distance between citizens and
politicians is even more vividly described; the politicians sit in a golden cage where they are
protected from any negative consequences, while society continues its path toward catastrophe
and downfall as described above.
Example 31 (wirschaffendas 144):
#WIRSCHAFFENDAS, so die Losung der Politiker aus deren goldenem Käfig, also
weiter in Richtung Katastrophe u Auflösung unserer Gesellschaft
#WECANDOIT, that’s the slogan of the politicians from their golden cage, and so our
society continues toward catastrophe and downfall
The previous examples already pointed to the perceived inability to act on the part of the
citizens. Even though the tweets described us as the ones who need to face the consequences, we
do not have a say in this matter as the politicians, particularly Chancellor Merkel, make the
decisions. The perceived enforcement of pro-refugee policies by the federal government also
affects local authorities, who are said to be left alone as illustrated in Example 24 and Example
25. Refugees, on the other hand, are described as more active, for example as actively pushing
for asylum, making the infrastructure collapse, and represented as an unstoppable force as in
Example 2 and Example 28.
The meaning of a tweet or statement is also influenced by the sentence structure or how a
phrase like wir schaffen das is embedded in the sentence. The following examples show how the
hashtag functions as a sentence element. In the first example the phrase is negated. German
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negation allows for simply adding the negation word nicht (English: not) after subject, verb, and
direct object (Literally: we can do it not). Therefore, the statement itself does not have to be
modified in order to be negated.
Example 32 (wirschaffendas 179):
#WirSchaffenDas nicht.
#WeCannotDoIt.
In the second example (same as Example 12), the hashtag is followed by a period. In
writing this would signal the end of a sentence, however, given the conversational style of
Twitter, it can also signal a pause. After the period, the tweet continues with a prepositional
phrase that may be syntactically connected to the previous phrase since the preposition is not
capitalized.
Example 33 (wirschaffendas 195):
#wirschaffendas. bis zum nächsten anschlag. #fluechtlinge
#wecandoit. until the next attack. #fluechtlinge
In the third example (same as Example 22), the phrase is followed by a question mark,
which indicates that the author questions that we will manage the migrant crisis. The verb
schaffen, which in this context means manage to do, is also used in a second question in
quotation marks to indicate that the author questions that the migrant crisis will be dealt with
successfully.
Example 34 (wirschaffendas 126):
#WirSchaffenDas? #Obdachlosigkeit,#Arbeitslosigkeit,#Altersarmut.Haben wir eines
dieser Themen “geschafft”? Was soll diesmal anders sein?
#WeCanDoIt? #homelessness, #unemployment, #oldagepoverty. Have we “managed”
one of these topics? What would be different this time?
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The last example uses another meaning of schaffen, more precisely the phrasal verb
abschaffen (English: to eliminate, to abolish). The author uses the similarity of the words to
perform a word play, in which the user implies the elimination of us because of positions like
refugees welcome and wir schaffen das as indicated by the use of the hashtags.
Example 35 (wirschaffendas 204):
Wir schaffen uns ab. #refugeeswelcome #wirschaffendas
We eliminate ourselves. #refugeeswelcome #wecandoit
Intertextuality
The findings also show that tweets contain intertextual references. There are three
intertextual references to Barack Obama’s presidential campaign slogan Yes we can, which is
similarly “adaptable” due to deixis and no fixed referents, two references to Merkel being from
East Germany, and five references to Merkel as a mother figure. In the following section, I will
explain and contextualize the references to Merkel as Ossi and Mom. Ossi is a pejorative term
used to describe someone from East Germany, or more precisely the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR). Close to 30 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, preconceptions and negative
stereotypes about East Germans still persist. Common negative steretypes include being dumb
and lazy and acting as an informer. Both derive from the economic and political system of the
GDR.
Although not as present in this dataset as in the datasets collected in December 2016
(#MerkelsTote, #BerlinAttack), there are some references to Merkel’s origin. Even though she
was born in Hamburg, West Germany, Merkel grew up and lived in East Germany, and since
1990 has been the representative of an electoral constituency located in Northern East Germany
in the German Bundestag. Moreover, Merkel is the first German Chancellor from East Germany.
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In the following tweet, the user compares the opening of the border between East and West
Germany in 1989 and the opening of the borders during the European migrant crisis.
Example 36 (wirschaffendas 158):
Danke #Merkel für d Öffnung d Grenzen.Wenn Ostdeutsche Weltpolitik machen.Echo
diesmal anders als b #schabowski #wirschaffendas
Thank you #Merkel for the opening of the borders.When East Germans do world
politics.Echo this time different than with #schabowski #wecandoit
Schabowski was the spokesperson of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) (German:
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the political party of the GDR, who announced at an
evening press conference on November 9, 1989 that travel and migration between East and West
Germany would be allowed, effective immediately. While the response to the opening of the
Berlin Wall was positive, the user implies that the response to opening the borders during the
migrant crisis would be different. The thanking at the beginning of the tweet can be understood
as ironic and at the same time as holding Merkel responsible as it precedes the phrase When East
Germans do world politics, which points to a generalization that East Germans are less
competent in doing politics. This generalization is corroborated by the fact Schabowski’s
announcement was in fact a mistake as the new regulation allowing travel between East and
West Germany was supposed to be released during the night and not during prime time.
Another code that emerged from the data was the depiction as Merkel as mother and
mommy. While it can be interpreted as a reference to her role as protector and caregiver of the
German nation, it could also point to her long-term chancellery (since 2005), and thus stability.
Her demeanor is often described as calm and composed, and her political style is characterized
by not taking many risks (dos Santos, 2013). However, in right-wing tweets, her role of protector
and caregiver is connected to the prioritizing of refugees as represented in Example 37 (same as
Example 28).
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Example 37 (wirschaffendas 110):
auf dem Weg zu #MutterMerkel gelten keine Gesetze&Regeln #Flüchtlinge lassen sich
nicht aufhalten #wirschaffendas
on the way to #motherMerkel there are no laws&rules #refugees cannot be stopped
#wecandoit
The user suggests that the function of protector and caregiver applies to refugees. In fact, Merkel
is presented as a mother figure for refugees who are not held back by the law in order to get to
her. Even though the depiction of Merkel as mother is often used by her supporters, Twitter users
seem to use this reference ironically when criticizing the position and practices of Merkel, which
is evident in the following example.
Example 38 (wirschaffendas 244):
Wie Merkel mal wieder zur Mutti wird! #Titelseite #wirschaffendas
How Merkel is becoming mommy once again! #frontpage #wecandoit
The tweet implies that Merkel becomes the center of attention, which is often beneficial for
politicians as it draws attention to them; she could thus use that for her own political purposes. It
suggests that Merkel uses the refugees to improve her image as caring mother of the nation.
References to Merkel as mother also make her gender relevant and exploit gender stereotypes of
women as too “soft” on tough issues.

Semiotic and multimodal resources
Hashtags are often used to categorize a tweet but hashtags can also have an evaluative
stance. Many tweets that contain #refugeesnotwelome, for instance, express anti-refugee
opinions or positions (Kreis, 2017a). Furthermore, hashtags are not only used as an additional
marker to categorize the content and meaning of the tweet, but they can also function as sentence
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elements. The following tweet (same as Example 22) shows how #wirschaffendas is used as a
question.
Example 39 (wirschaffendas 126):
#WirSchaffenDas? #Obdachlosigkeit,#Arbeitslosigkeit,#Altersarmut.Haben wir eines
dieser Themen “geschafft”? Was soll diesmal anders sein?
#WeCanDoIt? #homelessness, #unemployment, #oldagepoverty.Have we “managed”
one of these topics? What would be different this time?
In addition to the first hashtag, #WirSchaffenDas, the user adds three more hashtags. All three
hashtags denote the issues that have not been managed by the government according to the user.
The use of hashtags, as opposed to just words, might be explained by the increasing convention
of using hashtags creatively “as a simple means of emphasis” (Bruns & Burgess, 2015, p. 17).
Arounnd 36% of the #wirschaffendas tweets contained more than one hashtag. As in the
following example (same as Example 21), the hashtag is also used for buzzwords such as
welcoming culture or refugees.
Example 40 (wirschaffendas 245):
#Gutmenschen, großfressige Reden wie #Willkommenskultur, #reichesLand
#wirnehmenjedenauf #wirschaffendas – #Einladungen an Mrd. #Flüchtlinge
#thepoliticallyhypercorrect, loud-mouth speeches like #welcomingculture,
#richcountry, #weaccepteveryone #wecandoit – #invitations to billions of #refugees
The two hashtags that co-occur most with #wirschaffendas are #Merkel and
#refugeeswelcome, which seems consistent; not only is Merkel the person who stated the phrase
wir schaffen das, but also the phrase stands for pro-refugee policies and practices and hence
welcomes refugees. Although, as shown in the analysis, her pro-refugee stance is often inverted
with these same resources.
Another common feature in social media is the use of emoticons and emojis since users
often cannot rely on paralinguistic cues such as intonation, gestures, or facial expressions in
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order to convey the meaning of an utterance. Contextualization cues are particularly important
when expressing irony or sarcasm. The following example (same as Example 9) shows a
common emoticon that is used to express irony, that is, the emoticon of a winking face. In this
particular example, the emoticon is placed after #Wirschaffendas and, therefore, it signals that
the user questions that we can do it because of the occurrence of a fight in a refugee home. The
reference to the report about the fight is used to ironically question the government’s and
society’s ability to deal with the situation.
Example 41 (wirschaffendas 84):
Schlägerei in Fluchtlingsheim https://www.hna.de/lokales/hann-muenden/verletzternach-pruegelei-adelebser-fluechtlingsunterkunft-5542717.html … #Wirschaffendas ;-)
brawl in refugee home [Link to article] #Wecandoit ;-)
In the following example (same as Example 16), the emoticon of a sad face contradicts
the preceding utterance. Although the word hilarious appears in the tweet, the author does not
actually think the situation referred to in the article is funny. In fact, the author uses sarcasm to
criticize the situation described in the newspaper article. The emoticon of a sad face supports the
evaluation of the situation.
Example 42 (wirschaffendas 38):
...es wird immer lustiger! :-( #merkel #wirschaffendas
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article146825325/Fuer-Fluechtlinge-gekuendigtDas-war-wie-ein-Tritt.html …
…it’s getting more and more hilarious! :-( #merkel #wecandoit [Link to article]
Emoticons and emojis are not the only contextualization cues that appear. The
capitalization of letters, for instance, may also signal emphasis. In the following tweet (same as
Example 18), the user capitalizes not (German: nicht) to contradict the phrase wir schaffen das
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not only by negating the sentence but also by adding emphasis on this negation through
capitalization.
Example 43 (wirschaffendas 70):
Jetzt schon 1,2 Mio #Flüchtlinge Davon 70 % Männer die ihre Familien nachholen...
#wirschaffendas Nee, schaffen wir NICHT #hartaberfair
Already 1.2 m #refugees 70% of them will bring their families… #wecandoit Nope, we
WON’T #hartaberfair
Additionally, some users capitalize the first letters of the three parts of the phrase for readability
as in #WirSchaffenDas (English: #WeCanDoIt) since the hashtag consists of three words.
Another feature that was found in the data is the use of a creative text format. The
following two examples are written in the form of a stanza resembling a short poem. The first
example (same as Example 13) contains four lines of brief questions, which marks parallel form,
and ends in the ironic answer ja klar… (English: yes of course…).
Example 44 (wirschaffendas 113):
Deutschland ruinieren?
Kriminalität steigern?
Scharia in Europa?
Zensur überall?
Ja klar... #WirSchaffenDas
Ruin Germany?
Increase crime?
Sharia in Europe?
Censorship everywhere?
Yes of course… #WeCanDoIt
The second example (same as Example 23) also contains a parallelism. The first two lines are
almost identical with the only difference being the name of the politician. The third line
continues the content of the first two lines with a question about competent politicians. The last
line only consists of a hashtag.
Example 45 (wirschaffendas 239):
#Wirschaffendas – aber nicht mit #Merkel
#Wirschaffendas – aber nicht mit #deMaiziére
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wo sind die fähigen kompetenten Politiker?
#Dschauthin
#Wecandoit – but not with #Merkel
# Wecandoit – but not with #deMaiziére
where are the competent politicians?
#Germanyiswatching
This text format draws further attention to the tweets because it makes them stand out, and it
shows how users take advantage of the affordances provided by Twitter given the character
limitation and express themselves creatively.
Apart from hashtags, letter capitalizations, and creative text formats, images can also be
used to reinforce an argument or to explain the meaning of a tweet. Close to 15% of the tweets
with #wirschaffendas included some kind of image, for example, a photograph or a meme. The
following tweet contains two hashtags and an image that consists of four pictures, three captions,
and two rage faces (Figure 1).
Example 46 (wirschaffendas 75):
#ragecomic #WirSchaffenDas pic.twitter.com/FHA9NHBz6Q

Figure 1. Tweet “wirschaffendas 75.”
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The first hashtag identifies the image as a rage comic. Rage comics emerged on the image board
website, 4Chan, as “simple comics about life’s daily frustrations, … [and] have grown into a
format that includes a rich visual language of a huge number of MS paint faces” (Gulin, 2011).
The top left image shows an overcrowded boat and is captioned Das Boot ist voll! (English: The
boat is full!). The image is supposedly from June 2014 and appeared in a Time article about the
migrant crisis from April 2015 (Walt, 2015). The top right image shows a freight train with
people sitting on top of and hanging from a freight car. The bottom images show the portraits of
what seem to be two German politicians, former German Minister of the Interior, Thomas de
Maizière, on the left, and Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on the right. Both faces are covered by
rage faces. De Maizière seems to be at a press conference as he is in front of a microphone.
Merkel seems to be inside the Bundestag (German federal parliament) due to the shape and color
of the chairs in the background. Both politicians are shown with their hand and index finger
lifted or pointing at the audience. The image of de Maizière is captioned with the German word
NO followed by a period and the image of Merkel is captioned with the phrase WIR SCHAFFEN
DAS followed by an exclamation mark both in capital letters. The arrangement of the rage comic
suggests that the utterance the boat is full is negated by the Minister of the Interior and
contradicted by Merkel with the phrase wir schaffen das. For users who are familiar with rage
comics, the arrangement of images and captions as well as the use of rage faces may be
humorous. At the same time, the comic may represent a simplified version of the reaction of the
government toward the migrant crisis, and can be interpreted as criticism.
While the previous example required some knowledge about rage comics to be fully
understood, other images display the anticipated negative consequences of the migrant crisis
more directly. The following tweet consists of four hashtags, #Merkel, #Masseneinwanderung
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(English: mass immigration), #WirSchaffenDas, and #Deutschland (English: Germany), and an
image (Figure 2).
Example 47 (wirschaffendas 214):
#Merkel #Masseneinwanderung #WirSchaffenDas #Deutschland
pic.twitter.com/XybAIqb3TK

Figure 2. Tweet “wirschaffendas 214.”
The image shows a man wearing a t-shirt with the German flag and shoveling a grave. The
inscription of the tombstone is the coat of arms of Germany, which displays the Bundesadler
(English: Federal Eagle) in black and red on golden background. The image also shows a female
with a blond bob haircut and purple blazer, which are cues that the person is intended to
represent Merkel, standing in front of a grave and saying WIR SCHAFFEN DAS written in
capitalized letters. The man, representing Germany, shovels his own grave, while the Chancellor
stands in front of the grave cheering him on. The image illustrates the fear that Merkel’s prorefugee policy leads to Germany’s downfall. The hashtags are used as buzz words. The hashtags
do not inherently carry negative connotations unless they are further contextualized. Therefore,
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although the text of the tweet is neutral, the image provides the contextualization cues that help
convey the fear that Germany is facing its death due to pro-refugee policies.
The last example also includes four hashtags, #refugeeswelcome, #wirschaffendas,
#schreinachliebe, and #aktionarschloch, and an image.
Example 48 (wirschaffendas 173):
#refugeeswelcome #wirschaffendas #schreinachliebe #aktionarschloch
pic.twitter.com/eGhuOCe7J3
Schrei nach Liebe (English: scream for love) is the name of an anti-fascist punk song by the
German band, Die Ärzte, from 1993. Toward the end of the song, a Neo-Nazi is repeatedly called
Arschloch (English: ashole). Aktion Arschloch is a social media initiative against xenophobia
from August 2015. The name of the initiative picks up on the word of the song. The purpose of
the initiative was “to bring [the song] … back into the charts and into broadcast media” (Torges,
2015) in order to take a stand against xenophobia. If one only takes into account the hashtags, the
tweet seems to express a pro-refugee, anti-discrimination position; however, the content of the
image is not aligned with such a position. The image shows a blackboard and two sides. The left
side reads IN DEN HEIMEN VON FLÜCHTLINGEN VERGEWALTIGTE
FLÜCHTLINGSFRAUEN in capital letters, which translates to female refugees raped by
refugees in refugee homes. The right side says IN DEN HEIMEN VON “NAZIS”
VERGEWALTIGTE FLÜCHTLINGSFRAUEN in capital letters, which translates to female
refugees raped by “Nazis” in refugee homes. The descriptor Nazis is in scare quotes, which
indicates that the author questions the terminology. The left side has 215 lines and the right side
does not have a single line, meaning refugees are said to rape female refugees very often, while
there is no case of a so-called Nazi who raped a female refugee. It can be interpreted that the user
questions the legitimacy of pro-refugee positions, since rape and potentially other crime is
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committed by refugees themselves and not by so-called Nazis. The negative representation of the
other, in this case the refugees, is emphasized, while the negative representation of us is
downplayed. In fact, even the description of people as Nazis is questioned. The tweet thus
criticizes not only pro-refugee policies as represented by the first two hashtags but also antifascist initiatives.
The data show that images or memes are used to invoke fear, threat, and burden, and to
criticize politicians and pro-refugee actions. This criticism may be displayed in a humorous and
thus less direct way, which could soften the criticism or make it more “sayable.” The description
of the images illustrates that images can be used to express an opinion or reinforce an argument
in a visual way without the need of many words and explanations or often with combinations of
words that appear neutral or even representing a pro-immigrant stance. This not only suits
Twitter’s character limitation, but it also enables users to visually reinforce their opinions.

#openborders
In the #openborders dataset, the occurrence of discursive strategies and topics associated
with right-wing discourses is significantly lower compared to the other three datasets, as shown
in Table 6. Nonetheless, there are examples that employ negative presentation of migrants as
described in the following sections.

Referential/nomination and predication
Only one instance of negative references to migrants was found. Although expressions
like Neger, which is roughly comparable to the English word nigger, and genuine refugees
occur, the closer analysis of the context showed that the users of those tweets were involved in
meta-discussions about the usage of these words. These tweets could thus not be identified as
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supporting right-wing discourses. The one negative reference found in the dataset is also a
religious reference. The user references a tweet and article by a U.S. American conservative
news website claiming that the Islamic State smuggles Jihadi gunmen into Europe thanks to the
migrant crisis. The use of the words Jihadi and gunmen invokes fear and suggests that Europe is
under threat by Islamic fighters. The fallacy that Islam is under general suspicion is thus
reinforced through the tweet.
Example 49 (openborders 62):
4,000 Jihadi gunmen means they must have 4,000 guns at the ready. How could that
happen in the EU? #openborders
Apart from being referred to with negative words, refugees can also be associated with
negative characteristics and qualities. Refugees are described as flooding into Europe and
swarming across #Europe. The depictions of refugees as natural disasters (flood) or a pestilence
(insect swarms) are metaphors. Moreover, migration is depicted as an invasion (Example 50) and
refugees are associated with terrorism (Example 51). The author of the following example
claims, for instance, that the situation, referring to the immigration of refugees, should not be
called immigration because, according to the author, it is an uncontrolled invasion. An invasion
is generally considered an unwelcome intrusion and associated with a large number of people.
Migrants are thus depicted as a threat to Europe. The tweet is supported by the additional
hashtags, #Schengen (the name of the European treaty which regulates border control within the
EU), #EU, #immigrationtoEurope, #exodus, and #openborders.
Example 50 (openborders 67):
It’s not #immigration, it’s an uncontrolled #invasion. #Schengen #EU
#immigrationtoEurope #exodus #openborders
Another user concludes, supported by a story and a picture collage, that refugees pose a
terror threat.
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Example 51 (openborders 57):
He came to Europe by boat. One month later slaughtered 21 people in a Tunisian
Museum #openborders pic.twitter.com/Aw41u56xDV
The author claims that one of the perpetrators responsible for the March 2015 terror attack in
Tunisia had previously entered Europe by boat, which implies that he came as a refugee. This
claim is supported by a collage of four images. The two top images show the upper body of a
man with a hoodie making the victory sign and looking into the camera. The bottom left image
shows a rubber raft filled with people of color, suggesting it is a boat with refugees. The bottom
right image is a scene from a video recording showing three men, one of whom carrying a rifle
or machine gun. The tweet suggests that the person on the top is one of the people on the boat
and also one of the people shown in the recording; however, the collage does not align. In the top
right image, the person’s arm is resting on a gray ship’s rail and the background suggests an
overcast sky. No one on the orange rubber raft in the bottom left image resembles the man in the
top images and the weather is sunny.

Argumentation and perspectivization
Quoting sources is a common strategy used to support an argument. Tweets with
#openborders quote right-wing sources such as the online right-wing political website
FrontPage Magazine or the right-wing news and opinion website Conservative Post. The
following example contains an appeal to the world and to America to wake up.
Example 52 (openborders 24):
http://conservativepost.com/and-so-it-beginsisis-flag-among-refugees-in-germanyfighting-the-police-pictures/ #ISIS #Europe #OpenBorders #WakeUpWorld
#WakeUpAmerica
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In the tweet, open borders and pro-refugee policies are considered a threat to the national
security since refugees in Germany are allegedly waving an ISIS flag and fighting the police, as
reported by the website Conservative Post. Refugees are thus in general associated with ISIS,
which also invokes fear and depicts refugees as a general threat. Users also include numbers or
report about news stories to criticize the concept of open borders as in Example 49 and Example
51. Moreover, they are depicted as actively violent because within the sentence or clause they are
the grammatical agents as in Example 51 (i.e., refugees fighting police).
The topic of threat is also evident in the following example.
Example 53 (openborders 14):
#multiculturalism #openborders let’s import the third world & their conflicts. kebabs
vs kurds. GRAPHIC https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=522108844605728
The user sarcastically expresses the concern that open borders may lead to the import of local
problems: let’s import the third world & their conflicts. Kebabs vs kurds refers to the TurkishKurdish conflict. Turks are called kebabs, which is a pejorative expression as it reduces the
Turkish population to a food item and thus contributes to the negative stereotype of the Turkish
population. Moreover, through the use of the juxtaposition the author uses a generalization to
describe two diverse ethnicities. The tweet also consists of a link to a video posted on Facebook
prefaced by a warning in capital letters that the content is graphic. The video begins with people
peacefully marching in a street waving flags with symbols of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), a Kurdish militant organization. The video then continues with a brief segment in which
a car drives with fast speed into a group of people leaving many severely injured. The last and
longest part of the video shows a wounded man lying on the street surrounded by people who are
trying to stop his bleeding. In the last part, the people speak German. The location of the first and
second part cannot be determined. The caption of the video suggests that PKK terrorists were
110

responsible for both the car attack and the injuries of the man. According of the structure of the
tweet and the supporting video, the promoting of multiculturalism and open borders leads to
more violence in Europe and thus constitutes a threat to the safety of the people. The tweet can
therefore be understood as a criticism of open-border policies.
Even though the criticism of politicians is not a common feature in this dataset, there is
one tweet that calls for the United Nations to be disbanded due to their inability to fight ISIS.
The hashtag Openborders is used as the subject of the clause coming to a country near you.
Open borders is thus used as a metonymy. Not the open borders themselves are coming but the
consequences of open borders, that is, migrants who could potentially belong to ISIS.
Example 54 (openborders 160):
#UnitedNations should be disbanded, they have done nothing abt #Isis #Openborders
coming to a country near you #ukpol #eupol #tcot #auspol
Criticism is not only addressed to politicians or intergovernmental organizations. The
following tweet is addressing those who support open borders and requests that they remove
their locks and open their doors to everyone. The user criticizes advocates of open borders for
being hypocritical by making an analogy and assuming that they would not be willing to live
without locks and welcome everyone to their houses. This tweet addresses the concern that open
borders would lead to more migrants and thus foreigners who may pose a security risk to one’s
belongings and potentially even one’s life.
Example 55 (openborders 63):
All who believe in #openborders should first remove all locks and open their own
doors to all. Any less is hypocrisy.
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Semiotic and multimodal resources
As stated before, tweets may contain a variety of semiotic and multimodal resources that
can contribute to meaning-making processes and establish intertextual or interdiscursive
references. As in the following tweet, the use of multiple modes may help contextualize the text.
Example 56 (openborders 59):
Let’s hope it’s not just your hearts bleeding, with our new found arrivals
#openborders #UKIP pic.twitter.com/CSjfGMZOyB
Let’s hope it’s not just your hearts bleeding is a play on pro-refugee positions that express
empathy toward the difficult situation that refugees face when trying to reach the EU. The author
uses the figurative expression bleeding of hearts, which likely derived from the conventional
expression bleeding heart liberal, to allude to actual bleeding and thus injury and potentially
death caused by our new found arrivals. While the inclusion of #openborders contributes to the
construction of threat, #UKIP seems to represent a positioning and alignment of the author’s
political positions. UKIP stands for UK Independence Party, a right-wing populist political party
in the UK with nationalist positions against immigration and multiculturalism. The attached
meme reinforces the depiction of refugees posing a threat to Europe. The heading of the meme
says in capital letters WELCOME TO EUROPE. The sub-heading claims They are not refugees
and not migrants They are TERRORISTS. The headings are supported by four images. The
arrangement of the images as well as the color combination and captions suggest that the two
images on the left represent one person and the two images on the right represent another person.
In both cases, the pictures of the men captioned 2015 Refugee in Europe are juxtaposed with
images of men carrying a machine gun or rifle. The caption of the left image says 2014 ISIS and
thus claims that the person who is holding the machine gun was an ISIS fighter in 2014 and came
to Europe as a refugee in 2015. This is paralleled in the two images on the right. According to
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the caption, the man in the image was part of the Al Nusra Front, a Salafist terrorist organization,
and also came to Europe as a refugee in 2015. The meme in combination with the text invokes
fear as it suggests that terrorist fighters come to Europe disguised as refugees, taking advantage
of open borders, and pose a threat to Europeans. This threat may be perceived as a real one, in
the light of previous terror attacks in Europe that were claimed by ISIS.
As described above, hashtags may be used for various reasons and purposes. The
following example demonstrates an excessive use of hashtags.
Example 57 (openborders 32):
@zerohedge #Next #Step #Anyone #Opposing #New #World #Order #is #racist #for
#denying #openborders #and #wanting #to #protect #sovereignty
The tweet is a response to a tweet by @zerohedge quoting a report by the BBC that Germany is
reintroducing border control and sending riot police to support the local authorities handling the
influx of refugees. In the response tweet, every single word is preceded by a hashtag. This
unusual format may have been chosen to support the sarcastic tone of the tweet. The user
sarcastically claims that the next step, referring to the tweet by @zerohedge, would be that
anyone who opposes the so-called new world order would be called racist. By new world order
the author probably means open borders and the nation-states’ loss of sovereignty; criticizing
these concepts, that is, denying open borders and wanting to protect state sovereignty, means
being racist. Through this sarcastic exaggeration, the tweet can be understood as a sarcastic
criticism of liberal positions.

#MerkelsTote
After describing the datasets relevant to the first timeframe in the summer of 2015, the
following sections focus on the second timframe, that is, December 2016.
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Referential/nomination
In the #MerkelsTote dataset, the description of refugees is connected to their relationship
to Chancellor Merkel. Refugees and asylum seekers are referred to as ihre Asylanten (English:
her asylum seekers), Merkels Gäste (English: Merkel’s guests) (Example 58), Merkels neue
Kinder (English: Merkel’s new children) (Example 59), and Adoptivsöhne (English: adoptive
sons). The use of the possessive determiner her attributes ownership and thus responsibility to
Merkel. The depiction of refugees as Merkel’s guests implies that she invited them. Germany’s
suspension of the Dublin procedures in August 2015 was often portrayed as an invitation to the
masses to come to Germany, although the suspension of the procedures was to be applied to
Syrian refugees only (ZeitOnline, 2015). The expressions adoptive sons and Merkel’s new
children go even further as regards the relationship between Merkel and refugees; the users use
the reference to Merkel as mother and caregiver. The fact that the user chooses adoptive sons
instead of adoptive children also hints at the perception that refugees are mostly young males.
Example 58 (MerkelsTote 6):
#MerkelsGäste ? #Adoptivsöhne von #Merkel !
Alle auf den #Merkelmussweg !
Zuviel #MerkelsTote !
#Merkel’sguests ? #adoptivesons of #Merkel !
All to #Merkelmustgo !
Too many #Merkel’sdead!
The references to refugees as Merkel’s adopted or new children suggest, similarly to the
#wirschaffendas dataset, prioritization of refugees over German citizens. Furthermore, Merkel is
represented as the guardian and thus responsible for the actions of her new children. In the
following example, the author claims that Merkel’s new children are allowed to play war while
the politically hypercorrect are worried about the rise in right-wing populism.
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Example 59 (MerkelsTote 130):
#MerkelsneueKinder dürfen hier #Krieg spielen.Gutmenschen haben Angst vor mehr
#Rechtspopulismus. #krankeWelt #MerkelsTote #BerlinAttack
#MerkelsTote #BerlinAttack / #Merkel’snewchildren are allowed to play #war
here.The politically hypercorrect are afraid of more right-wing populism. #sickworld
#Merkel’sdead #BerlinAttack
Here is a deictic expression and refers to Germany, given that the tweet is written in German and
references the Berlin terrorist attack. The user employs irony to criticize the consequences of
Merkel’s pro-refugee policies as well as to criticize the do-gooders who are more concerned
about right-wing populism than the violent actions of refugees. The ironic tone is supported by
the description of refugees as children who play war as well as the hashtag sick world. Despite or
maybe because of the ironic tone, the user also invokes fear. The statement implies that refugees
engage in violent activities here, in Germany and Europe, and thus represent a danger for the
German people and the country’s safety. While the threat of right-wing populism is downplayed,
the user stresses the danger posed by refugees, which reinforces the negative presentation of the
other while deemphasizing any negative characteristics of right-wing discourses.
As in the #wirschaffendas dataset, a number of tweets contain pejorative references to
Chancellor Merkel and other politicians. For instance, Merkel is called a career politician
implying she is more interested in her re-election than the wellbeing of the people she represents.
She is also ironically referred to as a professional for uncontrolled mass migration. The term
Fachkraft (English: professional, skilled employee) is a reference to the often-discussed labor
shortage of qualified professionals in Germany. Some politicians and economists argued that
refugees may help fill the marketplace demands. The user of the tweet portrays Merkel as a
professional for uncontrolled mass migration. The reference to Merkel is established through the
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noun phrase, the #professional for uncontrolled #massmigration in the #Chancellory, because
the Chancellory is the location of the German Chancellor’s office.
Example 60 (MerkelsTote 82):
Wann kapiert die #Fachkraft für unkontrollierte #Völkerwanderung im #Kanzleramt
dass Schluss ist? Mehr #MerkelsGäste, mehr #MerkelsTote #AfD
When will the #professional for uncontrolled #massmigration in the #Chancellory
understand that it’s enough? More #Merkel’sguests, more #Merkel’sdead #AfD
Additionally, the tweet contains the causal construction more guests, more dead to establish a
cause-effect relation. The more migrants Merkel invites (Merkel’s guests), the more people die
because of Merkel. The hashtag Merkel’sdead thus also portrays the Chancellor as responsible
for the victims of the attack.
Even though she is usually not explicitly called murderer, some tweets include
#mörderraute. Mörderraute (English: murderer rhombus) is a word play on Merkel-Raute
(English: Merkel rhombus), Merkel’s signature hand gesture. By replacing Merkel with
murderer, Merkel is implicitly called a murderer and hence to blame for the victims of the
terrorist attack. Other politicians are also described as bootlickers and accomplices.

Predication
Many refugees who arrived in Europe and Germany in 2015 came from Muslim-majority
countries like Syria (Park, 2015), and even though some may not be (practicing) Muslims,
refugees can be under general suspicion to belong to radical Islamic groups such as ISIS and thus
to pose a threat to Europe’s security. Tweets which claim Islam is evil support such stereotyping.
Furthermore, values and traditions from the refugees’ countries of origin are depicted negatively
as in the following example.
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Example 61 (MerkelsTote 26):
Syrische Sitten sind einfach nur abartig. Wie können #Grüne darin eine #Bereicherung
sehen? #merkelstote
Syrian customs are just abnormal. How can #theGreens consider that #enrichment?
#merkel’sdead
The user claims that Syrian customs are abnormal and disgusting, suggesting superiority of
German customs, values, and traditions. It is unclear what exactly about Syrian customs leads the
user to make this claim, but it can be assumed that the user refers to differences between German
and Syrian traditions and values portrayed in various media outlets as regards the treatment of
women or the state of law. The author further questions the Green Party’s positive evaluation of
multiculturalism. The denial of cultural enrichment through foreign customs not only serves to
reinforce the notion of a threat to German customs; by adding #merkel’sdead, the user connects
multiculturalism with a threat to the German people.
Apart from negative associations with refugees and migrants, Chancellor Merkel and the
German government’s refugee policies are the predominant targets. Government policies and
practices are referred to as gesetzeslose (sic) Grenzöffnung (English: unlawful opening of the
borders) (Example 75) and irrsinnige Invasionspolitik (English: insane politics of invasion)
(Example 79). Users inaccurately claim that borders were opened against the law. Firstly,
Germany only borders countries participating in the Schengen Agreement, which abolishes
border controls and allows freedom of movement. Secondly, EU member states are allowed to
suspend the Dublin Regulation by applying the “sovereignty clause” on humanitarian grounds.
This means that a member state may examine an asylum application even if it is not its
responsibility (EU, 2013). The portrayal of an unlawful opening of the borders simplifies the
complexity of EU policies and contributes to the scare tactics of right-wing discourses. These
tactics are also reflected in statements that portray migration as an invasion because it invokes
117

the image of intrusion and threat. By calling government practices concerning asylum seekers
and refugees insane politics of invasion, the author suggests that the government is passively
watching the invasion of Germany and Europe or even actively helping the so-called invaders.
As head of government, Chancellor Merkel is also directly addressed by criticism and
insults and blamed for the victims of the terrorist attack in Berlin. She is called incomprehensible
and disgusting (Example 63) and a stupid, toothless, low energy career poltician (sic) (Example
62).
Example 62 (MerkelsTote 148):
#Merkel is prime example of stupid, toothless, low energy career poltician.
#prayforberlin #MerkelsTote #Berlin
Example 63 (MerkelsTote 143):
...unfassbar und ekelhaft,
dass sind SIE MERKEL! sie haben überhaupt nichts kappiert! #MerkelsTote
#Breitscheidplatz #BerlinAttack #merkel
..incomprehensible and disgusting,
that is YOU MERKEL! you don’t understand anything! #Merkel’sDead
Unfassbar und ekelhaft was the response of a German politician of the Social Democratic Party
of Germany (SPD), Ralf Stegner, to the original tweet of the far-right politician who called the
victims of the attack Merkels Tote. The user takes up the words of the tweet intended to criticize
the statement of the right-wing politician to criticize Merkel and thus establishes intertextuality.
Although Merkel and Stegner are not in the same political party – Merkel is the leader of the
liberal-conservative Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) – both of their political
parties built a coalition to form the federal government between 2013 and 2017.
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Argumentation
In order to support the negative nomination and predication strategies employed in rightwing discourses, users quote a variety of online sources including mainstream newspapers,
tabloids, and right-wing websites. In the following two tweets, reports from the conservative
German daily newspaper, Die Welt, and the Swiss-German regional daily newspaper, Basler
Zeitung, are referenced. Both can be considered mainstream media. In the first example, the
author uses the report about a homeless person who was set on fire by a group of young refugees
from Syria and Libya to reinforce the apparent danger that emanates from Syrians. The user not
only refers to the young refugees as Merkel’s children, but claims that it would be obvious that
the crime was committed by Syrians by adding who else?!
Example 64 (MerkelsTote 28):
#Obdachloser in #Berlin von #Merkel s Kindern #angezündet – #Syrer – wer auch
sonst?! – #MerkelsTote – WELT
https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article160619320/Polizei-verhoert-Tatverdaechtige-IhrStatus-wird-geprueft.html
#homelessperson in #Berlin #setonfire by #Merkel ‘s children – #Syrians – who else?!
– #Merkel’sDead – WELT [Link to article]
Even though the content of the tweet is not related to the Berlin terrorist attack, the hashtags
#Berlin and #Merkel’sDead put the crime into the context of the attack and contribute to the
construction of a larger threat by Syrian refugees.
The second example quotes a Swiss journalist, the editor in chief of Basler Zeitung, who
writes “It is true: They are Merkel’s Dead,” arguing that the Chancellor generally carries
responsibility for institutions like the police and intelligence services who failed greatly before
and during the investigations of the Berlin terrorist attack.
Example 65 (MerkelsTote 51):
#MerkelsTote http://bazonline.ch/21047209 und das schreibt nicht die #afd, sondern
ein schweizer Journalist. #Amri #umdenken #tunesier #berlin
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#Merkel’sDead [Link to article] and that’s not from the #afd, but from a Swiss
journalist. #Amri #rethink #tunesian #berlin
The main point of this polarizing and almost inflammatory article is a general critique of pro-EU
politicians and EU policies such as the freedom of movement. It is important to note that
Switzerland is not a member of the EU but participates in the Schengen agreement. The author of
the tweet as well as several other Twitter users utilize the assumed credibility of the journalist to
legitimize the blaming of Merkel as the culprit.
Apart from mainstream media, users quote tabloids like the British Daily Mail, the
German BILD, and the Swiss-German Blick, all of them known for sensationalist and unreliable
stories.
Example 66 (MerkelsTote 39):
Man dresses as ISIS fighter and walks straight across German border control
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4064256/Stupid-dangerous-Masked-manparading-SIS-flag-films-walking-straight-German-border-taunts-officials-non-existentsecurity-checks.html #Germany #MerkelsTote #tcot #p2
The story from the Daily Mail about a person dressed as an ISIS fighter who crosses the DanishGerman border without being checked supports the argument of lack of border control and,
consequently, the potential security threat. The action portrayed in the article as well as the tweet
create fear, since anyone, including potential criminals, can easily cross borders between
European member states, provided one resides within or has entered the Schengen area. The
freedom of movement is a founding principle of the EU and fundamental to the goals and
purposes of the political and economic union. Even though the author of the tweet does not
directly criticize the lack of border control, the author does quote the tabloid’s story and wording
(ISIS fighter), which clearly contributes to nationalist, anti-EU sentiments. Interestingly, the user
also includes two hashtags that are generally associated with the US-American context, #tcot
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(Top Conservatives on Twitter) and #p2 (Progressives 2.0). Both hashtags are frequently used on
Twitter to promote conservative or progressive ideas. The inclusion of these “US-American”
hashtags may be a common strategy employed by the user. Within the sample, two tweets were
written by the author of Example 66 and both included the two hashtags along with a link to a
newspaper article and additional hashtags pertinent to the content of the article. It could be that
the author is a German expat living in the US or a US national who is interested in the European
context.
The following tweet quotes an article published by the Swiss-German tabloid, Blick.
Example 67 (MerkelsTote 49):
DIE Bestandsaufnahme schlechthin: http://bit.ly/2itOgDq #berlin #terror
#staatsversagen #merkelstote #breitscheidplatz #Willkommenskultur
Taking the REAL stock: [Link to Blick article] #berlin #terror #governmentfailure
#merkel’sdead #breitscheidplatz #Welcomingculture
The article is entitled Deutscher Winter 2016 (English: German Winter 2016), which is a
reference to the phrase Deutscher Herbst (English: German Autumn). German Autumn refers to
the fall of 1977, which was marked by a series of terrorist events carried out by the WestGerman terrorist group, Red Army Faction (RAF), leading to an undeclared state of emergency
in West Germany (Kraushaar, 2007). The article thus indirectly compares the fall of 1977 with
the winter of 2016, which magnifies the scope of the 2016 terrorist attack. Moreover, the article
condemns how the terrorist attack is depicted in Germany and claims that politicians and media
downplay the connections between the summer 2015 events and the 2016 terrorist attack. In the
tweet, the link to the article is preceded by an expression of approval indicated by the capitalized
definite article and the German adverb schlechthin which supports the emphasis of the definite
article. The tweet also includes the buzzwords Berlin, terror, government failure, Merkel’s dead,
Breitscheidplatz, and welcoming culture, which function as key words, for example, for the
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location (Berlin, Breitscheidplatz) and the evaluation stance (government failure, Merkel’s
dead).
Mainstream media and tabloids are consumed by a large number of people. Right-wing
websites, on the other hand, may not reach the same amount of people, but through the
dissemination of articles from right-wing outlets on social media, they may reach a wider
audience, especially if their name cannot clearly be identified as far-right. Examples of
seemingly neutral websites are Die Achse des Guten (English: The Axis of the Good) and
Politikstube (English: parlor of politics). The website Politikstube has been classified as rightwing populist by the Amadeu Antonion Foundation, a German foundation against racism and farright politics. The blog Die Achse des Guten, a reference to President Bush’s phrase Axis of Evil,
self-identifies as neoconservative but German linguist Schiffer (2010) identified it as antiIslamist. When users quote websites like achgut.com and politikstube.com, they contribute to the
dissemination of right-wing discourses and the construction of fear and danger, particularly when
adopting pertinent vocabulary as in the following example.
Example 68 (MerkelsTote 25):
#MerkelsTote und der Marathon des Elends, den ihre Politik über die Welt bringt.
http://www.achgut.com/artikel/schaut_mal_was_mein_fluechtling_alles_kann
#Merkel’sDead and the marathon of misery, which her politics bring to the world.
[Link to article]
The user references an article that criticizes the destabilization of the German social security
system, the lack of refugees’ integration into German society, and the ideologization of political
correctness. The tweet cites the article’s phrase marathon of misery and claims that this misery is
caused by Merkel’s politics, indicated by the use of the possessive determiner her, and endangers
Germany and the entire world.
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As the hashtag Merkel’s Dead suggests, most tweets contain some sort of criticism of
Chancellor Merkel. She is portrayed as responsible for the attack and consequently the victims as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 69 (MerkelsTote 50):
12 Todesopfer in Berlin #Merkelstote Frau Kanzlerin Sie sind verantwortlich!
pic.twitter.com/PGT3aVwNla
12 casualties in Berlin #Merkel’sdead Mrs Chancellor you are responsible!
pic.twitter.com/PGT3aVwNla
Merkel is directly addressed as Frau Kanzlerin and with the formal personal pronoun Sie. Most
users refer to the Chancellor in third person singular and do not use politeness strategies such as
honorifics or the official title Bundeskanzlerin, here abbreviated to Kanzlerin. These politeness
strategies allow the user to directly address the criticism to the Chancellor. Additionally, the
tweet is supported by an image that shows two concrete barriers in an empty pedestrian street at
night. The words DANKE and MERKEL respectively are written in capital letters on the barriers.
In the bottom right corner of the image, one can see the words Identitäre Bewegung (English:
Identitarian movement), the name of a white nationalist movement. At first glance, the image is
not directly related to the content of the tweet, however, after the attack some Christmas markets
installed barriers for protection purposes. Even though the words on the barriers seem to align
with the politeness strategies found in the tweet itself, they are examples of mock politeness and
to be understood ironically; due to Merkel’s policies, pedestrian areas now need to be protected
from vehicles driving into groups of people.
Other users request that Chancellor Merkel assume responsibility without explicitly
stating what that would mean as in Example 70, or they directly demand her resignation by using
#Merkelmussweg (English: Merkel must go) as in Example 71. In both cases, the syntactical
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structure of the tweet points to the reason of the request for resignation. The statement They are
#Merkel’sdead is followed by the request and thus functions as the rationale.
Example 70 (MerkelsTote 47):
Es sind #MerkelsTote – Sie muß jetzt politische Verantwortung für ihren verfehlten
Kurs in der Flüchtlingspolitik übernehmen!
They are #Merkel’sdead – She must assume responsibility for her failed course of
refugee policies!
Example 71 (MerkelsTote 172):
Es sind #MerkelsTote #Merkelmussweg
They are #Merkel’sdead #Merkelmustgo
By tweeting, They are #Merkel’sdead, users also agree with the statement itself and thus with the
AfD politician’s original evaluation of the situation. Agreement can also be expressed by
retweeting the original tweet or by quoting the Swiss-German article published in Basler Zeitung
as described above.
Merkel is not the only politician who is criticized and considered responsible. Politicians
of other mainstream political parties, particularly of The Green Party, which supports prorefugee policies and embraces multiculturalism, are also held responsible as shown in the
following tweet.
Example 72 (MerkelsTote 5):
Sind ned #MerkelsTote, sond #SimonePetersTote. #Amri wär längst wieder zuHause
gewesn, wenn @Die_Gruenen es ned verhindert hättn
They’re not #Merkel’sDead, but rather #SimonePeter’sDead. #Amri would’ve been
home already if @Die_Gruenen didn’t prevent it
The user claims that not Angela Merkel but Simone Peter is responsible for the victims, since her
political party, The Green Party, opposes deportations to Tunisia in principle due to human right
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violations. The attacker was in fact Tunisian. His asylum application had been denied and he was
supposed to be deported to Tunisia, which never happened for a variety of reasons.

Perspectivization
As described in the previous section, Chancellor Merkel is portrayed as the main culprit
and blamed for the attack and the victims. Users depict her as the responsible actor who allowed
migrants from Muslim-majority countries to enter Germany and who subsequently facilitated
terrorist attacks. This portrayal of Merkel as being actively responsible is supported textinternally by grammatical structures and by references, for example, to Merkel having blood on
her hands. These references are mostly expressed visually and will be discussed in the
subsequent section. As regards the grammatical structures, users employ syntax, personal
pronouns, and modality to express agency as in Example 73, Example 74, and Example 75.
Example 73 (MerkelsTote 50):
12 Todesopfer in Berlin #Merkelstote Frau Kanzlerin Sie sind verantwortlich!
pic.twitter.com/PGT3aVwNla
12 casualties in Berlin #Merkel’sdead Mrs Chancellor you are responsible!
pic.twitter.com/PGT3aVwNla
Example 74 (MerkelsTote 47):
Es sind #MerkelsTote – Sie muß jetzt politische Verantwortung für ihren verfehlten
Kurs in der Flüchtlingspolitik übernehmen!
They are #Merkel’sDead – She must assume responsibility for her failed course of
refugee policies!
Example 75 (MerkelsTote 63):
Und vergiss nicht, dass sie noch lebten ohne Merkels gesetzeslose Grenzöffnung
#MerkelsTote
And don’t forget that they would still be alive without Merkel’s illegal opening of the
borders #Merkel’sDead
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In the first example, the Chancellor is directly addressed with the formal personal pronoun Sie
(English: you, formal) and the form of address Frau Kanzlerin (English: Mrs Chancellor). She is
thus the direct addressee of the criticism. In the second example, Merkel is referred to in third
person. The use of the modal verb must expresses responsibility and urgency. The possessive
determiner her in connection with failed course of refugee policies contributes to the
construction of Merkel being responsible for refugee policies and hence the negative
consequences. The third example uses the genitive construction Merkel’s illegal opening of the
borders to also support the construction of Merkel as the culprit as it suggests that she alone was
responsible for opening the borders, which enabled the perpetrator to enter Germany and carry
out his attack.
Refugees are also constructed as culprits. The syntactical constructions of Example 76
and Example 59 suggest agency on the part of refugees. Even though the first example contains a
passive construction due to German headline conventions and the frequent use of passive
constructions in the German language, the action itself attributes agency to the Syrian refugees.
Example 76 (MerkelsTote 28):
#Obdachloser in #Berlin von #Merkel s Kindern #angezündet – #Syrer – wer auch
sonst?! – #MerkelsTote – WELT
https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article160619320/Polizei-verhoert-Tatverdaechtige-IhrStatus-wird-geprueft.html …
#homelessperson in #Berlin #setonfire by #Merkel ’s children – #Syrians – who else?!
– #Merkel’sDead – WELT [Link to article]
In the next example, the use of the modal verb to be allowed expresses permission, which is
granted by Merkel as she is portrayed as the refugees’ mother and thus holds “parental authority”
allowing her new children to play war. The statement is juxtaposed with the pro-refugee
supporters’ fear of right-wing populism. This ironic juxtaposition emphasizes the threat of
refugees and de-emphasizes the threat of right-wing discourses.
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Example 77 (MerkelsTote 130):
#MerkelsneueKinder dürfen hier #Krieg spielen.Gutmenschen haben Angst vor mehr
#Rechtspopulismus. #krankeWelt
#MerkelsTote #BerlinAttack
#Merkel’snewchildren are allowed to play #war here.The politically hypercorrect are
afraid of more right-wing populism. #sickworld
#Merkel’sdead #BerlinAttack
Another common feature found in the data is the reference to Christmas. The attack
occurred few days before Christmas at a Christmas market. In Germany, Christmas is celebrated
not only as a religious but also cultural holiday. More than 50% of the German population
affiliates with either the Roman-Catholic or the Protestant church (fowid, 2017), however, many
people who are not affiliated with Christianity also celebrate Christmas as a family holiday
(Braunmüller, 2017). Moreover, it is common to visit one of approximately 1,500 Christmas
markets, set up in many German cities during Advent with more than 80 million visitors yearly
(Ift, 2013, as cited in Sakschewski & Paul, 2017). Several users include references to Christmas.
While some only use the hashtag Merkel Weihnachten (English: Merkel Christmas), others
include more religious references as in the following example. The tweet includes a line of a
popular German hymn which is commonly used during Advent in both Catholic and Protestant
churches (Fischer, 2007). The first line says Macht hoch die Tür, die Tor macht weit (English:
Make high the doors, the gates make even wider).
Example 78 (MerkelsTote 129):
#Merkel Christmas wünsche ich, macht hoch die Tür, das Tor mach noch weiter. . .
#BerlinAttack #MerkelsTote #breitscheitplatz
#Merkel Christmas I wish, make high the door, the gate make even wider . .
.#BerlinAttack #Merkel’sDead #breitscheitplatz
The user modifies the line by adding the comparative noch weiter (English: even wider). This
example not only contains the reference to one of the most popular German Advent songs but
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also an implicit critique of open-door policies as regards migration. This critique is evident
because of the comparative even wider and the inclusion of the additional hashtags,
#BerlinAttack, #Merkel’sDead, and #breitscheitplatz.
After a tragedy such as a terrorist attack, social media like Twitter are often utilized to
express and share emotions. While some users express anger, many also voice empathy, for
instance, with #prayforBerlin. In the following example, however, #IprayforBerlin is not meant
as sign of sympathy with the victims and their families but instead it is used to criticize migration
policies. The user does not pray for the victims but for the insane politics of invasion to end and
thus exploits the expression of empathy in order to criticize pro-refugee policies.
Example 79 (MerkelsTote 133):
#IprayforBerlin, dass diese irrsinnige Invasionspolitik jetzt endlich aufhört, dafür
bete ich. #breidscheidtplatz #BerlinAttack #MerkelsTote
#IprayforBerlin that these insane politics of invasion finally stop, that’s what I pray
for # breidscheidtplatz #BerlinAttack #Merkel’sDead
Semiotic and multimodal resources
Twitter users can avail themselves of a variety of semiotic and multimodal resources to
create meaning. In the #MerkelsTote dataset, two tweets include emojis and four tweets exhibit a
creative format, for example, in the form of letter capitalization as illustrated in the following
two examples. In both cases, capitalization is used as emphasis.
Example 80 (MerkelsTote 143):
...unfassbar und ekelhaft,
dass sind SIE MERKEL! sie haben überhaupt nichts kappiert! #MerkelsTote
#Breitscheidplatz #BerlinAttack #merkel
..incomprehensible and disgusting,
that is YOU MERKEL! you don’t understand anything! #Merkel’sDead
#Breitscheidplatz #BerlinAttack #merkel
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Example 81 (MerkelsTote 49):
DIE Bestandsaufnahme schlechthin: http://bit.ly/2itOgDq #berlin #terror #staatsversagen
#merkelstote #breitscheidplatz #Willkommenskultur
Taking the REAL stock: [Link to Blick article] #berlin #terror #governmentfailure
#merkel’sdead #breitscheidplatz #Welcomingculture
Another common resource for meaning-making is the use of images. Within the dataset,
26 tweets include an image. Several of these images contain a reference to Merkel having blood
on her hands supporting the claim that she is to blame for the attack and hence responsible for
the victims as shown in the following two examples. The first example contains two hashtags,
#merkelresignnow and #merkel’sdead, and an image collage that consists of three images of
Merkel using a black virtual reality device with googly eyes and one image of a hand covered in
blood in front of black background. The constellation of the images creates a sequence from top
left to bottom right. In the first image, Merkel holds the device with her left hand and her smiling
face is directed to the right. In the second image, she holds the device in front of her eyes and
seems to look through the device at her right hand. The third image shows a hand covered in
blood and based on the sequence of the images, it is implied that she sees her own hand through
the device. In the last image, she looks grim-faced slightly to the left as someone takes the device
from her. While she expressed excitement in the first image, her facial expression seemed to
have changed after looking through the device and seeing her own hand covered in blood, as
implied by the image (Figure 3).
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Example 82 (MerkelsTote 83):
#merkelresignnow #merkelstote pic.twitter.com/ytNFr7ngpX

Figure 3. Tweet “MerkelsTote 83."
The second example shows a portrait of Merkel and two hands, which are supposed to be
hers based on the position in the image (Figure 4). Her face, upper body, and hands are splattered
with blood. The image also contains two black ribbons which frame the text #PrayForBerlin
19.12.2016. #PrayforBerlin was commonly used after the terrorist attack as a sign of empathy.
The ribbons and the text are on a background that shows the colors of the German flag, black,
red, and gold, red being the dominant color covering the other two colors as if the color had
spilled. The text of the tweet consists of nine hashtags denoting the location of the attack
(#BreitscheidPlatz, #BerlinAttack, #PrayBerlin, and #PrayforBerlin), the terror attack itself
(#BerlinAttack and #Terror), a critique of Merkel (#MerkelMussWeg, #MerkelsTote, and
#MerkelChristmas), as well as an expression of empathy (#PrayBerlin, #PrayforBerlin). The
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excessive use of hashtags enables the user to make the tweet and image widely visible because it
could be seen by anyone who follows any of these hashtags.
Example 83 (MerkelsTote 80):
#BreitscheidPlatz #BerlinAttack #Terror #MerkelMussWeg #MerkelsTote #Merkel
#MerkelChristmas #PrayBerlin #PrayForBerlin pic.twitter.com/HazpZppYt7

Figure 4. Tweet “MerkelsTote 80.”
As in the #wirschaffendas dataset, users also allude to Merkel being from East Germany
as shown in the following example. The author claims that on Merkel’s nightstand there would
be a book by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and most
powerful politician of the GDR. The book is entitled My 100 best propaganda ploys. The GDR
was known for political propaganda. The connection between Honecker’s propaganda ploys and
Merkel’s bedtime reading implies that Merkel also uses propaganda to manipulate the people.
This form of criticism is reinforced by the inclusion of the hashtags, particularly
#governmentfailure and #merkelmustgo.
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Example 84 (MerkelsTote 31):
Ein Blick auf #Merkels Nachttisch: #merkel #staatsversagen #merkelmussweg
#breitscheidplatz #merkelstote #berlin #amri pic.twitter.com/B25IiV3n7C
A view of #Merkel’s night table: #merkel #governmentfailure #merkelmustgo #
breitscheidplatz #merkel’sdead #berlin #amri pic.twitter.com/B25IiV3n7C
#BerlinAttack
The last hashtag that is analyzed exhibits trends similar to the other datasets as regards
how refugees and politicians are called and which characteristics are associated with them. The
findings are described in the following sections.

Referential/nomination and predication
Refugees are referred to as Jihadists and Islamic terrorists that are being imported by
Merkel. Consequently, they are characterized as dangerous and threatening to the safety of
Europe and Germany. Danger, particularly to women, is also invoked by the blend rapefugees
that is used by some users to refer to refugees (Example 85). The blending of rape and refugees
establishes a semantic connection between the two and thus invokes fear and contributes to the
construction of a negative image of refugees, which is reinforced by the categorization of
migrants as Muslim invaders. References to invasion as well as to refugees as Muslims occur
frequently in the dataset. The threat of a Muslim invasion culminates in the implementation of
sharia law (Example 86).
Example 85 (BerlinAttack 132):
Could you watch your country burn in a sea of rapefugees and still sleep at night?
Merkel somehow can. The witch. #BerlinAttack
Example 86 (BerlinAttack 30):
#AngelaMerkel Welcomes the #muslim #invasion & will make #ShariaLaw legal in
#Germany! #BerlinAttack #SyrianRefugees #Cologne #Hamburg
132

Islam as a religion is criticized for being reactionary, radical, and dangerous to the values
of Europe and Germany. A common theme among right-wing Europeans is the identification of
the so-called common Judeo-Christian traditions (Wodak, 2015b). Muslim migrants are
perceived as a threat to these traditions. In fact, Arab refugees are described as anti-Semitic
(Example 87). Additionally, the legitimacy of the migrants’ status as refugees is questioned by
using quotation marks as in Deport all ‘refugees’ (Example 88).
Example 87 (BerlinAttack 110):
Merkel’s idea to fix Ger’s embarrassing past is by acceptng 1mn+ME Arab refugeesperhaps d most antisemitic ppl since d Nazis #BerlinAttack
Example 88 (BerlinAttack 104):
Ban immigration from #Muslim countries. Deport all “refugees”. Scrub the Internet of all
#Islamic propaganda. #BerlinAttack #Merkel
As in the previous datasets, Chancellor Merkel is held responsible for the Muslim
invasion and threat to the German people. She is called witch, murderer, and Mörderin (English:
murderer) and considered guilty of the terrorist attack and the victims (Example 89). As in the
#MerkelsTote dataset, users also claim that she has blood on her hands, which represents her
responsibility for the terrorist attack (Example 90).
Example 89 (BerlinAttack 90):
my mind is made up. Merkel is guilty of those deaths and she will be guilty of more.
This is just the start. #BerlinAttack
Example 90 (BerlinAttack 98):
#BerlinAttack the blood of these innocent people are on Merkel’s hands.
However, she is not only portrayed as guilty of the Berlin terrorist attack but also of the downfall
of Europe, which is illustrated in Exmple 91. The tweet contains references to Brexit and rightwing political parties and their leading politicians in Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
Additionally, the tweet includes an image that shows a person resembling Merkel sitting over
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and choking a person lying on the floor. EUROPE is written on the right arm of the person on the
floor suggesting that Merkel is choking Europe. A speech bubble pointing to Merkel reads in big
capital letters WIR SCHAFFEN DAS! and in smaller letters Angela Merkel, Rebbekah Kasner
Jentsch2, Assassin of Europe, and Madre Terrorista. Merkel is thus called assassin of Europe
and madre terrorista (English: terrorist mother). The author-less image also includes several
anti-EU hashtags and a paragraph about the downfall of Europe.
Example 91 (BerlinAttack 111):
Angela #Merkel is a murderer.
Remove her from office NOW.
#AfD #FraukePetry
#FN #MarineLePen
#PVV #GeertWilders
#BREXIT
#BerlinAttack pic.twitter.com/ptz5vQPgDd
Argumentation and perspectivization
Nomination and predication strategies of right-wing discourses are often strengthened by
argumentative structures that imply danger, threat, and burden. Moreover, arguments are
reinforced by presenting the perspective that the country and people, constructed as a
homogeneous entity, are under attack. This serves the purpose of othering and facilitates the
exclusion of the other. These features of right-wing discourses can also be found in tweets with
#BerlinAttack. In the following tweets, the Berlin attack is directly connected to Germany’s
refugee policy, for which the German government and especially the Chancellor are blamed and

2

This reference to Angela Merkel could be found on Spanish language websites propagating
conspiracy theories and is implicitly antisemitic. Merkel’s parents’ last names are Kasner and
Jentzsch. If she was from a Spanish-speaking country, Merkel could have her father’s and her
mother’s last name and she may not have taken her first husband’s name, Merkel. These
websites also claim that Merkel is actually Jewish, which would explain the Hebrew first name,
Rebbekah.
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which is described as failed. Consequently, Merkel is blamed for the victims, and users request
her resignation.
Example 92 (BerlinAttack 92):
#BerlinAttack ist direkte Konsequenz der deutschen Flüchtlingspolitik. Volle
Verantwortung dafür trägt aktuelle Bundesregierung. #MerkelGeh!
#BerlinAttack is the direct consequence of German refugee politics. The current
government is fully responsible for that. #MerkelGo!
Example 93 (BerlinAttack 59):
chancellor Merkel should resign her failed refugee policy and not vetting refugees RIP
to all the #BerlinAttack victims
Users also make references to Merkel having blood on her hands. This reference is made
within the text of the tweet via hashtag and by adding the image that was also used in Example
83, that is, a portrait of Merkel with her face, upper body, and hands splattered with blood, which
visually reinforces the perspective of her being guilty of the victims.
Example 94 (BerlinAttack 87):
#Berlinattack Angela Merkel should resign after her open door policy has caused so
many deaths #Bloodonherhands pic.twitter.com/kpSJGyiAi4
Most of the time, there is no direct addressee of a tweet. Merkel is mostly referred to in
third person, with the exception of Example 92 which includes a direct request addressed to
Merkel with #MerkelGo! In the following example, however, the user addresses the Polish
people by tweeting I want to apologize to the Polish people …
Example 95 (BerlinAttack 14):
I want to apologize to the Polish people for our #refugee policy Please help us to get rid
of #Merkel ! #berlin #berlinAttack #Poland #cdu
Moreover, the Polish people are asked to help us get rid of Merkel. The user apologizes to the
Polish people because it was a Polish truck that was hijacked and used for the attack. The Polish
truck driver was shot before the attack occurred. Even though it is unclear how the Polish people
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are supposed to help us to get rid of #Merkel, the user claims to speak for the German people by
using us. This points to the construction of an imagined homogeneous people.
In order to make their statements and claims more credible and thus support their
positions, users also cite experts and media sources. As in the other datasets, mainstream media,
tabloids, and right-wing websites are referenced. The difference between objective reporting and
biased opinions may not always be evident to social media users due to the abundance of media
that are being circulated on social media; adding a link to a source alone may seem to make a
claim more credible. Furthermore, many users may not click on and read through all of the
articles that their networks share. Nonetheless, the headlines as well as the users’ framing of the
articles may contribute to the shaping of one’s opinion. In the following tweet, for instance, the
user quotes the headline of an article from Fox News Insider, which is, according to their
website’s mission, “the official blog of Fox News Channel.” Fox News is known for biased
reporting. The quoting of a so-called expert makes the statement look more credible. The
wording of the statement, however, illustrates the judgmental presumption.
Example 96 (BerlinAttack 64):
Expert: ‘Merkel Has Been Importing Jihadists in Massive Numbers’
http://insider.foxnews.com/2016/12/20/counterterrorism-expert-berlin-terror-attackgerman-chancellor-angela-merkel
Man darf es auch anders sehen! #BerlinAttack
Expert: ‘Merkel Has Been Importing Jihadists in Massive Numbers’ [Link to article]
You are allowed to see it a different way! #BerlinAttack
The Twitter user includes not only the headline of and link to the article but also an implicit
critique, possibly of mainstream media in Germany. The German part of the tweet suggests that
German mainstream media portray a different perspective of the attack, and one is not allowed or
not supposed to view it any other way.
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Several users claim that mainstream media are not presenting the truth but rather are used
by the government to cover up terrorism and any connection between the attack, Islam, and
refugee policies. This is a common strategy of right-wing discourse. One user even calls it
censorship and hence implies conditions under an authoritarian regime.
Example 97 (BerlinAttack 101):
Interessant, dass nicht eine große Zeitung kritische Töne zu Merkel bringt.
#BerlinAttack #Merkel
Interesting that not a single big newspaper criticizes Merkel. #BerlinAttack #Merkel
Example 98 (BerlinAttack 33):
Many people seem surprised at the lack of new information about the #BerlinAttack.
Anyone familiar with Merkel’s media censorship is not.
Mainstream media are thus delegitimized as gatekeepers, while unmediated media platforms are
supported. In the following two examples, YouTube videos are embedded. The first example is a
video from Infowars.com, owned by US-American conspiracy theorist, Alex Jones. The narrator
supports the theory that the German government and mainstream media are covering up the
attack and Merkel has blood on her hands due to her open door refugee policy. The tweet also
includes a variety of hashtags, which make the tweet more visible.
Example 99 (BerlinAttack 108):
https://youtu.be/WC2e70qRSdY #Politics of #terrorism #Germany releases #terror
suspect #PrayForBerlin #BerlinAttack #merkel #Germany #deutschland
The second example is a video by a British YouTuber with more than 1.2 million subscribers
who claims to tell the world “the truth about the Berlin Christmas Market Attack.” The Twitter
user also claims that the majority of the German population does not support the Chancellor. The
so-called propaganda is to be revealed by the YouTube video. The tweet also includes #infowars,
which may be a reference to Alex Jones’ websites.
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Example 100 (BerlinAttack 141):
It is wrong, that the majority of Germans support A.Merkel. It is mere propaganda –
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGsFGvLNEGA … #infowars #BerlinAttack
Semiotic and multimodal resources
As in the other datasets, tweets with #BerlinAttack include a variety of semiotic and
multimodal resources such as emojis, images, letter capitalizations, and multiple hashtags.
Images are particularly impactful as they may convey a message without the need for long
explanations. The meme of Merkel splattered with blood illustrates this quite well (Example 94).
The figurative concept of Merkel having blood on her hands is represented visually. The actual
depiction of Merkel with blood on her body conveys the figurative concept and easily sticks in
one’s mind. Moreover, it can be understood across languages. Seeing someone with blood on
their hands in the context of fatalities triggers the perception that this person may be guilty while
being caught in the proverbial act.
Images may also serve the purpose of establishing intertextual references. During the
peak of the migrant crisis in 2015, Hungary took harsh measures to deter refugees, including
anti-refugee propaganda, the erection of fences and monitoring systems, and violence against
refugees. A positive reference to Hungary or Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary,
during that time points to a positive evaluation of Hungary’s measures and is therefore indicative
of a right-wing, anti-refugee position. The following tweet illustrates how this reference to
Hungary is still meaningful in December 2016. The tweet includes a collage of four images
(Figure 5). The two top images show typical pictures of Christmas markets and are entitled in
capital letters HUNGARY BUILT A FENCE TO KEEP ‘REFUGEES’ OUT. The scare quotes
point to the questioning of the legitimacy of the migrants’ status as refugees.
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Example 101 (BerlinAttack 81):
#BerlinAttack #MerkelMussWeg pic.twitter.com/YPlMoqQnrf

Figure 5. Tweet “BerlinAttack 81.”
The two bottom pictures show two scenes from German Christmas markets. In the left picture,
one can see four police officers in the foreground. The right picture shows the truck that was
used for the Berlin attack, identifiable by the damaged windshield and the label of a Polish
logistics company. The bottom pictures are captioned in capital letters GERMANY WELCOMED
THEM IN. In between the top and bottom pictures, it says SPOT THE DIFFERENCE. The meme
suggests that Christmas markets in Hungary, where a fence was built to keep so-called refugees
out of Hungary and Europe, are peaceful, while Christmas markets in Germany, where refugees
were welcomed, are attacked and need to be kept under surveillance.
Hungary is not the only right-wing reference that can be found in tweets with
#BerlinAttack. Several users include hashtags with the name of right-wing political parties or
politicians, as already mentioned above in Example 91. While Example 91 only included
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references that denote right-wing populism in Europe, the following example also contains
#CDU, the political party of Merkel, as well as #ISIS and #Trump. While the hashtags in
Example 91 are organized in separate lines by country, the hashtags of this example are strung
together. Additionally, all phrases and names are used with hashtags. The excessive use of
hashtags may lead to more visibility.
Example 102 (BerlinAttack 85):
#MerkelMUSSweg #CDU #AfD #FraukePetry #Hofer #ISIS #Brexit #Trump
#BerlinAttack #Berlin #Pegida pic.twitter.com/d3gD1LqKQJ
The tweet also includes an image that seems to have been photoshopped. The background of the
image is the truck that was used for the attack, which is the same image that was used in
Example 101. In the foreground, there are three smiling young women holding a colorful
Refugees Welcome banner. At first sight the manipulation of the image is not recognizable, but
the attire of the women does not fit the weather conditions in Berlin on December 20, 2016.
Even though not explicitly stated, the positioning of the image components suggests a causeeffect relationship between welcoming refugees and the Berlin terror attack. It is important to
note that the investigations had not been completed on December 20, 2016, and any presumption
that the attacker was a refugee was speculative.
Another topic that came up in the data is the depiction of Germany being powerless and
doomed to economic and political decline. Right-wing discourses generally advocate a strong
and sovereign nation-state and thus criticize the delegation of power to international and
supranational organizations, which limits national decision-making. The flag as a symbol of the
nation-state also plays an important role. While in many countries, the waving or display of the
national flag does not inherently carry negative connotations, in Germany it is not as widely
accepted due to Germany’s Nazi past. In fact, if the German flag is used privately outside of a
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sports event, it may be perceived as an expression of right-wing, nationalist-conservative
ideologies. In the following example, the user criticizes precisely this ambivalent relationship
between Germans and their flag. The user seems to be upset, indicated by three angry-face
emojis, about Merkel’s reaction to a fellow party member who is waving a German flag; she
takes the German flag away from him and slightly shakes her head. The clip is taken out of
context as it occurred at an election victory party in 2013, but it is used to declare Merkel as antiGerman and to construct a connection between her pro-refugee position and the threat to the
German people (Roßmann, 2016).
Example 103 (BerlinAttack 1):
The #BerlinAttack occurs and all Merkel is worried about is not waving the German flag
#berlinchristmas
#GermanChristmasMarket pic.twitter.com/f3vjBqF00Y
The user may or may not have known that the clip was taken out of context. It may have
appeared on their social media feed, which would suggest that the user is connected to users with
right-wing ideologies as such users were responsible for the December 2016 dissemination of
this clip (Roßmann, 2016).
The German flag is a recurring topic in right-wing discourses and frequently used at
right-wing rallies as a symbol of the imagined homogeneous people. According to another
Twitter user, however, the German flag is no longer black, red, and gold but white, which
symbolizes surrender and hence the loss of power and strength. Apart from the picture of a white
flag, the tweet also includes a series of hashtags including #StopImportingJihadists, which
reinforces the construction of Muslims being a threat to the German people.
Example 104 (BerlinAttack 40):
The official flag of #Germany !!!
...
#Merkel
#refugeeswelcome ? !
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#Berlin
#BerlinAttack
#refugeberlin
#StopImportingJihadists
#TruckAttack
pic.twitter.com/UTJDpLqzLp
Summary
The findings to the first research question, “What are the features of nationalistconservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses on Twitter?” show that during both time periods
right-wing discourses employ negative presentation of migrants and refugees as well as the
German Chancellor, and construct the image that the national security and culture are threatened
and in danger due to the Government’s refugee policies. Othering is employed in the form of us,
the people, versus them, the politicians and the migrants. The excessive use of hashtags allows
users to reach a wider audience and make their tweets and thus their ideologies more visible.
While there are many similarities between the two time frames, there are also differences. In
2015, users emphasize the financial and social burden that refugees would pose and employ
general criticisms of mainstream and left-wing politicians. In 2016, users construct the attack as
a direct consequence of Chancellor Merkel’s refugee policies. Hence, the Chancellor is the direct
target of right-wing supporters’ criticism.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
FINDINGS FOR COUNTER-DISCOURSES

In order to examine the second research question, “What are the features of nationalistconservative, right-wing, xenophobic discourses on Twitter?” I analyzed the features employed
in tweets that were identified as pro-refugee or counter-discourse to right-wing discourse. The
focus is on strategies, practices, and resources employed to reinforce the support of migrants and
refugees as well as to challenge and condemn xenophobic and discriminatory ideologies. The
chapter is organized by hashtags. As illustrated in Table 7, the distribution of main features
varies across hashtags.
Table 7
Frequency of features associated with pro-refugee positions and counter-discourses.
Features
Support for refugees
Welcoming refugees
Appeal to humanity
Difficulties refugees face
Economic benefits of
refugees
Criticism of right-wing
discourses
Quoting sources

#wirschaffendas
(n = 217)
19 (9%)
16 (7%)
3 (1%)
1 (<1%)
1 (<1%)

#openborders
(n = 217)
23 (11%)
52 (24%)
44 (20%)
35 (16%)
5 (2%)

#MerkelsTote
(n = 152)
-

#BerlinAttack
(n = 152)
6 (4%)
1 (<1%)
-

-

42 (19%)

11 (7%)

14 (9%)

3 (1%)

43 (20%)

1 (<1%)

5 (3%)
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#wirschaffendas
Praise and appreciation of support for refugees
In September 2015 during the peak of the European migrant crisis, many Germans and
other Europeans demonstrated refugee-friendly positions. They volunteered to support refugees,
gave donations, and welcomed refugees in their communities (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016). This
pro-refugee tendency is also apparent in the datasets from August-September 2015. The majority
of the tweets that could be identified as pro-refugee contain praise or appreciation for volunteers,
donations, the willingness to help refugees, and the cooperation between citizens and authorities
as shown in the following examples.
Example 105 (wirschaffendas 237):
Den Hunderten von Flüchtlingen am Hbf München rollt eine Welle der
Hilfsbereitschaft entgegen. #Wirschaffendas pic.twitter.com/iQcNxWxuxx
The hundreds of refugees at Munich central station are welcomed with a great amount
of willingness to help #Wecandoit pic.twitter.com/iQcNxWxuxx
Example 106 (wirschaffendas 238):
#wirschaffendas wirklich. Super Unterstützung von Bürgern für die ankommenden
Flüchtlinge. Bravo ...
#wecandoit really. Awesome support from citizens for arriving refugees. Well done …
Both tweets document people’s willingness to help refugees. The first example is a metaphor and
depicts this willingness to help as a wave (German: Welle) that rolls towards refugees, which
represents the magnitude of help. Furthermore, the tweet is supported by an image of grocery
bags symbolizing the donations given for refugees. The second example contains the evaluative
words super and bravo to express appreciation. In addition, the pro-refugee position that “we
will manage the situation,” expressed by #wirschaffendas, is reinforced by the adverb wirklich
(English: really). The hashtag is therefore not used to merely categorize the tweet, but rather as a
sentence element to reinforce the content of the hashtag, that is, we welcome refugees and
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together we manage the situation. Both examples also demonstrate support for Chancellor
Merkel’s open-border position; #wirschaffendas is used to express agreement with Merkel’s Wir
schaffen das statement.
Some tweets not only report about the positive reactions toward refugees but also
encourage others to contribute or to work together to manage the situation, as illustrated in the
following examples.
Example 107 (wirschaffendas 236):
Was #München kann, können alle in #Bayern und #Deutschland schaffen. Auf
geht’s! #Flüchtlinge #wirschaffendas
What #Munich can do, everyone in #Bavaria and #Germany can do. Let’s go!
#Refugees # wecandoit
Example 108 (wirschaffendas 207):
#refugeeswelcome https://www.change.org/p/für-ein-verbot-fremdenfeindlicher-demosvor-flüchtlingsheimen-heimeohnehass/share?just_signed=true
Es fehlen nur noch 7189 Stimmen zu 75.000!!! #wirschaffendas
#refugeeswelcome [Link to petition] Only 7189 votes are missing to reach 75,000!!!
#wecandoit
Munich is located in the south of Germany, less than 100 miles from the Austrian border. As the
biggest city in the south and state capital of Bavaria, it was the major point of arrival for refugees
in Germany who came via the so-called Balkan route, particularly by train (hence also the
reference to Munich central station in Example 105). The author of Example 107 encourages
everyone in Bavaria and Germany to follow the example of Munich and show as much
involvement as the people and authorities did in Munich. The phrase wir schaffen das is taken up
syntactically in the first sentence. Munich serves as a good example for dealing with the arriving
refugees and other communities can manage, too. The encouragement is supported by the
motivational expression Auf geht’s! (English: Let’s go!).
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While the first example’s encouragement to do something is rather vague, the second
example is more goal-driven. The tweet contains a link to a petition to prohibit xenophobic
protests in front of refugee homes. The petition is a reaction to a series of partially violent
protests against asylum seekers organized by extreme-right groups in a small town in the state of
Saxony in East Germany. The user indirectly requests the audience to participate in the petition
by pointing out that only few votes are missing to reach the goal of 75,000 votes. When the goal
of a petition is met, the organizers may connect with political decision makers and request policy
changes. In this example, #wirschaffendas not only functions as a form of agreement with prorefugee policies but also to encourage the audience to support the petition and thus advocate for
change, particularly to limit xenophobic activities.
The previous examples showed that #wirschaffendas is not only used to express rightwing, anti-refugee positions and to criticize Chancellor Merkel. Even though they are fewer in
numbers, there are tweets with #wirschaffendas that display support for refugees and pro-refugee
policies. As may be expected, these tweets exhibit different strategies and topics. Migrants and
refugees are not depicted as the dangerous other that threatens the German people and the
German nation-state. Moreover, the legitimacy of the refugees’ status is not questioned. Instead,
users emphasize the economic benefit of accepting refugees.
Example 109 (wirschaffendas 235):
Jeder, der kapiert hat, was #Fachkräftemangel in 10 Jahren hier bedeutet, muss die
#Flüchtlinge mit Handkuss empfangen #WirSchaffenDas
Anyone who understands what #lackofskilledworkers in 10 years signifies has to gladly
welcome #Refugees #WeCanDoIt
The example points out the lack of skilled workers and thus the often-discussed labor shortage of
qualified professionals in Germany. Studies suggest that especially STEM fields and the
healthcare system are affected by the labor shortage (Statista, 2018). Some politicians and
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economists have argued that refugees could help fill the marketplace demands. This argument is
taken up by Example 109. The migrant crisis is therefore framed differently in these tweets as
opposed to tweets that reinforce right-wing discourses. Refugees are depicted as in need and
thankful for donations and help. Instead of emphasizing negative consequences of the arrival of
refugees, users focus on the economic benefits refugees may represent to a host country.
Furthermore, many tweets express a welcoming stance toward refugees.

Reactions to right-wing positions
While the majority of the pro-refugee tweets do not explicitly take up right-wing
discourses, there are some tweets with right-wing references. In the first example the user quotes
an article by the German liberal mainstream daily newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, which
describes the citizens’ and the authorities’ welcoming and well-organized reception of refugees
in Munich. The article contrasts candy with bombs because people in Munich provide candy to
refugees and not bombs as in some other parts of Germany, for example the small town in
Saxony, which was referenced in the petition described above (Example 108).
Example 110 (wirschaffendas 212):
#wirschaffendas in action! Flüchtlinge in München – Bonbons statt Brandsätze –
Münche – Süddeutsche.de http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/fluechtlinge-inmuenchen-bonbons-statt-brandsaetze-1.2636088 … #refugees
#wecandoit in action! Refugees in Munich – candy instead of bombs – Munich – [Link
to article] … #refugees
A positive reaction to refugees is not only documented in the south of Germany. The
following tweet demonstrates that the people in the north of Germany are also welcoming
refugees.
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Example 111 (wirschaffendas 217):
#hhilft als #trainofhope in Harburg ankommt. Heller, immer heller. #WirSchaffenDas
#marchofhope #HellesDeutschland
#hhelps when #trainofhope arrives in Harburg. Brighter, and brighter still.
#WeCanDoIt #marchofhope #BrightGermany
Harburg is a neighborhood in Hamburg. #hhelps may be an abbreviation of Hamburg helps and
is an example of textual and semiotic polysemy. The abbreviation visually creates a double-h
which is a symbol of Hamburg as it represents the license plate code; it stands for Hanseatic City
of Hamburg (German: Hansestadt Hamburg). The train with refugees that arrives in HamburgHarburg is described as train of hope, which is also the name of refugee relief organizations in
Germany and Austria. March of hope is the name of a movie about the lives of refugees in
Europe. The user expresses hope not only by referencing the train and march of hope but also by
describing the situation as becoming more and more bright, which is a contrast to the term dark
Germany (German: Dunkeldeutschland). Dunkeldeutschland is a pejorative term that was used to
described East Germany in the early 1990s (Ondreka, 2015), but the term regained popularity
after former German President, Joachim Gauck, used the term during a speech in August 2015 as
a reference to xenophobia, racism, and extreme nationalism, which is in fact more prevalent in
East German states. The antonym bright Germany symbolizes hope and stands for welcoming
refugees.

Semiotic and multimodal resources
Tweets that support pro-refugee positions use fewer or no emojis and emoticons, letter
capitalizations, creative formats, and memes than right-wing tweets. Only eight tweets include an
image. The majority of the images show proof of donations or volunteers helping refugees.
Furthermore, only mainstream sources are quoted, and most of these sources can be described as
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liberal as for example the daily newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung. The articles that are quoted
confirm the citizens’ willingness to help and welcoming receptions of refugees.
The hashtag that occurs most commonly with #wirschaffendas is #refugeeswelcome,
which is used to support a welcoming stance toward refugees. This is also evident in the
following example.
Example 112 (wirschaffendas 129):
#refugeeswelcome #wirschaffendas Local Heroes - Kim Cartoon! http://www.kimcartoon.com/index.php/serien/local-heroes#.VfgvrzgYUgA.twitter
The tweet contains two hashtags, #refugeeswelcome and #wirschaffendas, and a link to a website
with cartoons, specifically the series Local Heroes. The cartoon is entitled Moin, which is a
Northern German greeting. In the background, one can see flat, rural land, a wind turbine, a few
cows, and a farm, further indicating that it is located in the North of Germany. In the foreground,
there are two personified animals who are engaging in small talk, a man taking his dog for a
walk and a farmer leaning on a gate. The former asks What do you say to all these refugees here?
and the farmer responds I say moin! The question of the dog walker points to the perception that
large amount of refugees (all these refugees) are present (here). The use of the deictic word here
is ironic because there are no other people present in the cartoon. In fact, the land is wide and
open and does not look densely populated. Conversely, the farmer’s reaction shows that he does
not perceive the refugees as a threat. Instead he would see them as ordinary human beings and
politely greet them.
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#Openborders
Support for refugees
The distribution of codes within the #openborders dataset (Table 7) shows that the
majority of the tweets with #openborders can be classified as pro-refugee or counter-discourse.
Pro-refugee positions can be expressed by sharing positive reports of acts of welcoming refugees
as in the following two examples.
Example 113 (openborders 247):
German football fans welcome refugees and invite hundreds to watch match
http://www.independent.ie/sport/leftfield/german-football-fans-welcome-refugees-andinvite-hundreds-to-watch-match-31490232.html … #solidarity in #FortressEurope
#openborders
The first example consists of the headline of and the link to an article by the Irish daily
newspaper, Irish Independent, and three hashtags. The article is a report about German soccer
fans who hold “Refugees Welcome” banners during Bundesliga soccer fixtures. Although racism
and xenophobia are common issues in European soccer, especially among some ultra soccer fan
groups (e.g., Kennedy, 2013; Lesny, 1995), in 2015 several German Bundesliga soccer clubs
joined a campaign to welcome and support refugees. Moreover, some clubs invited refugees to
attend soccer games. By sharing the article on Twitter, the user contributes to the construction of
a positive image of Germany managing the migrant crisis. It depicts German soccer fans and
clubs as welcoming and friendly toward refugees, hence setting an example for the treatment of
refugees in Germany. The author of the tweet further includes #solidarity in #FortressEurope
#openborders. The term Fortress Europe (German: Festung Europa) is an intertextual reference
with shifting connotations as it was used as a propaganda term by the Nazis during World War II
and resurfaced in the 1990s to criticize the EU’s restrictive immigration policies (Zandonella,
2009). During the migrant crisis, right-wing populists reframed the term with positive
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connotations and used it to claim that Europe, particularly the external border of the EU, needed
to be protected and secured from migrants. It is since used to express pro- and anti-refugee
positions. Given the content of the example, one can assume that #FortressEurope is used to
criticize restrictive closed-door policies. The author not only references an article that reports on
acts of welcoming refugees but also includes hashtags that express solidarity and call for open
borders.
Solidarity, open borders, and the end of fortress Europe are also addressed in the second
example.
Example 114 (openborders 214):
‘Airbnb for refugees’ group overwhelmed by offers of help http://gu.com/p/4c29e/stw
#solidarity STOP #FortressEurope #openborders #oneworld
Similarly to the previous example, this tweet also contains the headline of and the link to an
article that reports on the positive reactions toward refugees as well as several hashtags that
denote a pro-refugee position. According to the article, “a German group which matches citizens
willing to share their homes with refugees is overwhelmed by offers of support” (Elgot, 2015).
The so-called Airbnb for refugees facilitates the placement of refugees in private homes, which,
according to the article, is met with a positive response. The tweet uses the article to attest to the
positive reactions of Germans and thus the successful management of the arrival of refugees. As
in the previous example, several hashtags contribute to the pro-refugee stances of the tweet. The
sequence of the hashtags and the capitalized word STOP suggests that the user expresses
solidarity, requests the end of fortress Europe, and calls for open borders and one world, that is, a
united and not separated world.
While the previous examples displayed implicit requests expressed through the use of
hashtags, many tweets include more explicit requests, for example to support refugees, to open
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borders, and to legalize helping refugees. The addressees of these requests are not primarily
fellow citizens, as in the #wirschaffendas dataset, but national and international authorities, since
immigration policy is to a large extent the EU’s area of responsibility.
The first example contains two requests, indicated by the sentence structure and the three
exclamation points.
Example 115 (openborders 99):
Keine Strafen für Fluchthelfer.innen!Lasst die Leute ziehen!#openborders
#grenzenöffnen!
No punishment for escape helpers!Let the people go!#openborders #openborders!
The author requests that people who help refugees should not be punished. The author uses the
gender inclusive form of the plural noun indicated by the suffix .innen. Even though the male
form of a noun may be used as a generic form to denote both genders, it is generally accepted in
German formal writing to use a gender-inclusive or gender-neutral form. In fact, in some
German states the use of gender-inclusive and gender-neutral language is required in school and
government documents. Nonetheless, conservatives and right-wing populists reject the use of
such forms. The tweet addresses the concern that people who help refugees cross a border
illegally may be charged as smugglers. The Twitter user further requests that they should let the
people go; it is unclear whether only refugees or also helpers are meant by the people. The
command is written in second person plural (Lasst, English: Let). The user does not explicitly
name the addressee of the command, but one can assume that it is directed to border police or
government representatives. The tweet ends with #openborders and the German equivalent of
the hashtag followed by an exclamation mark, thus representing a third request.
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In the second example, the user also expresses three requests without direct addressee.
Based on the content of the requests, the implied addressee is a government, which would
usually be in control of ships, military airplanes, and borders.
Example 116 (openborders 208):
Use our ships of war as ships of safety. Don’t drop bombs drop bread. Turn borders
into ‘Welcome Points’ we are all human #openborders
The use of the possessive determiner our points to a democratic government, because, even
though the government makes the political decisions, it is legitimized by the electorate.
Moreover, equipment such as ships is usually bought with taxpayers’ money. For these reasons,
the author may claim the ships as ours and thus belonging to the people. In all three sentences,
the author juxtaposes actions of war and exclusion (ships of war, bombs, and borders) with
actions of safety, humanity, and inclusion (ships of safety, bread, ‘welcome points’). The
rationale for the commands is provided subsequently by the words we are all human, which
points to inclusion and equality.
The third example references Fortress Europe, which was described above (Example
113). The reference is preceded by a negative description thereof: seas of death, walls of razor
wire, hearts of stone. The author further uses an expletive to criticize Fortress Europe and
demands that the borders be opened.
Example 117 (openborders 219):
Seas of death, walls of razor wire, hearts of stone. Fuck Fortress Europe. Open the
borders.#FortressEurope #openborders #oneworld
Economic benefit of refugees and difficulties refugees face
While tweets that support right-wing discourses point out the economic burden of
refugees, tweets that support counter-discourses focus on the economic benefit of refugees. As
described above (Example 109), there is a shortage of qualified professionals in Germany in
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certain fields and it has been argued that refugees could potentially fill the gap. The following
example cites an article that addresses this issue. The tweet includes a quote by the weekly
magazine, The Economist, about the positive reactions in Germany toward refugees. According
to the article, corporate bosses would hire refugees if administrative barriers were lowered,
which could decrease current and future labor shortages.
Example 118 (openborders 35):
“#Corporate bosses demand that rules be loosened to hire #refugees as apprentices or
workers” #OpenBorders #Germany
By citing the article and thus economic elites, the author strengthens the image that accepting
refugees and migrants could be beneficial for the German economy.
The topic of economy and business is also addressed by the following example.
Example 119 (openborders 6):
If there is no border for capital,why there s for people?Coca Cola is more free than
refugees. #refugeescrisis #refugeeswelcome #openborders
The user criticizes the differences in treatment of capital and people; while there is no border for
capital, people are held back by borders. The author also mentions the iconic symbol of
Capitalism, Coca Cola, and thus criticizes that large companies like Coca Cola are treated
preferentially and do not face the same barriers as migrants. Implicitly, the tweet addresses the
double standard as regards the European Single Market, which entails the freedom of goods,
capital, services, and persons. There are legal and practical differences between the four
freedoms of the Single Market with differing rules for capital and people, but the author does
point out existing inequalities when it comes to open borders.
Users also criticize the distinction that is made between economic migrants and refugees.
Example 120 (openborders 9):
If we close borders for economic migrants than we shouldn’t allow fellow citizens to
seek better jobs abroad.Would it be fair? #openborders
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Not all migrants arriving in Europe at that time were classified as refugees according to the
definitions of the German Constitution and the 1951 Refugee Convention as economic migrants
are not covered under these definitions. Therefore, economic migrants are usually not granted
asylum in Germany. The author of the tweet criticizes this distinction between refugee and
economic migrant and points out the inequality when it comes to migration opportunities. While
the EU closes its borders for economic migrants from poor countries, European citizens are able
to migrate to other places within and outside of the EU for better jobs and thus also for economic
reasons. The author points to the double standard as regards freedom of movement. While people
in need are prevented by closed borders from seeking better opportunities, citizens of more
privileged countries are able to migrate. Consequently, there is an existing inequality between
people who already live in privileged and safe places and those who do not. Moreover, some
Twitter users support freedom of movement for all, because they consider the distinction
between refugees and economic migrants as arbitrary, as illustrated in Example 121, which is a
response to @Umut_Ozsu who finds the distinction troubling, and in Example 122, in which the
author demands that all migrants and not just refugees should be welcomed. Exampe 122 is also
supported by an article promoting open borders and advocating changes in the international
refugee system.
Example 121 (openborders 215):
.@Umut_Ozsu Yes, distinction betw. refugees and economic migrants is arbitrary.
Mvmt is a right. #openborders for all http://openborders.info/blog/junk-theinternational-refugee-system-and-open-the-borders/
Example 122 (openborders 18):
When we say ‘#RefugeesWelcome’ let’s make sure we’re not welcoming ONLY
refugees – #OpenBorders #MigrationRights
Describing the economic benefit of refugees may strengthen the argument to welcome
refugees. But while it may be economically beneficial to accept refugees, Twitter users stress
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that it is also morally necessary to welcome refugees. Many tweets call for more humanity and
highlight the difficulties refugees and migrants face in their war-torn home countries, on their
dangerous way to Europe, or in refugee camps, as illustrated in the following examples.
The first tweet contains the quote Drowned because we are all just watching, a request to
create legal escape routes, three hashtags, and a meme. The meme is a picture collage entitled
Aylan, 3 Jahre aus Rohava, Syrien. im Krieg geboren. vor Krieg geflüchtet. Ertrunken weil wir
alle nur zuschauen. (English: Aylan, 3 years old from Rojava, Syria. born during war. escaped
war. Drowned because we are all just watching.). The top image shows a toddler washed ashore
with his face in the sand. The image of the drowned toddler made headlines and went viral at the
beginning of September 2015. His name was Aylan Kurdi, he had left Syria with his family, and
drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. In the meme, the top image is juxtaposed with two images in
the bottom, which both show a laughing boy, allegedly the same boy before he and his family
left Syria.
Example 123 (openborders 216):
“Ertrunken weil wir alle nur zuschauen” Legale Fluchtwege schaffen #OpenBorders
#Frontex #KiyiyaVuranInsanlik pic.twitter.com/sY6yNx4oDn
“Drowned because we are all just watching” Create legal escape routes #OpenBorders
#Frontex #KiyiyaVuranInsanlik pic.twitter.com/sY6yNx4oDn
The hashtags used in this example include #OpenBorders, #Frontex, which is the name of the
European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and the Turkish phrase Kiyiya Vuran Insanlik,
which translates to humanity washed ashore and was often used at that time in combination with
the image of the washed ashore toddler.
The following two examples report on the obstacles migrants face while already in
Europe.

156

Example 124 (openborders 201):
#SyrianRefuge try to protect his wife and kid from the #Hungarian police today
#refugeeswelcome #OpenBorders #Austria pic.twitter.com/4s8rVFl0gl
The first example describes how refugees are treated by Hungarian police officers. The user
suggests that a Syrian refugee needs to protect himself and his family from Hungarian police
officers. The tweet is supported by an image of a man holding a woman with a headscarf and a
baby and lying on train tracks. Two Hungarian police officers are standing around them reaching
their arms toward the people lying on the ground. The image is framed by the tweet, which
clearly identifies the situation as harmful to the refugees. Based on the image alone, it is unclear
why the people are on the tracks and whether the police are there to help or harm them. However,
at that time the British daily newspaper, The Guardian, published a video of the scene that
showed riot police attempting to separate the family forcefully. According to an article by The
Guardian from September 3, 2015, refugees were removed from a train bound for the Austrian
border and feared that they would be sent to a refugee camp in Bicske, Hungary. Many refugees
protested by laying on the train tracks, and “one family – a man, his wife and their toddler – had
to be wrestled off the ground by a dozen riot police” (Nolan & Graham-Harrison, 2015). This
family is depicted in the image.
The second example refers to a town in the Czech Republic, Břeclav, which is located
close to the Austrian border.
Example 125 (openborders 230):
#Breclav is a shame for #humanity. #CzechRepublic #refugeeswelcome #openborders
At the beginning of September 2015, Břeclav made headlines because police officers wrote
numbers on the hands of arriving migrants, which led to associations with Nazi practices during
World War II when prisoners were tattooed with an identification number.
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Despite the many accounts of difficulties refugees face on their way to Europe or within
Europe, many users also spread hope as shown in the following two examples.
Example 126 (openborders 34):
Amid the #RefugeesCrisis horrors a picture of hope: a Danish officer playing with a
#refugee child. #EU #OpenBorders pic.twitter.com/Zz9GiT8hqj
In the first example, the user shares an image of a police officer and a child sitting on a road
across each other. The police officer is holding his hands in front of his face. The girl is smiling
and her hands are stretched out toward the officer. Based on these cues, it looks like they are
playing a game. In the background, one can see two more police officers standing and a group of
people sitting next to the road. The scene seems to take place in Denmark because the officer’s
uniform shows the national coat of arms of Denmark. The tweet frames the image as a symbol of
hope amid the horrors of the refugee crisis. This tweet also contrasts with the portrayal of the
Hungarian and Czech police (Example 124 and Example 125).
In the second example, the user claims that refugees do not constitute a crisis, indicated
by the negation not and the quotation marks around the word crisis. The author further claims
that they, referring to the refugees, are future friends, customers, doctors, neighbors, and cooks,
which is why one should welcome them. The user appeals to the inclusion of refugees in society
and daily life, which humanizes refugees who are seen as equals rather than strangers who pose a
threat.
Example 127 (openborders 68):
Refugees not “crisis.” They are future friends, customers, doctors, neighbors, cooks.
Welcome them. #openborders
Use of personal pronouns and possessive determiners
Personal pronouns and possessive determiners may serve as linguistic tools to establish
belonging and exclusion. The personal pronoun we, for instance, can be used as an inclusive or
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exclusive we. Right-wing discourses tend to use the exclusive we to distinguish us, the in-group,
from them, the other. This construction of an in-group defined by ethnicity, religion, or
citizenship (Wodak, 2015b) is not found in pro-refugee tweets. On the contrary, sentences like
we are all human as in Example 116 illustrate how authors use pronouns to establish inclusion.
The inclusive we is used in order to demonstrate that belonging is not defined by ethnicity,
religion, or citizenship but by being human. The first person pronoun we is also used to address
the pro-refugee community and to encourage others to show compassion to all migrants as in
Example 122.
Example 128 (openborders 208):
Use our ships of war as ships of safety. Don’t drop bombs drop bread. Turn borders into
‘Welcome Points’ we are all human #openborders
Example 129 (openborders 18):
When we say ‘#RefugeesWelcome’ let’s make sure we’re not welcoming ONLY
refugees – #OpenBorders #MigrationRights
Possessive determiners, on the other hand, signal belonging in a different way. In the
following two examples, my Europe and in my name is used in combination with a negation by
which the users position themselves in opposition to policies and practices of the EU. In the first
example, the user opposes Europe as a gated community, and in the second example, the user
opposes to be represented by a European Union that does not address human rights violations of
member states. The tweet includes #Bicske, which is a reference to the scene described above in
which Hungarian riot police were forcing refugees out of a train at the train station in Bicske.
Example 130 (openborders 93):
My Europe is not a gated community #refugeeswelcome #openborders
Example 131 (openborders 175):
Wie viele Menschenrechtsverletzungen braucht es noch, bis die EU endlich handelt &
hilft? #Bicske #openborders #notinmyname
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How many more human rights violations are needed until the EU finally acts and helps?
#Bicske #openborders #notinmyname
The concept of representation is also present in Example 128, in which the possessive determiner
points to democratic legitimization as described above.
In the following two examples, the author indirectly addresses the audience by using the
possessive determiner. Example 132 is an appeal to the audience that refugees need our help.
This appeal is justified by the preceding sentence, in which the dangerous situation for refugees
is summarized as death chases after refugees! Example 133 appeals to the reader’s moral
understanding. Refugees should be welcomed and let in because their lives are in danger either in
their home countries or on the dangerous migration routes toward the EU. Life is depicted as a
privilege that should not only apply to those of us who are already in a safe place but also to
refugees, according to the user.
Example 132 (openborders 46):
Death chases after refugees! They need our help. #refugeeswelcome #refugeescrisis
#openborders
Example 133 (openborders 47):
#refugeeswelcome life is not just our privilige . #openborders for refugees
Citing sources
Most tweets use emotions and moral arguments to express support for refugees or to
encourage others to support refugees as described in the previous section. The second most
frequent strategy is the reference to sources or experts to back up one’s argument. This support
strategy ranges from referencing the feeds of Twitter to citing newspaper articles. In Example
134, the user claims that the supporters of open borders are not a minority but that it is a
worldwide feeling. This is justified by the feeds of Twitter, and thus probably based on the fact
that #openborders was a trending hashtag at that time. The tweet portrays the image that there is
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widespread support for open borders regardless of what governments or media may say. The
tweet also refers to the UK as striving to be history’s loser, which may be a reference to the
UK’s position during the migrant crisis, particularly concerning the refugee camp in Calais,
France. Many refugees who attempted to reach the UK stayed in a refugee camp in Calais, from
where they tried to cross the Channel to the UK. The UK, however, prevented refugees to enter.
Example 134 (openborders 168):
It is clear by the feeds of Twitter that #OpenBorders is a worldwide feeling, and the
#UK is currently striving to be history’s loser.
Most examples in this category cite newspaper articles, mainly from mainstream sources
such as the German daily newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, the German publicly owned TV
channel, Das Erste, the British daily newspaper, The Guardian, and the US-American daily
newspaper, The New York Times. The tweets often use a similar format, that is, the headline and
the link to the article followed by several hashtags that denote pro-refugee positions, as
illustrated in the following three examples.
Example 135 (openborders 122):
Flüchtlinge in München Applaus für die Ankommenden
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/fluechtlinge-willkommen-in-muenchen1.2635848 #DankeDeutschland #OpenBorders #RefugeesWelcome
Refugees in Munich Applause for those arriving [Link to article]
#ThankyouGermany #OpenBorders #RefugeesWelcome
Example 136 (openborders 214):
‘Airbnb for refugees’ group overwhelmed by offers of help http://gu.com/p/4c29e/stw
#solidarity STOP #FortressEurope #openborders #oneworld
Example 137 (openborders 170):
Hungarian police and refugees in standoff after train returns to camp – #Hungary
#Fascism #OpenBorders http://gu.com/p/4c4tp/stw
The articles in the first two examples share stories about the positive reactions toward refugees,
and thus portray a positive image as regards the reception of and dealing with refugees in
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Germany. However, users do not only share positive experiences but also difficulties refugees
have to face. In the third example, the user cites an article by The Guardian, which describes the
situation in Bicske, which was referenced in previous examples. The article is supported by two
videos illustrating the tense situation between refugees and Hungarian authorities. The user also
includes #Hungary, #Fascism, and #OpenBorders. The use and sequence of these hashtags in
combination with the citing of the article suggests that the user classifies Hungary’s actions as
fascist and demands open borders.

Criticism of right-wing discourses and the EU
As already mentioned in previous examples, pro-refugee and counter-discourse tweets
also contain forms of criticism. The targets of this criticism are the EU, national governments,
and the supporters of right-wing discourses. When the EU is targeted, users often refer to
concepts or legal documents such as fortress Europe and the Dublin agreement as shown in the
following example.
Example 138 (openborders 50):
#FestungEuropa tötet Menschen und dient Schlepperbanden. #FortressEurope
#noborders #fuckdublin #openborders
#FortressEurope kills people and serves gangs of smugglers. #FortressEurope
#noborders #fuckdublin #openborders
The EU and the members of the EU can also be addressed more directly as demonstrated
in the following two examples. Although the EU does have its own executive with the European
Commission, the member states’ heads of state or government form the European Council,
which sets the EU’s political direction. Additionally, the Council of the European Union is made
up of the member states’ government ministers and has legislative power. Consequently, the
member states’ governments play a crucial role in the EU’s decision-making processes.
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Therefore, a critique of the EU government as in Example 139 may be directed to both the EU
and its member states. The content of Example 140 (same as Example 131) points more directly
to the EU as human rights violations can fall within the scope of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. The European Commission, for example, can sue member states if they do not
comply with EU law, which includes human rights.
Example 139 (openborders 83):
#Refugees volunteers networking themselves, because #eu governments failing.
#TrainofHope #OpenBorders
Example 140 (openborders 175):
Wie viele Menschenrechtsverletzungen braucht es noch, bis die EU endlich handelt &
hilft? #Bicske #openborders #notinmyname
How many more human rights violations are needed until the EU finally acts and
helps? # Bicske #openborders #notinmyname
As stated above, users also criticize the supporters of right-wing discourses. Right-wing
discourses are characterized by invoking fear of the other. This fear can be created by implying
the arrival of large numbers of foreigners, for example by referring to migration movements as
invasions or floods of migrants. The user of the following tweet reverses the origin of fear by
inverting the meaning of the same metaphors typically used to describe immigrants and
immigration. The author uses the negative buzz words swarms, waves, and floods in combination
with racists, racism, and fascism and thus constructs the image of an influx of racists that
threatens the society. The topic of threat is also taken up by the second example. The author uses
the tragedy of a drowned boy to illustrate the emotional numbness of too many for whom he was
just another migrant; a threat.
Example 141 (openborders 52):
Swarms of racists. Waves of racism. Floods of fascism. That’s what I’m afraid of.
No to #FortressEurope #RefugeesWelcome #openborders
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Example 142 (openborders 213):
A little boy drowns. He was someone’s son, someone’s joy. For too many, he was just
another migrant; a threat. #SyriaCrisis #openborders
Semiotic and multimodal resources
52 tweets include images. Most images are pictures that display the difficulties refugees
encounter en route or in refugee camps as described above and the support that migrants receive
from Europeans. Pictures show pro-refugee rallies across Europe, indicated by hashtags like
#Austria and #TrafalgarSquare, where people hold signs like treating refugees as the problem is
the problem, #love refugees, and all refugees welcome. Images also demonstrate the refugees’
gratefulness for being welcomed for example in the form of signs that say thank you in multiple
languages. Another common image used in tweets is the washed ashore body of the Syrian boy,
Aylan Kurdi, who drowned in the Mediterranean Sea.
Example 143 (openborders 109):
#NoOneIsIllegal #OpenBorders #RefugeesWelcome pic.twitter.com/Kvm1u3Mhg6
The image consists of a drawing of a child, who resembles the picture of Aylan Kurdi because of
his body position and the red t-shirt, and a French text which translates to I tell myself that we
could believe that he is sleeping, that he will wake up, that he’s alive, that the sea cannot reject
like that a child that young, I imagine my child in his place, my heart hurts, my stomach hurts, I
cannot remove this image from my head. It’s the image of shame, the one that tells us that it’s
time to stop CLOSING OUR EYES.
The second example also displays a drawing of Aylan Kurdi. His body is placed on a
map entitled world new map. The continents are separated from the ocean by a wall with razor
wire. The body is behind the wall on top of the ocean. The image symbolizes fortress Europe and
the consequences of building a wall to keep refugees out.
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Example 144 (openborders 174):
No human is illegal! #openborders #refugeeswelcome pic.twitter.com/ha7fLlvgU9
Apart from images, some tweets also include letter capitalizations and the use of multiple
exclamation points to reinforce the message of the tweet as in the following example.
Example 145 (openborders 118):
DANKESHÖN DEUTSCHLAND UND ÖSTERREICH!! #openborders
THANK YOU GERMANY AND AUSTRIA!! #openborders
Emoticons were not present in the dataset. As regards the use of additional hashtags, the two
most frequently used hashtags were #refugeeswelcome (76 tweets) and #FortressEurope (29
tweets). As described above, #refugeeswelcome was used to support a welcoming stance toward
refugees and #FortressEurope was used to criticize the EU’s refugee policies and practices.

#MerkelsTote
Criticism of right-wing discourse
As might be expected, there is only a small number of tweets in the #MerkelsTote dataset
that can be identified as pro-refugee or counter-discourse. The features that were found in these
tweets include complaints about how right-wing politicians and supporters react to the attack and
exploit the attack for their own purposes, using sarcasm and counter-arguments.
In the first example, the author claims that most Twitter users who include #MerkelsTote
in their tweets remain anonymous. Anonymity in the context of Twitter may refer to not using
one’s offline name but a pseudonym instead. Consequently, the user may imply that these users
hide behind their screens and do not stand up for their positions. The user ends the tweet with
three noun phrases, which seem to represent the reason for or consequence of the anonymity.
The second noun phrase is written as a direct object, indicated by the ending -en which is used
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for determiners of masculine nouns in direct object position. Based on this grammatical
structure, it can be assumed that the user claims that these users do not have morale and decency
but only hatred. Furthermore, the hashtag is used metapragmatically, that is, referring to the
hashtag itself (See also Example 148).
Example 146 (MerkelsTote 84):
Die meisten, die unter #MerkelsTote twittern, tun dies anonym. Keine Haltung.
Keinen Anstand. Nur Hass.
Most who tweet under #Merkel’sDead do so anonymously. No morale. No decency.
Only hatred.
The second example also points out hatred. The author claims that there is no compassion
but plenty of hatred. In the first sentence, there is no explicit referent to whom this claim applies,
but in the subsequent sentence fragment the user refers to right-wing populists without a
conscience and thus implies that right-wing populists do not express compassion toward the
victims of the terrorist attack. Instead they utilize hatred as it suits their purposes. The phrase that
is to be expected suggests that this is typical for right-wing populists. The tweet ends with
#Merkel’sDead and #neverafd, the former being used to categorize and contextualize the tweet
and the latter being used to reject the extreme-right political party, Alternative for Germany.
Example 147 (MerkelsTote 111):
Mitleid gibt’s keins, Hass dafür genug. Naja, wie zu erwarten von gewissenlosen
Rechtspopulisten. #MerkelsTote #niemalsafd
There is no compassion, but plenty of hatred. Oh well, that is to be expected from
right-wing populists without a conscience. #Merkel’sDead #neverafd
While the previous example only implicitly addressed that right-wing supporters exploit
emotions and promote hatred, the following example directly addresses this right-wing strategy.
The author states that #MerkelsTote, and thus the notion that Merkel is to blame for the victims,
is used to instrumentalize the attack and distort the reality. As in the previous example, the tweet
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negates that this hashtag expresses any form of empathy or solidarity.
Example 148 (MerkelsTote 85):
#MerkelsTote ist der widerliche Hashtag, der mir seit langem unter die Augen kam. Null
Solidarität, pure Instrumentalisierung und Verzerrung
#Merkel’sDead is the most disgusting hashtag which I’ve seem in a long time. Zero
solidarity, pure instrumentalization and distortion
The following example is a direct request with which the user implicitly addresses those
who employ right-wing discourses by blaming others and invoking fear. The user not only
criticizes right-wing strategies but also provides an explanation, namely feeling helpless.
However, the user argues that feeling helpless does not justify right-wing discourses.
Example 149 (MerkelsTote 112):
Don’t start blaming people and stirring up hatred just because you feel helpless.
#BerlinAttack #Breitscheidplatz #Merkel #MerkelsTote
Twitter users also employ sarcasm to criticize #MerkelsTote and thus also the users of
this hashtag. As stated before, #MerkelsTote is often used when blaming Chancellor Merkel for
the victims of the terrorist attack. The strategy of scapegoating is common in right-wing
discourses as it provides an easily identifiable target that can be blamed for problems and
concerns. The user of the following tweet uses a hyperbole and analogic reasoning to ridicule
that Merkel is blamed for the attack by asking if Merkel is also to blame for the death of the
user’s goldfish. The tweet also directly responds to the Twitter account of the AfD on the federal
level by including @AfD_Bund.
Example 150 (MerkelsTote 159):
Mein Goldfisch ist gestorben #MerkelsTote?? @AfD_Bund
My goldfish died #Merkel’sDead?? @AfD_Bund
Another example of a sarcastic tweet is the following.
Example 151 (MerkelsTote 119):
Wenn ich noch einmal #MerkelsTote lesen muss, kotz ich ins Auto von AFDPolitikern und anderen Vögeln
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If I have to read #Merkel’sDead one more time, I’ll puke into the cars of AFDpoliticians and other morons
The tweet is a predictive conditional sentence, which describes a condition and the resulting
consequence. The condition is reading another tweet with #Merkel’sDead and the consequence is
that the author of the tweet would vomit into the car of politicians of the extreme-right party,
AfD, and others alike. The user refers to AfD politicians because it was a politician of that party
who coined the phrase Merkel’s dead. The user further extends the applicability to other morons,
which may refer to those who support the AfD and right-wing discourses because of the negative
associations with the word Vogel (English: moron, lit: bird) in this context. The word implies
lack of reasonable behavior. The informal style and unlikely realization of the consequence
indicate sarcasm.

Argumentation
Most tweets that can be classified as counter-discourse to right-wing discourses employ
blaming and sarcasm, but there are also some examples that provide rational arguments in order
to delegitimize the validity of right-wing discourses. The following two examples address the
fallacy that refugees automatically represent a threat to the safety of people and state. The first
example reminds the audience that refugees did not commit the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks and a Syrian child did not commit the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack. The user probably
chooses to specify the age and origin (#Syrian child) because the attacker did originally enter the
EU as a refugee, however not in 2015 after Germany suspended the Dublin regulation but several
years earlier. Therefore, the user questions the conclusion that Merkel is to blame for the victims
since her government allowed Syrian refugees to apply for asylum in Germany starting in 2015.
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The tweet thus reveals the fallacy used in right-wing supporters.
Example 152 (MerkelsTote 157):
Those tweeting #MerkelsTote forget that none of 911 terrorists were #refugees &
#Breitscheidtplatz attacker was no #Syrian child #berlin
Both Example 152 and Example 153 address right-wing populists and their supporters in
third person. In Example 152 the user creates further distance by using the demonstrative
determiner those. The author of Example 153 also chooses to address right-wing supporters in
third person (@AfD_Bund-voters), but additionally the Twitter account of the AfD is directly
addressed via the feature @username. The author may have chosen this affordance in order to
reach a wider audience since the tweet also appeared in the feed of @AfD_Bund due to the use
of @username.
Example 153 (MerkelsTote 27):
Wann verstehen @AfD_Bund -Wähler, daß #Breitscheidplatz eher DAMIT zu tun
hat, anstatt #refugeesNOTwelcome und #MerkelsTote zu skandieren?
[Link to tweet]
When will @AfD_Bund -voters understand that #Breitscheidplatz has to do WITH
THAT instead of chanting #refugeesNOTwelcome and #Merkel’sDead?
[Link to
tweet]
The tweet also includes a tweet by the German-language news website, Spiegel online, which
cites an article about German military missions against ISIS. This tweet by Spiegel online is the
reference for the capitalized da-compound DAMIT (English: with that). The capitalization of the
word expresses emphasis, which is necessary as the referent is not included in the text of the
tweet itself but in the tweet that is attached to it. Based on the sentence structure, the author
argues that terrorist attacks in Europe are caused by Western countries’ military missions in the
Middle East. These military missions provide reason and rationale for radical groups to fight
back and take revenge. The tweet ends with an emoji that shows a face with rolling eyes, which
is commonly used to show contempt.
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Users react to right-wing discourses by criticizing them for inciting hatred and
instrumentalizing for their own purposes, that is, the creation of fear with which discrimination
and exclusion can be justified. Those who use #Merkel’sDead to reinforce right-wing discourses
are accused of only stirring up hatred and not expressing compassion toward the victims of the
attack. Furthermore, users present counter arguments in order to provide a rational argument
with which right-wing discourses can be fought.

#BerlinAttack
Expressing sympathy and prayers and references to religion
In the aftermath of several tragedies of the last few years, social media platforms were
used to express sympathy and to show compassion. After the Paris attacks in 2015, for instance,
some Facebook users added solidarity filters to their profile pictures such as the Je suis Charlie
logo or the French flag. Users also post messages and tweets expressing their thoughts and
prayers. In this dataset, three tweets contain a sign of sympathy as illustrated in the following
two examples. In the first example, #IchBinEinBerliner and an attached image express solidarity
with the victims and their families.
Example 154 (BerlinAttack 13):
#Breitscheidplatz #BerlinAttack #IchBinEinBerliner pic.twitter.com/1ohUAP0ked
The phrase Ich bin ein Berliner (English: I am a Berliner) is a quote by US President John F.
Kennedy, who gave a speech in West Berlin in 1963 voicing the United States’ support of West
Germany and West Berlin. Syntactically and semantically, the phrase also resembles the slogan
Je suis Charlie (English: I am Charlie), which emerged after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris
in January 2015 and which was varied after other tragedies including the Paris attacks in
November 2015 and the Orlando shooting in 2016. Consequently, social media users may
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recognize and use the phrase Ich bin ein Berliner as a sign of solidarity and compassion. The
tweet is further supported by a picture which shows flowers and grave candles lying on the
sidewalk, representing a symbol of sympathy.
The second example not only offers sympathy by using the phrase prayers and thoughts
with the victims but also promotes peaceful coexistence and equality. #coexist is often used to
demonstrate the ability of humans with different religions or ideologies living together
peacefully. The capitalization of the hashtag adds emphasis. While right-wing discourses often
use religion to distinguish between in-group and out-group and focus on the alleged danger that
derives from Islam, the author of this tweet seems to embrace diversity and support peaceful
coexistence.
Example 155 (BerlinAttack 17):
#BerlinAttack is heartbreaking - prayers and thoughts w/ the victims. We’re dedicated
to working towards peace & equality on earth #COEXIST
The topic of religion is also addressed in other tweets. As stated before, in right-wing
discourses Islam and Muslims are often equalized with threat and terror. Conversely, tweets that
support counter-discourses reject this generalization and state instead that Islam is a peaceful
religion and that Muslims oppose terror, as in the following example. After the Berlin attack,
#MuslimeGegenTerror (English: #MuslimsAgainstTerror) was a trending hashtag and used to
demonstrate that German Muslims condemn terrorism and violence.
Example 156 (BerlinAttack19):
Islam heißt Frieden #MuslimeGegenTerror #BerlinAttack
Islam means peace #MuslimsAgainstTerror #BerlinAttack
The following tweet also addresses the generalizations to which Muslims are subjected. The
author refers to right-wing supporters as cowards and declares them responsible for the
extremism, which they blame on all Muslims. Therefore, the user directly criticizes right-wing
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supporters and their discursive strategies.
Example 157 (BerlinAttack 42):
Yeah here we go – right wing cowards start blaming all muslims for the extremism
they helped unleash in the first place. #BerlinAttack
Criticism and quoting sources
While the previous example does not specify who is meant by right wing cowards, the
following two examples have more specific addressees of their criticism. In both examples, the
political party, AfD, is criticized for exploiting the Berlin attack for their own purposes, that is,
agitation against migrants and refugees and critique of the government and mainstream media.
Both tweets are supported by an article from Meedia.de and DerWesten.de, respectively, two
online news portals, the latter catering primarily to North Rhine-Westphalia, a state in Western
Germany. In the first example, the @username function is used to directly address @AfD_Bund
and @MarcusPretzell, however, syntactically they are referred to in third person. @AfD_Bund is
preceded by the demonstrative determiner this and @MarcusPretzel is followed by the
prepositional phrase with his statements, his referring back to @MarcusPretzell. The author of
the tweet thus distances him- or herself from the addressees, which is reinforced by the word
choice repulsive to describe the political party and the politician who originated the phrase
Merkel’s dead.
Example 158 (BerlinAttack 43):
Einfach nur abstoßend, diese @AfD_Bund, insbesondere @MarcusPretzell mit seinen
Äußerungen zu #BerlinAttack http://meedia.de/2016/12/20/merkels-tote-soinstrumentalisiert-die-afd-den-lkw-anschlag-in-berlin-in-den-sozialen-medien-fuer-ihrezwecke/
Simply repulsive this @AfD_Bund, especially @MarcusPretzell with his statements
about #BerlinAttack [Link to article]

172

In the second example, the @username function is not used, but the AfD is also referred
to in third person. The author claims that the AfD exploits the attack, which is supported by an
article, as in the previous example, and adds a further description of the political party. The user
implicitly calls the AfD the wolf in sheep’s clothing, which is a figurative expression to describe
someone who disguises their true nature by looking innocent. The exploitation of the attack is
implied as the party showing its true nature, that is, their proclivity to Nazi ideology, after
disguising itself to appear mainstream and acceptable. Although the reference to Nazi ideology is
not directly mentioned in the tweet, the article by DerWesten.de makes several connections
between AfD politicians’ word choice and Nazi jargon.
Example 159 (BerlinAttack 18):
AfD instrumentalisiert #BerlinAttack
https://www.derwesten.de/209039125 Hoffentlich erkennt der Bürger nun den Wolf,
nachdem Schaafspelz abgelegt hat.
AfD exploits #BerlinAttack [Link to article] Hopefully, the citizen now recognizes the
wolf after sheep’s clothing is taken off.
Twitter users add links to articles that support their position pointing out and criticizing
the AfD’s instrumentalization of the Berlin attack as well as articles that provide a more nuanced
view of the situation as in the following example.
Example 160 (BerlinAttack 75):
Wichtiger Kontrapunkt zu Kritik an #Merkel – #Flüchtlingspolitik nach
#Breitscheidplatz http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/berlin-market-attack-2016 …
#AfD #CSU #BerlinAttack
Important counterpoint to the criticism of #Merkel – #Refugeepolicies after
#Breitscheidplatz [Link to article]
The author introduces the tweet with the statement important counterpoint to the criticism of
#Merkel. The counterpoint is provided in the article by the British online version of the
international monthly men’s magazine, Gentlemen’s Quarterly. Specifically, the article criticizes
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British extreme-right politician, Nigel Farage, for his premature conclusion that Merkel’s refugee
policy caused the attack. The article further argues that Islamist extremism is home-grown in
Europe, that is, migrants do not come as extremists but are radicalized in Europe. Moreover, the
article questions Merkel’s responsibility, which is insinuated in Pretzel’s claim They are
Merkel’s dead, since the only person to be held responsible for the attack is the attacker himself.
It is important to keep in mind that the sample of tweets with #BerlinAttack was posted
within 24 hours after the attack and before the police identified and released the identity of the
attacker. For this reason, other Twitter users also criticize the hasty judgments made by rightwing politicians and supporters. The following example specifically addresses the premature
assumption that the attack was committed by a migrant or refugee, as the perpetrator could also
be a person born and raised in Berlin.
Example 161 (BerlinAttack 29):
How do you know that the perpetrator of the #berlinattack was not born and raised
in Berlin? #berlinattack
Support for Chancellor Merkel’s position
As stated above, many tweets criticize Chancellor Merkel and her refugee policies and
even call for her resignation. However, there are also some Twitter users who express their
support for Chancellor Merkel and her refugee policies as shown in the following two examples.
Example 162 (BerlinAttack 62):
#BerlinAttack #merkel Sie sind die Richtige. Weil Sie im Chaos die Ruhe bewahren
und den Überblick behalten
#BerlinAttack #merkel You are the right person. Because you keep calm in the chaos
and stay on top of things
In Example 162, Chancellor Merkel is addressed directly with the formal personal
pronoun Sie (English: you, formal). Even though her name is used as a hashtag, not capitalized,
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and not followed by a comma, the use of the personal pronoun clearly indicates that the user is
addressing Merkel. The first part of the tweet is then followed by an explanation why Merkel is
the right person. According to the user, she keeps her cool and stays abreast of the situation. The
tweet can be understood as a form of approval of Merkel’s general position and her reaction to
the attack as the tweet begins with #BerlinAttack.
The second example uses the third person to refer to Merkel. In this example, the user
positively evaluates Merkel’s immigration policy by calling it enlightened.
Example 163 (BerlinAttack 134):
Angela Merkel’s enlightened immigration policy will beat terrorism in the long run.
Don’t let one mad man defeat humanity #BerlinAttack
The author also claims that Germany’s immigration policy would beat terrorism in the long run.
Furthermore, the user does not distinguish between migrants and refugees but refers to
immigration as a whole. In December 2016, Germany’s government still supported the so-called
open-door policy as regards refugees. With the statement Don’t let one mad man defeat
humanity, the user addresses and rejects the call of right-wing politicians and supporters for
closed borders and stricter immigration laws. The user seems to consider Angela Merkel’s
enlightened immigration policy a form of humanity and thus evaluates it positively. Moreover,
the tweet regards the attack as an isolated event, as opposed to a general tendency as depicted in
right-wing discourse.
An appeal to values like freedom, unity, and open borders is also evident in the following
tweet.
Example 164 (BerlinAttack 31):
A. Merkel:“...wir werden die Kraft finden für das Leben, wie wir es in Deutschland leben
wollen: FREI, MITEINANDER und OFFEN.”#berlinattack
A.Merkel: “…we will find the strength for the life we want to live in Germany: FREE,
TOGETHER and OPEN.” #berlinattack
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The tweet includes a quote by Chancellor Merkel from a press conference on December 20,
2016. In her statement, she encourages the people to find strength to live in Germany like people
wish to live, namely free, together, and open. She addresses all people in Germany by using the
first person pronoun we and by not distinguishing who does or does not have the right to live in
Germany. The Twitter user seems to support this statement because the three adjectives free,
together, and open are capitalized and the tweet does not include any negative framing of this
statement. By quoting the Chancellor and including #berlinattack, the user disseminates her
message on Twitter and makes it thus visible to a greater audience.

Summary
The findings to the second research question, “What are features of counter-discourses to
right-wing positions?” show that counter-discourses focus on highlighting the humanitarian
reasons for supporting refugees and migrants, on sharing examples of existing support for
refugees, and on condemning right-wing discourses as regards refugees. Furthermore, counterdiscourses provide positive presentations of the Chancellor and her refugee policies. However, as
shown in Table 7, there are differences between the datasets. While the datasets that represent
the summer of 2015 include more instances of supporting refugees and appealing to humanity,
the datasets that represent the timeframe after the Berlin terrorist attack contain more sarcasm
and mostly criticisms of right-wing discourses. Othering is also present in the data, however in
contrast to right-wing discourses, the other is represented by right-wing supporters.
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CHAPTER SIX:
FINDINGS FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN RIGHT-WING AND COUNTER
PERSPECTIVES

For the first and second research question, I mostly looked at individual tweets because
the majority of the tweets were not part of an interaction between users. In some cases, another
user may have been addressed directly because this function may increase the tweets’ visibility,
but the direct interaction could not always be reconstructed due to the sampling strategy.
For the third research question, “To what extent do the technological and communicative
affordances of Twitter lead to a potential for dialogic interaction between the opposing discourse
communities?” I focus on the interaction between users. I specifically focus on direct interactions
via responses to tweets in order to analyze the potential for dialogic interactions between users
who feed right-wing, nationalist-conservative discourses and users who challenge and condemn
such discourses and reinforce pro-refugee discourses. In all four datasets, the majority of the
sample are not replies to another tweet nor followed up by a direct response from another user.
Nonetheless, there are some examples of user interaction in all four datasets. For the analysis of
the third research question, only responses to tweets from the dataset are taken into
consideration.
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#wirschaffendas
The findings show that the majority of interactions between users occur within the same
type of discourse. Furthermore, the strategies and topics employed in the original tweet are often
also used in the replies. For instance, when a tweet criticizes Merkel, the replies also contain a
form of criticism of Merkel, or when the topic of financial burden is highlighted, the response
echoes the financial burden of refugees, as in the following example.
The tweet by @ThomasGBauer (Figure 6, wirschaffendas 80) is a response to
@WilliamsJon, who tweeted about the increasing numbers of refugees entering Austria. The user
cites the Red Cross and includes the reference in the form of the link to an article by the
Guardian. @ThomasGBauer’s tweet is a sarcastic response to @WilliamsJon’s tweet as it is a
request to let them, that is, the refugees who entered Austria, proceed to Germany. Germany is
capitalized and described as the land of milk and honey, which is a reference to the bible and thus
to Judeo-Christian traditions. In contemporary English, the idiom is understood as a place with
abundant resources where one can have an easy life. The two hashtags, #noproblem and
#wirschaffendas, further point to the sarcastic tone of the tweet. The second user addressed by
@ThomasGBauer directly replies with G€RMONEY (for all)! and also addressed the user of the
first tweet, @WilliamsJon. @Lars9596 takes up the capitalized word Germany, albeit with
altered spelling, and adds for all in parentheses as well as an exclamation point. The notion of
(financial) abundance, to which @ThomasGBauer’s tweet alludes with the land of milk and
honey, is expressed by the alteration of the spelling. The first e is replaced by the Euro sign, €,
and the second and third syllables are replaced by money. This word play is possible due to the
phonemic similarities of -many (/məni/) and money (/mʌni/), which differ in only one phoneme.
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Figure 6. Tweet “wirschaffendas 80” with reply.
As already mentioned in the previous example, a connector between users is the use of
humor and sarcasm. In the following example (Figure 7, wirschaffendas 115, same as Example
11), user @ThomasGBauer brings up the threat of terrorist attacks and includes negative
stereotyping of Muslims. The same user then replies to his own tweet and includes the addressee
of his previous tweet, @Lars9596. The response is a continuation of the previous tweet as the
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user further exploits the concept of suicide bombers looking for virgins in paradise. The user
ironically claims that the virgins would be at the Oktoberfest, which equals heaven, while the
suicide bombers would end in hell. User @Lars9596 contradicts @ThomasGBauer by stating
that they would in fact go to ‘heaven’, but with 72 mothers in law.

Figure 7. Tweet “wirschaffendas 115” with replies.
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Heaven is placed in quotation marks because the user plays with the negative connotations of
mothers-in-law. Therefore, the contradiction is used to confirm the previous tweet’s sarcastic
message that suicide bombers would be surprised when discovering that they did not end up in
heaven. @ThomasGBauer affirms the response by @Lars9596 by using the word correct and by
further elaborating on the mother-in-law joke (i.e., several wives) and stating everything will be
fine. Karma rules. The overall stance constructed by the three users is one of alignment, that is,
the critique of #wirschaffendas.
The previous two examples show that some users seem to interact more than once. It is
possible that the users know each other offline, or they may belong to similar online networks.
Twitter relationships are not primarily based on offline relationships as, for example, Facebook.
If one’s account is public and one did not restrict the privacy settings, any Twitter user can see
and react to one’s tweets and become a follower. It cannot be determined whether
@ThomasGBauer and @Lars9596 followed each other at the time of the interaction, but it is
likely the case because @ThomasGBauer addressed @Lars9596 twelve times within the
#wirschaffendas dataset.
While the majority of the interaction occurs within the same discourse community, there
is one example of interaction between a user who seems to support refugees and a user who
seems to fear the burden of refugees. In the following example (Figure 8, wirschaffendas 116),
@Holefleisch tweets A thought: 70 years ago people ran away from us for their life. Now they
run to us to protect their life. #wirschaffendas. The user makes an implicit reference to refugees
during World War II who escaped Nazi Germany, which is contrasted with the situation during
the European migrant crisis and refugees seeking help in Germany. User @OrganicFUD
responds by negating and clarifying the last part of @Holefleisch’s tweet to protect. According
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to @OrganicFUD, people do not come to be protected, but to live from us. The user further
claims that there was already protection in Turkey, Greece,… Austria,… Therefore, the user
argues that refugees, who are only implicitly referred to through the context of both tweets, come
to Germany deliberately to exploit the social security system. The reply was tweeted six days
after the original tweet and the author of the original tweet did not react to the reply.

Figure 8. Tweet “wirschaffendas 116” with reply.

#openborders
As shown above, the majority of the tweets with #openborders supported pro-refugee
positions or criticized right-wing positions. This trend can also be found in tweets with replies;
the interaction between users is for the most part based on pro-refugee positions as illustrated in
the following examples.
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The first example (wirschaffendas 31) is part of an exchange of eight tweets between two
users. User @LesvosW2eu shares that the mayor of Mytilene, the capitol of Lesbos, Greece,
requests the federal government to declare a state of emergency. Lesbos is less than four miles
away from the Turkish coast and en route the Western Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean routes,
which were used by the majority of refugees in the summer of 2015. User @xoriskanape replies,
wondering how a state of emergency would help with the issues, that is, the high number of new
arrivals of refugees and the lack of care. @LesvosW2eu then suggests that the only solution is
#openborders, legal routes for Refugees without documents to enter Europe safely, to which
@xoriskanape agrees by starting the reply with agreed. Their exchange continues for three more
tweets, in which the users not only agree with each other but also build on each other’s ideas and
suggestions to help refugees continue their way toward Athens.
The second example (same as Example 144, openborders 174) is an exchange of three
tweets. In the initial tweet, user @michelmaietta states No human is illegal! and shares an image
showing a toddler’s body placed on a map entitled world new map. The continents are separated
from the ocean by a wall with razor wire. The body is behind the wall on top of the ocean, and
resembles the body of washed ashore Aylan Kurdi. Two other users reply to the tweet. Both
responses can be considered agreements with the original tweet. While the first response
corroborates the pro-refugee position by stating that we need humanim (sic) and empathy in
#Europe, the second response quotes the author and text of the original tweet, including the
image. Both responses support the position of the original tweet as they indirectly agree with
@michelmaietta.
In the third example (Figure 9, openborders 211), the users also agree with each other by
pointing out that refugees were not responsible for several financial crises or economic issues
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within the EU. User @tinawirnsberger asks Can you remember when refugees caused the Hyposcandal? No? Me neither, which represents a simulated dialogue. The question is in quotation
marks, but it does not seem to be a quote from a different source. The user suggests that refugees
are not responsible for a financial crisis caused by investment bankers. Hypo-scandal is a
reference to the Austrian bank, Hypo Alpe Adria, which represents a symbol of bad investment
banking and the 2008 European debt crisis.

Figure 9. Tweet “openborders 40” with replies.
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The tweet is echoed by @HellSchu, who adds additional crises that have not been caused by
refugees or the migrant crisis but by financial institutions (‘The European bank crisis?’ ‘The
Greece crisis?’ ‘The signing of TTIP?’ – Can easily be continued). The second response seems
to contradict the original tweet and the first response with doch (English: on the contrary).
However, upon closer examination, it is evident that @burner_vie supports the positions of the
other tweets. The user employs a word play and uses the verb flüchten (English: to escape) with
Verantwortung (English: responsibility) in order to claim that those who escape responsibility
are responsible for the financial crises, which may be a reference to bankers who did not get
prosecuted for their actions that led to the financial crisis (on the contrary. Those who espaced
responsibility).
As the examples illustrate, most interactions occur between users who seem to share
similar ideologies and positions. However, there are some examples that show that interaction
also happens between users of opposing opinions. The following example (same as Example 56,
openborders 59) shows the interaction between a user who claims with an image that some
refugees belong to terrorist groups and a user who contradicts the claim by replying guy on the
left not ISIS not Nusra. Since the tweet by user @PatrickHilsman is merely a sentence fragment,
it is useful to explore the profile information of the user. The profile picture of @PatrickHilsman
shows a gorilla punching Hitler, identified by mustache and swastika armband. In the profile
description, the user also included Freelance Journo + Semi-Pro Sleuth, … Troll Hunter! These
profile cues help infer the meaning of the tweet as they position the user as anti-fascist and
interested in detective work and discovering internet trolls.
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#MerkelsTote
The #MerkelsTote dataset is more diverse as regards interaction between users. The
findings show interaction between users who criticize the use and meaning of #MerkelsTote,
between users who support right-wing positions, and between users of opposing discourses.
The first two examples show how users who oppose the blaming of Chancellor Merkel
for the victims and the scare tactics of right-wing populists interact with each other. In the first
example (Figure 10, MerkelsTote 159, same as Example 150), user @Dadgess states that their
goldfish died. The statement is followed by #Merkel’sDead with two quotation marks and the
direct address of the right-wing populist party’s Twitter account, @AfD_Bund.

Figure 10. Tweet “MerkelsTote 159” with replies.
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The structure of the tweet suggests that the user is asking whether Merkel is also responsible
when one’s goldfish died. This ironic exaggeration points to the user’s critique of right-wing
populists’ scapegoating strategy. Two other users also respond to the tweet with ironic
statements. @Noah3567_ makes a reference to refugees by saying that the fish was certainly a
refugee (The fish was certainly a refugee). The irony is supported by the letter repetition in the
German words for was, certainly, and a and by multiple exclamation points. The number one
between the exclamation points may have been a typing mistake. The response by @ReibyDE
addresses media reporting. The user asks whether the media have already reported. The question
is ironic and may point to sensationalist media reports after tragedies (have the media reported
yet?).

Figure 11. Tweet “MerkelsTote 119” with replies.
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In the second example (Figure 11, MerkelsTote 119, same as Example 151), the author
complains about the use of #MerkelsTote by threatening to vomit in the car of right-wing
politicians and others alike (If I have to read #Merkel’sDead one more time, I will puke into the
car of AFD-politicians and other morons). User @Annixp1 takes up the threat by threatening to
poop in the trunk (And I poop into their trunk

) and thus picks up te same “storyline” by using

a variation of the same theme. The author of the initial tweet, @Laminatrice, shows approval
with an emoticon expressing a big smile. By using sarcasm, these two users thus affiliate around
the criticism of right-wing discourses.
While there are a few examples of user interaction between users criticizing right-wing
discourses, users who support right-wing positions seem to react to each other more frequently.
As the following examples illustrate, users build on each other’s right-wing discourses.
The first example (MerkelsTote 10) is an interaction between nine users. @FrischFritz96
shares an image of a Christmas Market entrance that is blocked by three concrete blocks with the
purpose of preventing vehicles to enter the market. The user sarcastically claims that secure
borders are not needed if nice concrete blocks can be placed in front of the Christmas Market.
The tweet also includes #BerlinAttack and #MerkelsTote. Eight users respond to the tweet and
take up the topics of border control and security threat. One user (@HaraldPetermann) also
makes references to other events that require additional protection such as the Oktoberfest or the
New Year’s Eve party in front of the Cologne Cathedral. This particular response also takes up
the sentence structure of the original tweet by beginning the tweet with or and ending it with and
and… (or fences at the Oktoberfest, for ‘recapturing’ the cathedral square and and…). The
tweet is thus a continuation of the initial tweet.
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In several interactions, the users support each other’s critique of politicians and
government. For instance, the author of the following example (Figure 12, MerkelsTote 5, same
as Example 72) criticizes that The Green Party prevented the deportation of the attacker (They’re
not #Merkel’sDead, but rather #SimonePeter’sDead. #Amri would’ve been home already if
@Die_Gruenen didn’t prevent it). The users who respond to that tweet reinforce that Merkel is
to blame, too. User @eysvog3l claims that both, Chancellor Merkel and The Green Party are to
blame, the former for letting refugees in and the latter for not letting them leave (Both are guilty:
#Merkel let them in – #TheGreenParty don’t let them out).

Figure 12. Tweet “MerkelsTote 5” with replies.
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User @Synelly asserts that the attacker would not have been here, that is, in Germany, without
Merkel (Without Merkel he wouldn’t have been here. @BonkeKolja @Die_Gruenen). Even
though the three users do not fully agree on which politician is to blame for the victims, they
support each other’s perception that politicians are responsible for the attack because of the
policies implemented or blocked by them.
As stated above, interaction within the #MerkelsTote dataset does not only occur between
users who seem to share ideologies. The following tweets illustrate interactions between users
supporting right-wing discourses and users challenging those discourses. In all examples, the
initial tweet can be classified as right-wing, and in two of the four examples, the author of the
initial tweet also replies to the response tweet.
In the first example, MerkelsTote 11, user @RegensburgWatch provides a lead for the
police: Here a new lead for #police: One, who hasn’t been here long, is happy about a pile of
unholy corpses. User @RobertDittmar responds to the tweet by directly addressing the author
with the personal pronoun Sie (English: you, formal) and accusing the author of defamation.
@RobertDittmar also provides a reasoning for his accusation (You vilify a man who smiles
because he just found out that wife and child are safe.) and ends his tweet with the exclamation
Shame on you! @RegensburgWatch replies to this accusation by questioning @RobertDittmar’s
reasoning (At the location of #terror at least 1 h after #attack, why would he wait that long to
call wife&child? A confidant!). While @RobertDittmar does not include any hashtags in his
tweet, @RegensburgWatch includes hashtags both within the sentence and at the end of the
tweets. In both tweets, the author includes #AfD, which may be a sign of approval of the party’s
positions and ideologies.
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In the following example, MerkelsTote 45, user @MaxEricThiel affirms They are
#Merkel’sDead! and claims that Amri is the second terrorist whose deportation was blocked
(They are #Merkel’sDead! She is drawing a trace of blood through the Republic. With Ansbach
it is already the 2nd terrorist whose deportation was blocked!). The tweet is supported by a
campaign poster of the AfD’s youth organization, Junge Alternative (English: Young
Alternative). The poster shows Harald Weinberg, Member of the Bundestag from the political
party, Die Linke (English: The Left), wearing an explosive belt. The poster claims that he was
against the deportation of the perpetrator of a suicide bombing in Ansbach, Germany. User
@de_escalation responds to the tweet by addressing the members and supporters of the Junge
Alternative (JA) with the personal pronoun ihr (English: you all, informal). The user claims that
the people support Chancellor Merkel all the more, the more dumb and illogical the JA incites
against her (You JA don’t even realize that the people supports Merkel all the more, the dumber
and more illogical your agitation against her.). This tweet is followed by a four-tweet exchange
in which @MaxEricThiel and @de_escalation address each other with the personal pronoun du
(English: you, informal). While @MaxEricThiel uses sarcasm (I argue against that, I believe you
will first be shot down by the flying spaghetti monster.) and does not directly react to the other
user’s arguments, @de_escalation continues their line of argument and supports it with a
reference to a program by the second channel of German television broadcasting (ZDF). The
user claims that right-wing discourse is being exploited by ISIS (They [ISIS] want the division of
society &strengthening of the Nazis) and Merkel counteracted with her policies (#Merkel
counteracted. Got it?).
In the last example, MerkelsTote 140, user @Knuddelbacke shares an image of an
obituary remembering the isolated cases who lost their lives because of refugees. The tweet also
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includes a reference to Chancellor Merkel’s New Year’s address (#NewYear’saddress no words
!!!) and the two hashtags #newyear’seve2016 and #Merkel’sDead. Three users react to this tweet
with the first two responses being the most critical. User @ribachman tweets two questions in
response to the tweet by @Knuddelbacke. The user indirectly criticizes the obituary because it
does not include people who suffer because of the politics of Western countries (And where are
the thoughts for all the people who had to leave their home thanks to the politics of the West? /
And where are the thoughts for the thousands of dead for which Europe and also Germany are
responsible?). @ribachman therefore presents a counterargument to @Knuddelbacke’s position.
The other two users question @Knuddelbacke’s purposeful lack of conceptual clarity and lack of
coherence.

#BerlinAttack
As in the #MerkelsTote dataset, the findings show that there is interaction between users
who share similar ideologies and between those who do not share the same positions. The first
example (Example 165, BerlinAttack 23) is a tweet by the Russian news network, RT, which
includes a link to an article by the network and a picture of four politicians including Chancellor
Merkel and Minister of the Interior de Maizière laying down flowers. The tweet by @RT_com
itself does not express a clearly identifiable position toward the attack, however, the six users
who reply to the tweet express strong criticism of Merkel as shown in the exchange below. Two
users, @PaulaDuvall2 and @S0lar_Wind, address Merkel’s political career and declare her
UNFIT to lead Germany and her career as dying. One user (@blackfishbird) invokes the topic of
security and the government’s (they) lack of implementing security, which may be a reference to
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border control. Another user (@EmperorShine1) addresses the consequences of the
government’s “open-door” policy as regards refugees and lack of integration measures.
Example 165 (BerlinAttack 23):
@RT_com: #BerlinAttack: ‘#AngelaMerkel’s #NightmareBeforeChristmas’ (Op-Ed)
on.rt.com/7y9r
@PaulaDuvall2: I hope this horror in Berlin seals her “political coffin”, next year. She’s
UNFIT to lead Germany!
…
@blackfishbird: Maybe now they’ll try some security. Probably not though.
@EmperorShine1: well that’s the price you pay for mass immigration and not trying
to acclimate them .#merkelsfault #nightmarebeforechristmas
@S0lar_Wind: she should take these flowers and put in her ass, this fake sympathy wont
save her dying career after all she did
The second example (same as Example 103, BerlinAttack 1) is a 24-tweet interaction
about Chancellor Merkel’s reaction toward the German flag shown in a video. User
@MillenialCon_ shares a short clip in which one can see CDU politicians celebrating, including
Angela Merkel. One politician takes a small German flag and starts waving it. Merkel takes
away the flag and slightly shakes her head with a facial expression of disapproval. The video is
from a 2013 election victory party, which is not indicated by @millenialCon_. In fact, the
sentence structure of the tweet suggests that the terrorist attack occurred before the scene shown
in the video. The time frame is further supported by #berlinchristmas and three Christmas tree
emojis. Most users who respond to the tweet support the criticism of Merkel and disregard the
fact that the video does not relate to the terrorist attack. In fact, the video is used as a justification
for criticism. Users claim, for instance, that she is not patriotic and request that she should be
voted out or removed from office. Merkel is also called incompetent and a traitor. One user even
goes as far as suggesting killing her by tweeting She Should Dangle From A Rope! All of the
responses were posted in English and many of the responses refer to Germans and German
citizens in third person, meaning the users may not be Germans themselves or live outside of
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Germany. The use of the term impeachment also signals an outsider perspective since the
German Chancellor cannot be impeached. In Germany, only the President can be impeached.
Furthermore, Merkel is compared to the US-American politicians, Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton. In both cases, the references are negative, which may point to the users’ leaning toward
right-wing, conservative ideologies. Two users also bring up the topic of downfall and claim that
Merkel would contribute to the downfall of Germany. However, two users point out that the
video is older and thus taken out of context, but these replies are not taken up by the other users.
Example 166 (BerlinAttack 1):
@MillenialCon_: The #BerlinAttack occurs and all Merkel is worried about is not
waving the German flag
#berlinchristmas
#GermanChristmasMarket
…
@Bellajane127: That’s so sad! A German leader disgusted with her country’s flag. She
must be voted out!
@johnmich44: She will be gone, Germans are fed up with their Obama like President!
…
@dernhelm75: She is afraid of triggering the terrorists with national pride! What an
absolutely disgraceful act!
…
@ahikingtrail: when are the proud German citizens going to refuse this witch, reminds
me of Hillary, we said no to her propaganda, they can too
@Thomas95631199: She Should Dangle From A Rope!
@Ted_Cruz_2018: That stupid Communist! She is either going to destroy
Deutschland or cause a “Deutschland fur Deutsch” movement.
@SCRUB58: If I lived in Germany, I would do everything in my power to make sure
Angela Merkel would lose her job! She’s incompetent.
@Fastcars2016: She’s a traitor to all Germans. She should be removed from office,
impeached even asap or else Germany will perish.
@_SimonBarnett: Um. That clip is probably older that you are.
@Snoss82: video is way older. Get some dignity!
…
@Incognnitto: give her the isis flag ! She loves that one
@waltjesseskylar: verrrry interesting - is she anti-German?
While the previous example showed that users who presented counter-arguments were
ignored, in the following example (Example 167, BerlinAttack 21), the author of the initial tweet
engages with the user who criticizes the tweet. User @KeepItRealist tweets about the media
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covering up that migrant crime is a growing national epidemic in Germany and claims that
Germany is not a free society. User @LeonTysen responds to this tweet questioning
@KeepItRealist’s credibility by asking if the user is from Germany, which is denied by
@KeepItRealist, who continues the argument of media manipulation and suppression of
information. @LeonTysen again questions the other user’s credibility by arguing that one has to
live in the country to judge the situation, which is again denied by @KeepItRealist, who claims
that the reporting after the 2015 mass sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve was altered
at the instruction of Chancellor Merkel. At this point another user steps in and accuses
@KeepItRealist of not knowing the facts and being a racist. This user also addresses
@LeonTysen in their tweet, which may be an acknowledgment that @LeonTysen tried to engage
in a failed dialogic interaction.
Example 167 (BerlinAttack 21):
@KeepItRealist: Migrant crime is a growing national epidemic in Germany, yet it’s
covered up by the media. Germany is not a free society. #BerlinAttack
@LeonTysen: are you from Germany?
@KeepItRealist: I am not, but I pay attention to things going on there. Suppression of
information in this case is nothing new.
@LeonTysen: information can be manipulated. You have to experience live here to tell
@KeepItRealist: No, you don’t. German media bosses were forced to admit it after the
Cologne attacks. They suppressed the story for Merkel.
@CatslaveCop: Ok, that proves that you don’t have a clue. Oh, and your timeline shows
you’re a fucking racist. It’s not working @LeonTysen
Summary
The findings to the third research question, “To what extent do the technological and
communicative affordances of Twitter lead to a potential for dialogic interaction between the
opposing discourse communities?” show that there is little interaction between users. If users
respond to each other, then they usually respond to people who share their own views. Users
therefore affiliate around shared ideologies. In interactions between members of opposing
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discourse communities, it is more common for users who employ counter-discourses to
challenge users who share right-wing positions than vice versa.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I discuss the findings and implications of the study as well as limitations
and directions for further research.

Summary and Discussion
Although there are few direct negative references to migrants, refugees, and asylum
seekers, they are often depicted as taking an active role in the form of pushing for asylum or
invading Germany and Europe. This constructs a negative image of migration and its
consequences and questions the legitimacy of their status as refugees. While the English term
refugee may not inherently carry negative connotations, negative connotations associated with
the German word for refugee, Flüchtling, have evolved as right-wing discourses have used the
term when pointing out negative situations. By questioning the legitimacy of the term refugee,
users also question the rightfulness of any financial aid for refugees and claim that refugees are
prioritized over citizens and represent a financial burden for taxpayers.
Furthermore, migrants and refugees are depicted as a threat to German and European
culture, traditions, and belief systems. Religion is often used to justify this threat because users
draw on negative stereotypes of Islam. Refugees are discursively constructed as violent and
dangerous, posing an imminent threat to the safety of German citizens. References to previous
Islamist terrorist attacks corroborate this construction of threat and danger.
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The major target of right-wing complaints is the German government. The slogan wir
schaffen das, which became a symbol of the German government’s refugee policy, is used
sarcastically in juxtaposition with negative descriptions of refugees. This argumentation strategy
ridicules the German government’s position on refugees and constructs the distinction between
citizens and politicians. The citizens have to deal with the consequences that result from the
actions of politicians, particularly the members of the federal government3. Not only refugees
and politicians but also those who support pro-refugee policies are the targets of othering;
however, the main scapegoat is Chancellor Merkel as she uttered the symbolic phrase wir
schaffen das. Refugees are depicted as her guests, implying that she invited them with her openborder refugee policy, and even children or adopted sons, implying that she would care for them
as a mother. This sarcastic comparison to a mother criticizes the perceived prioritization of
refugees over citizens and draws on the concepts of financial and social burden. Furthermore,
users establish causation by directly linking the Chancellor’s open-border refugee policy in the
summer of 2015 to the terrorist attack in December 2016.
Both in August – September 2015 and in December – January 2016, right-wing
discourses are thus characterized by negative presentations of migrants and refugees. Users
construct the image that the national security is threatened and the national identity and culture
are in danger. The discursive strategies employed in right-wing discourses establish a positive
self-presentation and negative other-presentation used to justify the exclusion of others who do
not belong to the constructed and imagined homogeneous community of white Germans and
Europeans sharing Christian traditions. Several topics common to right-wing discourses are
invoked and exploited such as financial burden, security threat, and the downfall of the nation.
3

It is important to note that the term government is conceptualized differently in German. It
refers only to the Chancellor and the Ministers.
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These findings align with previous research on right-wing discourses both in mass media and
political discourse as well as digital discourse (e.g. Baumgarten, 2017; Doerr, 2017; Wodak,
2015b; Richardson & Wodak, 2009). The data further show that the de-emphasis and
downplaying of Nazi and extreme right positions is evident.
Users also leverage the technological affordances of Twitter. Twitter’s character
limitation facilitates simple and informal language that can be understood by a wide audience.
Repetitions and buzzwords are common features of tweets. The character limitation may
promote an impulsive and uncivil discourse as well as depersonalized communication because
both the person criticizing and the person who is criticized are behind a screen (Ott, 2017). This
may lead to a new form of political discourse (Terkourafi et al., 2018); users are able to
circumvent mass media gatekeepers and share political opinions and news directly (Engesser et
al., 2016). Consequently, social media may play a role in political agenda-setting and in
constructing and maintaining the image of political actors and processes (Enli, 2017).
Another example of a technological affordance is the use of memes, which are frequently
used to propagate right-wing discourses. Visuals contribute to the spread of right-wing
discourses as they facilitate naturalization processes. Furthermore, right-wing tweets often
contain multiple hashtags. The excessive use of hashtags makes tweets more visible and thus
provides the potential to reach a larger audience. Not only hashtags that denote right-wing
positions are used but also hashtags that do not carry negative or positive connotations such as
#refugees or #Merkel, as well as hashtags that contain positive associations with refugees such as
#refugeeswelcome. While #refugeeswelcome is often used to express a positive stance toward
refugees, in combiation with #BerlinAttack, the users make use of it to criticize pro-refugee
positions. (e.g., #AngelaMerkel welcomes the #Muslim #invasion ... / so not to tarnish her open
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border #refugeewelcome policy). In other instances, tweets simply consist of a variety of
hashtags denoting various positions on refugees. This can be described as inter-ideological
mingling (Graham, 2016) and facilitates the spread of right-wing ideologies, and is used to a
lesser extent by those who counter these discourses. It is possible that the excessive use of
hashtags is more common in right-wing tweets because of social bots which are used more
frequently by right-wing political actors (Schäfer, Evert, & Heinrich, 2017) and “are no longer a
marginal phenomenon on social media platforms” (Keller & Klinger, 2019, p. 172).
While there are many similarities as regards the discursive strategies, topics, and semiotic
and multimodal resources employed in right-wing discourses during both time frames, there are
also some differences between the first and second time frame. The most common topics in the
August 2015 dataset include financial and social burden of migrants and refugees, while tweets
in December 2016 focus on pointing out the consequences of the German government’s refugee
policies. Furthermore, when users employed criticism in August 2015, it addressed politicians,
mainstream media, and the elite in general. Users distinguished between us, the people, and
them, the politicians and the elite. In December 2016, however, the criticism was directed toward
specific politicians. Chancellor Merkel was the main target of right-wing criticism. As the head
of the German government, she is directly associated with Germany’s refugee policies. Her
gender as a female leader also plays into this. Her portrayal as mother aligns with metaphors
used by liberals and conservatives in political discourse and the construction of family as a type
of governance. While conservatives lean toward a strict father model, liberals lean toward the
nurturant parent model, according to Lakoff (2002). By using references to Merkel as mother in
negative contexts, right-wing supportors not only recontextualize the connotations of the
reference to Merkel but also criticize liberal positions on migration policies and claim the
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prioritization of refugees over citizens. Members of other political parties, especially The Green
Party, were also blamed for the attack and the casualties, albeit in much lower numbers
compared to Angela Merkel. It needs to be pointed out that users rarely used the @username
function in this context. There were only two examples of @-mentions related to The Green
Party, and users did not use @AngelaMerkelCDU, the official Twitter account of the Chancellor,
to address Chancellor Merkel. Conversely, #Merkel was used very often.
While right-wing discourses aim at creating fear in order to justify harsh treatment,
exclusion, and discrimination, counter-discourses use emotions differently. Sharing reports and
images of migrants’ hardship and existing inequalities aims at triggering empathy and
compassion. Positive reports of refugee relief efforts undertaken by German and other European
citizens aim at pointing out the support for refugees among the German and European population.
Right-wing diction is reappropriated to serve the purpose of portraying the support as strong and
widespread as well as to depict right-wing discourses and right-wing supporters as the actual
problem that is threatening the country.
Users construct a positive image of refugees by pointing out the economic benefits for
European countries as well as the cultural enrichment refugees represent. The phrase wir
schaffen das is thus contextualized differently in counter-discourses, taking a positive stance.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack, Chancellor Merkel and her
refugee policies are evaluated positively, whereas right-wing rhetoric is criticized and ridiculed.
Moreover, users provide counter-arguments and caution against generalizations of migrants in
general and Muslims in particular.
While right-wing supporters distinguish between us on the one hand and migrants,
refugees, mainstream politicians, and refugee supporters on the other hand, supporters of
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counter-discourses distinguish between us, which includes citizens and politicians, on one side
and right-wing supporters on the other side. Similarly to right-wing discourses, there are few
instances of @-mentions. The examples in which users address other Twitter users focus mostly
on accounts related to the far-right political party, AfD. Counter-discourses employ discursive
strategies to justify inclusion rather than exclusion and call out right-wing rhetoric by identifying
and explaining the discursive strategies employed by right-wing supporters.
To conclude, the findings show that both right-wing and counter-discourses are
represented on Twitter. Right-wing discourse thus only reflects one type of discourse. Counterdiscourses provide different perspectives and evaluations of the European migrant crisis and do
not construct migration as a threat to the nation but rather emphasize the economic and societal
benefits. Furthermore, users of both discourse communities leverage the technological
affordances of Twitter and employ a variety of semiotic and multimodal resources to create
meaning. However, right-wing discourses contain more hashtags, more visuals, and more
sarcasm than counter-discourses. Humor and sarcasm seems to be used to create affiliation.
Especially in the case where controversial issues are being discussed, sarcasm also seems to
serve as a mitigating device that allows users to hide behind opinions. Lastly, English seems to
be used within both right-wing and counter-discourses to connect across geopolitical boundaries
and to reach a wider audience. The use of English enables users to bring international attention to
German issues and allows more users to participate in the discourse about these issues.
As regards interactions between users in general and specifically between users of
opposing discourse communities, the findings show that most tweets are not part of an exchange
between users. Furthermore, users who do engage with others usually chose to support each
other’s positions and thus stay within the same type of discourse, which may contribute to the
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construction and maintenance of filter bubbles. Humor and sarcasm seem to be a connecting
element in user interactions and serve to create affiliation and bonds of co-membership online. In
fact, most interactions in the dataset include humor or sarcasm. Tweets that are part of an
interaction also tend to contain similar discursive strategies and topics. The hashtag that
provoked most interactions between users of opposing discourse communities was
#MerkelsTote, which may be due to the hashtag’s inherent provocation and the fact that it started
based on the tweet of a far-right politician. The findings regarding user interaction align with the
general lack of turn-taking expectations on Twitter. Although tweets of celebrities and public
figures do receive attention in the form of likes, retweets, and replies, most tweets do not get a
reaction. Since #MerkelsTote derived from a politician’s account, it is thus not surprising that
this hashtag yielded more interactions between users.

Implications and Contributions
The European migrant crisis has contributed to the rise in right-wing, nationalistconservative, and xenophobic discourses across Europe (Bennett, 2016; Doerr, 2017). Refugees
and asylum seekers are portrayed as scapegoats and individual cases of negative encounters are
exploited to generalize that refugees represent a threat for Germany and Europe and to justify
closed borders and strict immigration policies (Rettberg & Gajjala, 2016). Consequently, it is
important to react to these discourses by not reducing and simplifying complex contexts, by
providing different perspectives in a civil manner, and by creating more spaces for dialogue
online and in society at large. The counter-discourses explored in this study illustrate some of the
strategies that are used to challenge and condemn right-wing discourses. Examining right-wing
discourses and their counter-discourses may help raise awareness, contribute to the development
of policy guidelines to educate users of all ages about social media usage and the dangers of
203

ideological manipulation and confirmation bias, and hopefully prevent the naturalization of these
discourses and the discrimination against refugees and asylum seekers.
Throughout the European migrant crisis, the German government and particularly the
German Chancellor were criticized for not presenting viable solutions to handle the migrant
crisis and to counter right-wing discourses. The rise of the German far-right political party and
its electoral success across Germany may thus be seen as a logical consequence due to the
construction of fear and the perceived inability of mainstream political parties to provide
solutions. It may thus be helpful to improve the government’s communication strategies in order
to prevent right-wing discourses from further spreading and becoming the norm. This may be
achieved by a stronger presence in social media and through a critical examination of right-wing
discourses. When political leaders critically evaluate and examine right-wing discourses and
demonstrate interest in the concerns of citizens, they may facilitate a better connection to their
constituency and prevent political apathy which is often exploited by far-right political parties in
order to promote their own agenda and ideologies.
In the last few years, Twitter has gained importance as a platform where discourses are
produced, reproduced, as well as challenged. Right-wing political actors in particular have taken
advantage of the micro-blogging service to connect with followers directly without a gatekeeper
and to spread their ideologies (Ott, 2017). When mainstream media outlets are called the lying
press and when fake news spread across social networking sites, it is important to reveal and
detect misleading and manipulative strategies in order to prevent the dissemination of fake news
and simplified and distorted information. Increasing social media users’ digital media
competence is therefore pivotal. For this reason, colleges and universities should make efforts to
foster students’ digital media competence by providing guidelines on how to detect manipulative
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strategies and make informed judgments about claims and fake news spread via Twitter and
other social networking sites and by teaching positive norms online. Students in the field of
linguistics in particular should be encouraged to critically examine language and its role for
issues of power and (in)equality.
This multimodal critical discourse study has shown that Twitter is a platform where rightwing, nationalist-conservative ideologies are disseminated as well as challenged. The
combination of critical discourse analysis and multimodal discourse analysis was able to reveal
that right-wing supporters as well as supporters of counter-discourses use a variety of discursive
and semiotic resources and leverage the technological affordances of Twitter. According to a
2018 study by the German forsa Institute for Social Research and Statistical Analysis (Forsa,
2018), most online users have encountered hate speech online. However, most comments, posts,
and tweets that include inciting speech are often written by only a few very active accounts,
which was also found in this study. While it shows that right-wing supporters are more actively
using Twitter to disseminate their ideologies, it may also offer opportunities as regards the
handling of these accounts. For instance, in Germany, the Federal Criminal Police Office
(German: Bundeskriminalamt) has investigated several online users who disseminate hate speech
on the basis of Volksverhetzung, incitement of the people, according to § 130 of the German
penal code. In addition, this study has shown that there are many Twitter users who not only
contribute to the production of counter-discourses but also criticize and challenge right-wing
ideologies, which may also help prevent the naturalization of right-wing discourses.
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Limitations
This study also has limitations that need to be addressed. The main limitations are related
to the data sample. Although the sampling strategy is appropriate for the purpose of this study
and aligns with previous in-depth qualitative research studies that also analyzed 25-200 tweets
(Bennett, 2016; Graham, 2016; Rasmussen, 2015; Rettberg & Gajjala, 2016), it is important to
point out that sampling by theme may not fully account for “co-occuring discourse activities”
(Androutsopoulos, 2013, p. 497). Moreover, it may be difficult to bind a group by tracking the
use of hashtags because not all hashtags are used to interact with others and to build a
community (Marwick, 2013). The limitation of sampling by time is that the analysis only covers
a small piece of a possibly larger phenomenon. Furthermore, since I conducted a multimodal
critical discourse analysis and needed to examine each tweet for relevance as well as linguistic,
semiotic, and multimodal features, I was not able to analyze larger amounts of data. I hope to
reduce the significance of these limitations by having provided a fine-grained, contextualized
analysis connected to the broader socio-political phenomenon. I believe that the discoursehistorical approach to CDA facilitated these connections. By closely examining the particular
contexts chosen for this study, I was hopefully able to contribute to the understanding of
nationalist-conservative, rightwing, and xenophobic discourses on Twitter in the context of the
rise of the right-wing populists in Europe and specifically in the relatively understudied context,
Germany. Germany plays a significant role in this context not only because of its current leading
political role within the European Union but also because of its historical baggage.
I am aware that even though the online and offline worlds are not strictly separated, there
are differences between online and offline discourse. These differences are due to technological
affordances but also related to the population who engages in online discourse. As I included but
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did not focus on demographic data since they may not represent the users’ offline identity, I
cannot draw firm conclusions about the population that engages in these types of discourses. I
also cannot deny the “digital divide” (Tagg, 2015) that most likely also exists in Germany. I am
however not interested in representing German or European society as a whole but rather in the
reaction of Twitter users to specific events and how these reactions resonate with the current rise
in xenophobia in Europe.
KhosraviNik and Unger (2016) further point to the “problem of a-historicity of the web,
because sites and texts are subject to continuous change” (p. 209). This makes replicability and
transparency of the data collection and analysis more difficult. In fact, conducting searches of the
same hashtag one month after the initial data collection showed that some tweets were no longer
available, for example because they were deleted or because the account was suspended. I hope
to minimize this issue by disclosing the data collection procedures.
A further point of consideration is non-standard orthography. Some users may
accidentally misspell a word or deliberately use non-standard orthography. Consequently, I may
have missed some tweets that were significant for the data sample. While this would mean that
the tweet is not part of the community because it does not appear under the trending topic and is
thus not visible to the common user, it is visible to the users’ followers and thus significant. For
this reason, I explored some possible misspellings, for example, “wirschafendas,” or
“MerkelTote,” however I did not find a significant amount of tweets to which this applied.
Lastly, I need to address the language of the tweets. Since most tweets were written in
German, I had to translate them into English. Translations rarely establish the exact same
connotations and associations. Therefore, I embedded each translation in a rich description and
explanation of the historical and socio-cultural context whenever necessary.
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Directions for Future Research
With this study I attempted to explore right-wing discourses and counter-discourses as
well as interactions between them during the European migrant crisis. The dataset was limited to
four hashtags and two timeframes. In order to get a more detailed picture of these discourses and
interactions, the analysis of additional hashtags and contexts is needed. For this reason, I will
expand the findings of this study by collecting and analyzing other hashtags that were trending
during the course of the European migrant crisis and hashtags that co-occurred with the hashtags
of the dataset. In my future research, I will also analyze specific user accounts such as the user
account of the far-right political party, Alternative for Germany, in order to investigate how the
party’s diction evolved over time. This is important since members of this political party take an
active role in the production and dissemination of right-wing discourses. Although Germany
played a crucial role during the European migrant crisis, the discourses present in other countries
are equally important. For this reason, I will also include additional geographical contexts both
within Europe as well as the US in my future research. In order to further explore the interaction
between users of opposing discourse communities, future research will focus not only on direct
interaction via replies but also on interactions via addressing users by username, retweets, as well
as indirect interaction via references to and addressing of constructed groups, for example, by
using relative clause constructions like those who … or group denominations such as AfD
sympathizers. Lastly, I believe it is also important to investigate migrant narratives. Studies on
right-wing discourses mostly analyze the discourse about migrants, however, we also need to
draw attention to the voices of migrants and refugees themselves and analyze their own
representation on Twitter in order to get information about how refugees process and experience
discourse about them and how they create their own narratives.
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Overall, the purpose and character of your use ☐supports fair use or ☐does not support fair use.

NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
Likely Supports Fair Use

Likely Does Not Support Fair Use

☐ Factual or nonfiction
☐ Creative or fiction
☐ Important to favored educational objectives
☐ Consumable (workbooks, tests)
☐ Published work
☐ Unpublished
Overall, the nature of the copyrighted material ☐supports fair use or ☐does not support fair use.

AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF MATERIAL USED IN RELATION TO WHOLE
Likely Supports Fair Use
Likely Does Not Support Fair Use
☐ Small amount (using only the amount
necessary to accomplish the purpose)
☐ Amount is important to favored socially
beneficial objective (i.e. educational objectives)
☐Lower quality from original (ex. Lower
resolution or bitrate photos, video, and audio)

☐ Large portion or whole work
☐ Portion used is qualitatively substantial (i.e. it
is the ‘heart of the work’)
☐Similar or exact quality of original work
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Overall, the amount and substantiality of material used in relation to the whole ☐supports fair use or
☐does not support fair use.

EFFECT ON THE MARKET FOR ORIGINAL
Likely Supports Fair Use

Likely Does Not Support Fair Use

☐ No significant effect on the market or
☐ Replaces sale of copyrighted work
potential market for the original
☐ Significantly impairs market or potential
☐ No similar product marketed by the copyright market for the work
holder
☐ Numerous copies or repeated, long-term use
☐ You own a lawfully acquired copy of the
☐ Made accessible on Web or to public
material
☐ Affordable and reasonably available
☐ The copyright holder is unidentifiable
permissions or licensing
☐ Lack of licensing mechanism for the material
Overall, the effect on the market for the original ☐supports fair use or ☐does not support fair use.

CONCLUSION
The combined purpose and character of the use, nature of the copyrighted material, amount and
substantiality of material used in relation to the whole and the effect on the market for the original
☐likely supports fair use or ☐likely does not support fair use.

Note: Should your use of copyrighted material not support fair use, you may still be able to locate and
request permissions from the copyright holder. For help on this, please feel free to contact your
Copyright Librarian.

This worksheet has been adapted from:
Cornell University's Checklist for Conducting A Fair use Analysis Before Using Copyrighted Materials:
https://copyright.cornell.edu/policies/docs/Fair_Use_Checklist.pdf
Crews, Kenneth D. (2008) Fair use Checklist. Columbia University Libraries Copyright Advisory Office.
http://copyright.columbia.edu/copyright/files/2009/10/fairusechecklist.pdf
Smith, Kevin; Macklin, Lisa A.; Gilliland, Anne. A Framework for Analyzing any Copyright Problem. Retrieved from:
https://d396qusza40orc.cloudfront.net/cfel/Reading%20Docs/A%20Framework%20for%20Analyzing%20a
ny%20Copyright%20Problem.pdf
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